1998 Supreme(SC) 1231

1998(9) Supreme 415
Supreme Court of India
(From Bombay High Court)
S.B. Majmudar & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
M/s. Savita Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. —Appellant
versus
Dyes & Chemical Workers Union & Anr. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 10611 of 1995
Decided on 11-12-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : M.C. Bhandare and N.B. Shettye, Sr. Advocates, Sushil Kumar Jain, A.P. Dhamija, Pradeep Aggarwal, Umesh Bohare, A. Mishra, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Ms. Anitha Shenoy and Sanjay Parikh, Advocates.

Important Points
1. Strike notice u/s 24 Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices need not necessarily be typed in prescribed Form 1 read with Rule 22. If the notice fulfils the basic requirements of Form 1 merely because it was not in Form 1 strike cannot be invalidated on ground it was violative of Section 24(1)(a).
2. Grievance about non-implementa­tion of crystallised terms of settle­ment cannot be said to be ‘matter covered by settlement’ for purpose of definition of illegal strike.
3. Extreme step of strike without following remedy under Section 28 of Maha­rashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act to get adjudicated unfair labour practice per se would not invalidate strike unless it falls within fore-corners of Section 24(1)(i).

Headnote:(i) Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 —Sections 24(1)(a) and 25—Maha­rashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Rules, 1975—Rule 22 — Strike — Legality of—Charter of demands served by union stating therein on expiry of 14 days workmen would go on strike—Demand letter stated it should be treated as strike notice—Reply notice by Factory Manager—Workmen going on strike as proposed in demand notice—Plea of Management that strike notice not legal and void as notice of strike was not in prescribed Form— Unions stand that requirements of prescribed notice as per Form-1 read with Rule 22 complied with— Held: Notice of strike need not necessarily be typed in same sequence in which Form-1 is drafted or that it must mention Section 24(1)—Notice must fulfil basic requirements of pre­scribed form—Notice in question mentioned name and address of Trade Union, date of notice indicated, nature of addressee and address mentioned and from which date strike is proposed to be resorted clear­ly mentioned, reason for proposed strike also mentioned—All basic requirements of Form-1 have been complied with —Merely on ground notice of strike was not in prescribed Form-1 strike cannot be invali­dated.

       Held : The Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975 are for guidance of the Labour Courts and for regulating the practice and procedure of these courts. Thus, Rules 50 and 51 which are part and parcel of these rules, cannot have anything to do with the format of the notice of strike which a union has to give to the management as per Section 24(1)(a). Prescribed format for the purpose of the said provision will necessarily be as per Form-I as was laid down by Rule 22 of the Rules framed by the State Govt. Rules 50 and 51 of the Labour Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1975 are, therefore, totally redundant and irrelevant for resolving this controversy. (Para 13)

       A mere look at the said Form-I shows that the notice must contain, amongst others, the following basic requirements:

        (i) The name of the Trade Union giving notice, its address and the date of the notice;

        (ii) The name of the employer and full address of the undertaking for which the notice is meant;

        (iii) Clear indication in the notice about the call for strike of the workmen employed in the undertaking and the date from which the strike is to be resorted to;

        (iv) and the reasons for the proposed strike.

       It is easy to visualise that if all the aforesaid four requirements are fulfilled, in substance, the basic requirements of Form-I would get satisfied. It is not as if that the notice must be typed in the same sequence in which Form-I is drafted or that it must mention Section 24(1). The latter are mere formal requirements. In substance, the notice must fulfil the aforesaid basic requirements of the prescribed form. If they are fulfilled, which section of the Act applies to such notice can be easily found out by reference to the Act. Similarly, whether notice is given by registered post or by hand delivery is also not a basic requirement. It refers to mode of service. (Para 13)

       In the present case, it is not in dispute that notice was duly served on the management. Sending of copies of notice to men­tioned persons is also not a part of the basic requirement of the notice. When we examine the impugned strike notice, we find that all these four basic requirements of Form-I have been complied with in the present case. The name and address of the Trade Union which served the notice was clearly mentioned, the date of the notice is also indicated, the nature of the addressee of the notice and his address are also mentioned, namely, it has been addressed to the Factory Manager of the company who was in-charge of the company at the rele­vant time and under whom the workmen proposing to go on strike were actually working. It is also clearly mentioned as to from which date the strike is proposed to be resorted to, as it is mentioned that the strike would be resorted to on the expiry of 14 days from the date of the receipt of the letter cum notice. It is also clearly mentioned that the letter will be treated as notice for going on proposed strike. Then follows the heart of the notice, namely, reasons why the proposed strike has to be resorted. Thus, all the basic requirements of Form-I have been satisfied. Even the Labour Court took the view that the substance of the notice had to be seen and not its form. Still, however, its persuaded itself to hold that the notice was not in the prescribed form. The said finding of the Labour Court was patently illegal and was rightly reversed by the High Court in the impugned judgment. (Para 13)

