Important Point
The Tribunal was justified in its direction to the State that respondent be promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country Planning quashing the charge memo dated 31.7.95 on ground of delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings and ignoring charge memos dated 27.10.95 and 1.6.96 as per recommendation of DPC.

Headnote:Service Jurisprudence-Question of promotion of respondent to the category of Director of Town and Country Planning-His name had been included in the panel prepared by the DPC-But denied on the ground that the disciplinary enquiry initiated against him had not yet been terminated-Petition to Administrative Tribunal-Tribunal holding that the delay vitiated the disciplinary proceedings and directed that respondent be promoted ignoring the charge memos-Whether justified? (Yes) (A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1963 and 1991-Rules 19 and 20 respectively) Case Law discussed.
       Held : It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. (Para 19)
       Held further : In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without particularizing the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau had pointed out that no witnesses had been examined before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had been appointed one after the other, had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody’s case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. The Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos. (Para 20)
       Held finally : Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal. It is dismissed with costs. (Para 21)

Judgment

Wadhwa, J.-Against the judgment dated December 12, 1996 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, in O.A. No. 2239/96, filed by the respondent, the State of Andhra Pradesh has come up in appeal. By the impugned judgment the Tribunal allowed the petition of the respondent and directed that the respondent be promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country Planning, in the existing vacancy, ignoring the charge memos - (1) Memo No. 2732/FL/87/27/MA, dated July 31, 1995; (2) Memo No. 145/B2/93-19/MA, dated October 27, 1995; and (3) Memo No. 898/B.2/94/M.A. dated June 1, 1996, if the respondent is otherwise eligible. The Tribunal found that the Departmental Promotion Committee met on August 16, 1995 and prepared the panel for the panel year 1994-95, which was approved by the State Government in October, 1995. One of the persons included in the panel was promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country Planning by G.O.M. dated November 14, 1995. The Tribunal observed that the panel itself having been prepared on August 16, 1995 should lapse only on December 31, 1996 and not on December 31, 1995 as was contended by the State. The name of the respondent was included in the panel. The Tribunal, therefore, held that since the panel would lapse only on December 31, 1996 the respondent was entitled for promotion before that date. The Tribunal also noticed that the objection of the State that the panel lapsed on December 31, 1995 was never raised either before it or in the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition filed by the State against an interim order earlier made by the Tribunal.

2. Tribunal was concerned with the question if promotion of the respondent could be denied to him after his name had been included in the panel prepared by the DPC on the ground that the disciplinary inquiry initiated against him had not yet been terminated. The respondent had submitted before the Tribunal that the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 was served upon him just before the meeting of the DPC only to deprive him his claim of promotion and further that the charge memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996 being subsequent to the date of meeting of DPC could not be taken into consideration for promoting him to the post of Director, Town and Country Planning. Tribunal noticed that the memo dated July 31, 1995 related to the incidents that happened in the years 1978, 1979 and 1984, which were also the subject-matter of the memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987. While the memo No. 1412 had been issued under Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1963 (for short “1963 Rules”) that dated July 31, 1995 was issued under Rule 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 (for short “1991 Rules”). Earlier memo No. 1412 was neither cancelled nor annulled before issuance of memo dated July 31, 1995 and the Tribunal was of the view that because of this circumstance memo dated July 31, 1995 could not have been issued and inquiry should have proceeded under the old Rules after the Inquiry Officer had been appointed.

3. State has contended before us that the Tribunal wrongly assumed that the charges communicated to the respondent on July 31, 1995 were belated and not only that it quashed that charge memo but also other charge memos when there was no challenge to that. Merely on the ground of delay the Tribunal should not have conferred unwanted benefits on the respondent. It was submitted that the whole approach of the Tribunal in giving relief to the respondent had been the delay in not concluding the inquiry in furtherance to the charge memo. It may, however, be noticed that the respondent did not seek setting aside of the memo dated July 31, 1995 and that dated December 27, 1995. The Tribunal only quashed memo dated July 31, 1995 and as regards memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996, it said that the State might proceed against the respondent for taking action as per law but the

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1998 Supreme(SC) 465

Cases Referred (2)