1997(7) Supreme 647
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Delhi High Court)
K. Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmad and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India -Appellant
versus
M/s. Price Waterhouse & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4600 of 1997
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25231 of 1996)
Decided on 11-7-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sr. Advocate, K.K. Jain, Ajay K. Jain, Pramod Dayal and Shashi Bhushan, Advocates.
For the Respondents : P.P. Rao, Sr. Advocate and N. Ganpathy, Advocate.
Per Majority (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Held : A combined reading of relevant provisions in Section 21 and Regulation 16 does indicate that the recording of a finding of guilt or non-guilt by the Council is mandatory to take further action or to dismiss the complaint or for further process. The Council is required to consider independently the explanation submitted by the member and the evidence adduced in the enquiry before the Disciplinary Committee and the report of the Disciplinary Committee. It provides an in-built mechanism under which the Council itself is required to examine the case of professional or other misconduct of a member of the Institute or associate member, taking the aid of the report submitted by the Disciplinary Committee, the evidence adduced before the Committee and the explanation offered by the delinquent member. Entire material constitutes the record of the proceedings before the Council to reach a finding whether or not the delinquent member committed professional or other misconduct. Otherwise, the primacy accorded to the report of the Disciplinary Committee attains finality, denuding the Council of the power of discipline over the members of the Institute; that would render deleterious effect on the maintenance of discipline among the members or associate members of the Institute. (Para 13)
Further held that the view expressed by the High Court is clearly incorrect and it would defeat the object of the Act of maintaining professional standards of the professional conduct or other conduct consistent with the dignity of the profession of the accountants. We, therefore, hold that the Council has the power to call for further report from the Disciplinary Committee on non-guilt of the professional or other misconduct of the respondent. In this backdrop, the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 16 becomes relevant. In case, on the second occasion, the report of the Disciplinary Committee still holds the delinquent member not guilty, there is no option left to the Council except, by operation of proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 16 read with Section 21(2), as the Council is enjoined, to record finding of no guilt since the power of calling for further report would stand exhausted. Any other view, in our considered opinion, would defeat the object of the Act. (Para 13)
The ultimate control over conduct of the members is by the Council. The Disciplinary Committee is a fact-finding body which is a body subordinate to the Council as a fact-finding authority. If its finding of guilt or non-guilt receives finality, it denudes the Council of the power to direct further appropriate enquiry into the professional or other misconduct not adequately dealt with by the Disciplinary Committee. Similarly, the Council would be disabled to exercise effective vigil and supervision over the professional or other misconduct of the members of the Institute. The Parliament has invested that power with the Council and the construction suggested allows the tail to wag while the controlling body, the council lamentably look at it. (Para 13)
Per Minority (S. Saghir Ahmad, J.)
Held : If Sub-section (2) of Section 21 and the Proviso extracted above are read together, it will come out that if the Disciplinary Committee submits report of "not guilty", the Council has to accept this report and close the proceedings as the mandate of law is that the Council shall not record its findings contrary to the report of the Disciplinary Committee. This provision does not affect the primacy of the Council. It does not have the effect of making the Council a body subordinate to the Disciplinary Committee which remains one of the Standing Committees of the Council. Now if the President and Vice-President of the Council, who are also the President and Vice-President of the Disciplinary Committee, have together with other Members of the Committee, decided on the basis of the material on record, that the Member against whom disciplinary proceedings were initiated either on the information received by the Council or on a specific complaint made to it, that the Member is "not guilty", the same President and Vice-President sitting in the Council are required not to adopt a contrary finding but to adopt the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and close the proceedings. (Para 32)
Under the present Act and the Regulations made thereunder, the Disciplinary Committee is a Committee headed by the President of the Council who is the Chief Executive Authority of the Council under Section 12(2) and sits on the Disciplinary Committee along with the Vice-President. The highest authority of the Council, therefore, heads the Disciplinary Committee as also other Standing Committees of the Council. If, therefore, the Regulation says that where the finding of the Committee is that the Member is "not guilty", the Council shall not pass any order contrary to that finding, it is quite understandable as the Disciplinary Committee being headed by the Chief Executive Authority of the Council is not expected to overrule itself. (Para 33)
A further enquiry can be ordered only where the Disciplinary Committee has initially found the Member to be "guilty" and has recorded a finding to that effect. An order for further enquiry can be passed only on a consideration of the report of Disciplinary Committee and the representation of the Member made against such report. What is implicit in this provision is that a Member to whom a copy of the finding is furnished may have the occasion to challenge or to accept the findings. (Para 38)
Reading into the provisions that the Council has power to call for a further report even in those cases where the finding given by the Committee is that the delinquent Member is "not guilty", would amount to altering the terms of the Statute and introducing a provision which did not exist, unless it is a case of casus omissus, which, admittedly, it is not. (Para 42)
(ii) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES-Harmonious construction-All provisions to be read harmoniously to give effect to all provisions as a consistent whole rendering no part of the provisions as surplusage.