       The argument that it was not mentioned in the notice that the union being a recognised union has obtained the vote of majority of the members to go on strike and therefore requirements of Form-1 was not complied with could not be accepted. It must be kept in view that this clause 2 of Form-I being an asterisk which says that any portion which is not applicable has to be struck off when not applicable. It was not the case of the appellant at any time that Res­pondent No. 1 Union was a recognised union under the Act having followed the requirements and had obtained the certificate of a recognised union under Section 12 of the Act. On the contrary, when we turn to the application filed by the appellant before the Labour Court, we find that it was the case of the appellant itself before the Labour Court that the Union was a registered Union and claimed to represent the employees employed by the applicant in the said factory. It was not the case of the appellant before the Labour Court in the application Under Section 25 that Respondent No. 1 Union was a recognised union under the Act. Not only that, the application sought to invoke only Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharash­tra Act and did not invoke Section 24(1)(b) of the Act which deals with a recognised union. It is also the case of Respondent No. 1 that it is not a recognised union under the Act. Thus, it was almost an admitted position on the record before the Labour Court that Respondent No. 1 Union was not a recognised union under the Act. Once that conclusion is reached, it becomes obvious that paragraph 2 of the Form-I did not apply to the facts of the present case and had to be treated to have been struck-off for the purpose of issuing strike notice by Respondent No. 1 Union to the appellant company. Consequent­ly, the finding of the Labour Court that the impugned notice was not in a prescribed form and therefore, would result in the strike of 30th March, 1983 onwards becoming an illegal strike being contrary to Section 24(1)(a) of the Maha­rashtra Act must be held to be patently erroneous and was rightly set aside by the High Court in writ juris­diction. It must, therefore, be held that the impugned notice of strike was not violative of the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act. It must be held that the said notice was a per­fectly valid strike notice as required by the said provision read with Rule 22 and Form-I of the relevant M.R.T. and P.U.L.P. Rules, 1975. (Para 13)

       (ii) Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 —Section 24(1)(b)—Strike—Legality of—Declaration sought that strike was illegal on ground strike was contrary to provisions of Section 25(1)(a) and (i)—Plea before Sup­reme Court notice violated provisions of Section 25(1)(b)—Labour Court had no occasion to consider question now raised—Management cannot be permitted to impugned notice on ground it violated Section 24(1)(b). (Paras 13 & 14)

       (iii) Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 —Section 24(1)(i)—Illegal strike—Strike in respect of matter covered by subsisting settlement—Grievance about non-implementation of crystallised terms of settlement cannot be said to be matter covered by settlement for purposes of definition of ille­gal strike—Extreme step of strike without following remedy under Section 28 to get adjudicated unfair labour practice per se would not invalidate strike—Strike resor­ted to raising demand on the issue of computation of privilege leave—Settle regarding privilege leave was subsisting Management’s plea was that strike was illegal—Unions stand was that matter in issue not covered by settlement.

       Held : The question is whether any part of this settlement on privilege leave was sought to be by-passed or challenged in the impugned notice so as to get voided on the touch­stone of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act. The said provision lays down that “Illegal strike” means a strike which is commenced or continued during any period in which any settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award. The question is whether the proposed strike, amongst others, was concern­ing the grievances in connection with any matter “covered” by the settlement. A conjoint reading of relevant clauses of settlement on demand No. 14 regarding Privilege Leave shows that it was settled between the parties that during the continuation of the settlement, a workman would be entitled to claim only 12 days for 240 days of work and 1 day for every additional 12 days of work beyond 240 days thereafter in a given year. It was not the case of Respondent No. 1 Union in the impugned notice of strike that they wanted any more days of privilege leave after 240 days of work in a year by way of grant of privilege leave vis-a-vis the number of days worked during the year. The impugned strike notice, as noted earlier, recited an entirely different grievance, namely, that there were illegal changes brought about in the matter of computing privilege leave. Actual and correct computation of privilege leave on the basis of actual days worked in a year for concerned workers was not covered by the terms of the settle­ment. This grievance pertained to non-implementation of the agreed settlement regarding privilege leave and had nothing to do with the claim for any extra privilege leave in addition to that which was agreed to between the parties. To take an analogy, the rights crysta­llised in the decree stand on an entirely different footing as compared to the grievance in execution proceedings regarding non-implementation of the settled rights under the decree. The grievance made in the impugned strike notice did not pertain to any modification of the crystallised rights regarding privilege leave granted to the workmen under the settlement but it pertained to an entirely different griev­ance based on a situation which was posterior to settlement of rights and obligations regarding privilege leave between the parties. Thus, as seen earlier, this grievance about non-implementation of the crystal­lised terms of settlement cannot be said to be a matter “covered” by the settlement for purposes of the definition of “illegal strike”, referred to above. It can be said to be amounting to a grievance in connection with non-implementation of the settlement in its true and correct perspective. That, of course, would also amount to allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer as reflected by a conjoint reading of Section 26 and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act, as noted earlier. But the allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of the management has nothing to do with the question whether it also amounts to going behind the settlement. Thus, the strike notice referred to a claim which arose subsequent to the settlement in con­nection with non-implementation of the main terms of the settlement. The Labour Court was patently in error when it took the view that because of the alternative remedy available to the workmen of filing a complaint about alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the management, they could not have resorted to a more drastic remedy of strike under the provisions of the Maharashtra Act. Nothing in this Act could be relied upon to show that if any grievance of the workmen is covered by unfair labour practice alleged against the employer, they cannot resort to strike. (Para 15)

