Judgment

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J:- It is more than 12 years since this court declared in Hussain Ara Khaton, (1979) 3 SCR169 that right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Art.21. Many a decision thereafter re-affirmed the principle. There has never been a violation of this right entails quashing of charges and/or conviction . It is however, contended now before us that no such fundamental right flows from Article 21. At any rate, it is argued, it is only a facet of fair and reasonable procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and nothing more. It is also argued that violation of this right does not result in quashing of the charges and/or conviction. It is submitted that the right, if all there is one, is an amorphos one, a right which is something less than other fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution. On the other hand, proponents of the right want us to go to a step forward and prescribe a time limit being which no criminal proceeding should be allowed to go on. Without such a limit, they say, the right remains a mere illusion and a platitude. Proponents of several view points have put forward their respective contentions. We had the benefit of elaborate arguments addressed by counsel on both sides of the spectrum. A large number of cases have been cited. Different view points have been presented. We shall refer to them at the appropriate stage. First, how these matters have come to be posted before the Constitution Bench.

2. Writ Petition No. 268/87 and a few other criminal appeals came up before a Division Bench when it was urged for the accused that a time limit be fixed for concluding all criminal proceedings. Without such a time limit, it was argued, the guarantee of right to speedy trial will remain a mere platitude. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the said contention "raises a very important constitutional question" which " is likely to arise more often in many cases and that, the decision on the question will have far-reaching consequences in tens of thousands of criminal cases pending in courts all over the country". Accordingly, the Bench directed the cases to be placed before a Constitution Bench. Subsequently, other cases too were added. Though several cases are posted before us, we indicated to the counsel that we will not enter into or investigate the factual aspects in all the cases but shall take the facts of only the first two cases. We indicated that we will dispose of these two cases, namely, W.P. No. 268 of 1987 (Ranjan Dwivedi v. State) and W.P. No. 833 of 1990 (A. R. Antulay v. State) and relegate the other cases to a Division Bench, after laying down the appropriate principles. We shall first notice the facts of these two cases before we advert to respective contentions of the parties.

FACTS IN W.P. No. 833/90

3. The petitioner in W.P.No. 833 of l990, A.R. Antulay was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra from 1980 to January, 1982. The complainant/respondent R. S. Nayak moved the Governor of Maharashtra by his application dated September 1, 1981 requesting him to grant sanction to prosecute the accused-petitioner as required by Section 6 Of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as1947 Act) for various offences alleged to have been committed by him. Without waiting for the Governors response on his application he filed a complaint in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay on September 11, 1981 (Criminal Case No. 76 (Misc.)/ 81) against the accused and some others. His case was that the petitioner-accused was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21, I.P.C. and that he has committed several offences punishable under Sections 161, 165, I.P.C. and Section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as also under Sections 383 and 420, I.P.C. read with Sections 109 and 120-B, 1. P.C. The learned Magistrate called upon the complainant to satisfy him as to how the complaint is maintainable without a valid sanction required by Section 6 of