K. Ramaswamy & G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Held : It is settled rule of interpretation that all the provisions would be read together harmoniously so as to give effect to all the provisions as a consistent whole rendering no part of the provision as surplusage. Otherwise, by process of interpretation, a part of the provision or a clause would be rendered otios. (Para 13)
S. Saghir Ahmad, J.
Held : It is said that a Statute is an edict of Legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a Statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the Legislature. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the Statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the Legislature cannot be approached as the Legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the Legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or Statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making. Statute being an edict of the Legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. (Paras 43 to 45)
Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the Statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so." (Para 46)
Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been said in the Statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity, which is not the case here. (Para 48)
JUDGMENT
K. Ramaswamy, J.-Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave arises from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Delhi, made on September 12, 1996 in Civil Writ No. 676 of 1994.
3. The Export-Import Bank of India (for short, the EXIM Bank ) commissioned the services of the respondent firm to assist it in the preparation of a book entitled India - Your Software Opportunity . The need for such booklet was explained by the EXIM Bank at the inside cover of the booklet which reads as under:
"The information set out in this publication, meant for general guidance, has been complied by Price Waterhouse (India) at the instance of the Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM BANK). While the booklet is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject, the information contained is based on sources and interpretations of applicable legal provisions believed to be reliable for which, however, both EXIM Bank and Price Waterhouse (India) are unable to assume any liability. For further information, clarifications and assistance, interested parties may communicate with Price Waterhouse offices located at:
1102/1107, Raheja Chambers, Nariman Point, Bombay- 400 021.
Telephones : 235138/2870466, Talex : (011) 5791.
B-102, Himalaya House, 23, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi - 110 001.
Telephones : 3313591/3312856. Telex : (031) 63070."
4. The appellant-Council had treated the said publication as amounting to solicitation of professional attainments, violating clauses (6) and (7) of Part I of First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (for short, the Act ) and called upon the respondent by proceedings dated December 13, 1990 to send the name of the members who were answerable to the charge of misconduct. On January 28, 1991, respondent No. 2, Shri Amal Ganguli, partner of the first respondent filed his written statement. On consideration therefore, by proceedings dated 5-6th August, 1991, the Council prima facie opined that the second respondent was guilty of professional and/or other misconduct and referred the case to the Disciplinary Committee for enquiry and report. The Disciplinary Committee submitted its report on January 16, 1993. The Disciplinary Committee sent a copy of the report to the second respondent informing him that if he so desired, he may send his representation against the said report within 30 days. By further letter dated July 8, 1993, It was communicated to him that the report of the Disciplinary Committee would be considered by the Council in its meeting from August 5 to 7, 1993 and that he can appear in person or through a member. On August 5, 1993, he sent a letter stating that the report of the Disciplinary Authority may be accepted. On the even date, the Council, after considering the report dated January 16, 1993 and the written submissions of the second respondent dated 5, 1993 came to the conclusion that further enquiry was necessary and decided that the further enquiry should be made by the Disciplinary Committee. It was communicated to him by letter dated December 21, 1993. On receipt thereof, the from respondent on February 2, 1994, filed the above writ petition in the High Court challenging the power of the Council to refer the matter to Disciplinary Committee for further enquiry. The High Court in the impugned judgment opined that by operation of the Regulation 16 made under the Act, the Council was devoid of the power to direct the Disciplinary Committee to hold further enquiry. Accordingly, it quashed the letter dated December 21, 1993 and allowed the writ petition. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
5. Shri Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that the view taken by the Division Bench in not correct in law. Section 21 of the Act read with Regulation 16(3) and (4) gives power to the Council to direct the Disciplinary Committee, which is a fact-finding committee, to make further enquiry and to submit a report. The power under Section 21(2) of
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