1998 Supreme(SC) 155

1998(3) Supreme 244
Supreme Court of India
(From Karnataka High Court)
S.B. Majmudar & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
R. Rudraiah & Anr. -Appellants
versus
State of Karnataka & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 561-562 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14405-06 of 1989)
Decided on 4-2-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : P. Krishnamurthy, N.S. Hegde, Sr. Advo­cates, (R.S. Hedge) Advocate for K.R. Nagaraja, P. Mahale, P.P. Singh, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar, Advocates.

Headnote:(i) Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961-Sections 48A-Limita­tion for filing application for occupancy right-After 1978 amendment deleting proviso to Section 48A power to condone delay not available-Amendment took away power of condonation of delay-Section 48A is not capable of more than one interpretation. (Para 17)

       Held : Comparing the unamended Section 48-A with the amended Section 48-A set out above, it will be noticed that the above proviso was deleted by the Amending Act 1/1979 with effect from 1.3.1979. Thereafter to obviate hardship, 6 months time was given from date of commencement of Section 1 of the Amending Act, 6 months from 1.1.1979, i.e. upto 30.6.1979. It is obvious that by deleting the provisions relating to the power to condone the delay for sufficient cause, the Legislature had clearly intended to do away with the said power of condonation of the Tribunal. It was in fact so held by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Virupaxappa v. Land Tribunal, 1980(2) Kar.L.J. 428. This view, in our opinion, is quite correct. If therefore the Legislature wanted to make a deliberate departure and introduced an amendment to take away the power of condonation of delay, it is difficult to accept the contention that Section 48-A is capable of more than one interpreta­tion-one leading to injustice and another permitting avoidance of such injustice to tenants and that the Court should opt for a liberal interpretation. Another reason for rejecting the appellant’s contention is that we have also to give importance to the words ‘save as provided in the Act’, occurring in Section 48-A. It is no where else provided in the Land Reforms Act, 1961 that the period fixed for tenant to file an application under Section 45 gets extended. None has been brought to our notice. In our view Section 48-A, as amended, has fixed a specific date for the making of an application by a simple rule of arithmetic, and there is therefore no scope for implying any `ambigui­ty’ at all. (Paras 16, 17 & 18)

       (ii) Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961-Section 45 read with Section 48A and Village Offices (Abolition Act) 1961-Application for occupancy right-Limitation-Application ought to have been filed on 30.6.1979 but actually filed on 7.3.1984-Plea that there existed dispute under Village Office Abolition Act over regrant of land in question between heirs of original occupant to whom it was emolument attached to vil­lage office-Contention that limitation to file application under did not start until adjudication of that dispute-Not sustainable-Appli­cation barred by limitation.

       Held : It is true that Form 7 framed for purposes of filing an applica­tion by the tenant under Section 45 (read with Section 48-A and Rule 19(1)) of the Land Reforms Act, 1961, requires in the first column that the ‘name of landlord/landlords’ and their address to be given. But, on the facts of this case, if after 1.1.1979 when fresh period of limitation was given upto 30.6.1979-the 1st appellant did want to file an application, he could have mentioned in the above column that the landlord, according to him was Narasimha Moorthi (on his death, Kittamma). He could have also stated by way of a Note that there was a dispute raised by Laxmi Narasappa and Prahlada Rao and that they had two shares out of the land and that the said question was pending in proceedings under Section 5 of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Further, even if it was not possible to add such a Note, there is a clear provision in Section 48-A read with Rule 19(1) for a public notice in Form 8 addressed to all other persons entitled to be regis­tered as occupants under Section 45 and to all landlords of such lands and all other persons interested in such lands. Unfortunately, the 1st appellant did not avail of such a procedure which was clearly avail­able and permissible. We may also state that in an application under Section 45 as presented in Form 7, the tenant who claims occupancy rights must prove his possession as tenant before 1.3.1974. Even if the names of landlords are not known, the provision for public notice protects the rights of natural justice of landlords or persons inter­ested in the land, whose names are not known to the tenant applicant and not shown in Form 7. There is therefore no such difficulty as imagined by the 1st appellant in the matter of filing an application under Form 7 before 30.6.1979. (Paras 21 & 22)

       It is true that under Section 4(1) of the Village Offices Aboli­tion Act, 1961 it is stated that “all village offices shall be and are hereby abolished” and Section 4(3) says that land attached to the office “be and is hereby resumed”. It is true that Section 5 provides for re-grant of land so resumed to the holder of the village office. Here what is important to notice is the language employed in sub-clause (3) of Section 4 which deals with resumption as compared of the language employed later in Section 5(3) of the same Act. In other words, the resumption is not absolute but subject to the provision relating to re-grant to erstwhile office holders as in Sec­tion 5 and other types of re-grant in Sections 6 and 7. Section 5(1) deals with re-grant to the office holders and procedure to be follo­wed by them to pay the occupancy-price and upon such payment on or before the date stated in the provision, the holder “shall be deemed to be an occupant or holder or a ryotwari patta” and under Section 4(2), if he does not pay the occupancy price within the prescribed period, he shall be summarily evicted. Therefore, on abolition and resumption, the erstwhile office holder continues in occupation of the land which previously was attached to his office and with a right to have his claim for re-grant considered. If he does not pay the occupancy price then he can be evicted. Of course, if he is not re-granted the land, he has any way to vacate. (Para 24)

       On a comparison of language employed by the legislature in Section 4(3) of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 which only speaks of resumption subject to re-grant under Sections 5, 6 and 7 with the language employed in Section 5(3) which speaks of ‘vesting in the State Government free of all encumbrances”, it is clear that by mere resumption under Section 4(3) subject to Sections 5, 6 and 7, it was not intended by the legislature to equate conditional resumption with absolute vesting of the land in the Government free from all encum­brances so as to be treated as ‘government land’. In fact, because of the restriction imposed by Section 4(3) that resumption is subject to Sections 5, 6 and 7, the land resumed under Section 4(3) cannot be allotted for general or public purposes but remains strictly earmarked for re-grant and is liable to be re-granted under Sections 5, 6 and 7. On the other hand, land coming under Section 5(3) where it vests in government, free from all encumbrances, is clearly ‘government land’ and is at the disposal of government for all public purposes. There­fore, on resumption under Section 4(3) the land has not become ‘govern­ment land’. (Para 26)

       Section 107 says that the Land Reforms Act does not apply to ‘govern­ment lands’. This is however subject to the provisions of Section 110. Under Section 110, Government may ‘by notification’ direct that any land covered by Sections 107 and 108 shall not be exempt from such of the provisions of this Act from which they have been exempted under the said Section. Reading the section, it appears that there are good reasons of policy as to why, under Section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, government land is exempt. Firstly the section takes notice of the fact that when ceiling on land held by various bodies is to be imposed, such a ceiling cannot be imposed on land held by Government or certain other enumerated bodies. Government ‘right to hold land’ cannot be limited, inasmuch as government does require lakhs of acres for use for public purposes. Further there is no purpose in taking over excess land from State Government and again revesting the said land in the State Government. Again the policy of the legislature appears to be, so far as Chapter III of the Act and amendments thereto are concerned, that tenants from Government are not entitled to claim occupancy under Section 45 of the Act against the Government, even if they were in possession before 1.3.1974. We shall first assume that the contention of the 1st appellant that upon ‘resumption’ under Section 4(3) of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 the land held by the erstwhile office holder had become ‘government land’ is correct. The position then will be that if, as a matter of policy the provisions of Section 107 of the Land Reforms Act, 1961 right from 2.10.1965 when the said Act came into force, were not to be applied to such lands, then Sections 45 and 48-A substituted by Act 1 of 1974 w.e.f. 1.3.1974 or as they now stand, would not also apply, even after 1.1.79 or 30.6.79. Therefore such tenants cannot seek occupancy or ownership rights in lands held by government, even after 1.1.79. No application under Section 45 would be maintainable and the very application of the appellant would have to be dismissed on that ground, whether filed in 1974 or 1979 or later. This contention of the appellants appears to have been advanced without noticing that it is clearly self-destructive. Further, even if the land had become ‘government land’, on resump­tion, there is no procedure for change of ownership from government land to the erstwhile-holder of village office outside Section 4(3) so as to permit a contention that the land ceased to be government land. There can be a cessation of the land as government land under Section 107 only if government proceeds to exclude by notification under Section 110 such land from the purview of Section 107. It is no body’s case that after a decision as to who is entitled to re-grant under Section 5 of the Village Offices (Abolition) Act, 1961, government is to issue a notification under Section 110 excluding the land so re-granted from the purview of ‘government land’. Hence the entire theory based on Section 107 propounded by the appellant does not fit into the scheme of the Land Reforms Abolition Act, 1961. (Paras 27 to 30)

       (iii) Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961-Section 126 read with Village Offices (Abolition) Act, 1961-Amendment to Section 126 to include tenants referred to in Section 8 of Village Offices (Abo­lition Act) is clari­ficatory or decla­ratory. (Para 34)