       Such a drastic remedy is of the last resort. When a less drastic remedy is available, the workmen should have resorted to the same for maintaining industrial peace and production. However, that would be in the realm of trade union policy. It may be more prudent for a union of workmen, with a view to having industrial peace and continued production as well as for not disrupting continui­ty of employment of workmen, to resort to negotiations, and that if needed, to go in the Labour Court with complaint under Section 28 on the ground of unfair labour practice by the employer for the alleged non-implementation of the settlement. It may also be an ideal solution of the problems. But what is ideal may not necessarily be filed by a more militant body of workmen. It may in the long run, prove to be a more drastic remedy for the workmen as they would suffer pangs of unemployment and starvation not only for themselves but also for the members of their families. But only because such better and more prudent remedy was available, it cannot be said that the extreme step of strike resorted to by the Union by not following such remedy was per se illegal unless it fell within the fore-corners of Section 24(1)(i) of the Maha­rashtra Act. It is also easy to visualise that the same Maharashtra legislature which enacted Section 24(1)(i) also enacted Schedule IV Item 9 by treating it to be an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer. The Maharashtra Act laid down two separate provisions in connection with illegal strike as well as unfair labour practice by the employer. What is unfair labour practice on the part of the employer cannot be pressed in service by the management to show that workers making grievances regarding the same could not have resorted to the strike in connection with the same unfair labour practice and if they did so the strike only on that score became an illegal, strike, especially when it was not contrary to any of the provisions of Section 24(1). In any case, the grievance regarding non-implementation of the settlement is not treated by the legislature to be a matter “covered” by the settlement as both these topics are separately dealt with it by enacting Section 24(1)(i) on the one hand and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act on the other. (Para 15)

       The intention of the legislature by enacting 24(1)(i) is that during any period in which any settlement is in operation if strike is resorted to by the union or the workmen in connection with any matter “covered” by the settlement the strike would be illegal. Therefore, it must be shown that the strike has been resorted to in connection with any matter covered by the settlement. It, therefore, necessarily means that the terms of the settlement, when read, must indicate that they encompassed any matter which is made the subject matter of the strike notice. We must see the express terms of settlement with a view to finding out as to which matters are covered by the settlement. This necessarily would connote that the settlement in express terms must refer to a matter which is subsequently made a subject matter of notice of strike. (Para 16)

       (iv) Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 —Section 24(1)(i)—Illegal strike—Matters covered by settlement or award—Meaning of.

       Held : The phrase “covered by the settlement” as found in the said clause of Section 24 is not defined by the Act nor it is defined by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 or by the Central Act, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We can, therefore, turn to the general dictionary meaning of the term “covered”. When we under­take this exercise, we find the term “cover” defined by Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition at page 219 to mean, amongst others, “include, comprise, deal with”. It is pertinent to note that the legislature in its wisdom has not construed a strike to be illegal if the same is resorted to during any period of settlement which is in operation, in respect of any of the matters “arising out of such settlement”. The term “covered” is more restrictive in nature as compared to the term “arising out of” or “referable to”. If the phra­seology employed in the said provision was to the effect “any of the matters “arising out of” or “referable to any settlement”, learned senior counsel for the appellant would have been right in his conten­tion that implementation of the settlement also would be a matter “arising out of” the settlement or may be “referable to” the settle­ment. But these words are conspicuously absent and only the phrase “matters covered by the settlement” has been employed by the legislature to treat any strike regarding such covered matters in a settlement to amount to an illegal strike. The term “arising from” has also a precise meaning as found at page 46 of the aforesaid Concise Oxford Dictionary which states that the word “arise” means “originate; be born; come into notice or result (from out of)”. Question of imple­mentation of the terms of settlement may be said to be a matter “arising out of” the settlement or “referable to” the settlement but it is certainly not “covered” by the settlement. Therefore, it is far from being “covered” by the settlement. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 99 the term “arising out of” has been indicated to have a special meaning relating to a decision in the case of Newman v. Bennett (Kansas Reports). It has been mentioned in the said dic­tionary that the “words “arising out of employment” refer to the origin of the cause of the injury”. Thus, the term “arising out of employment” in this case was held to refer to a grievance whose origin was found in the employment concerned as noted in this diction­ary. Similarly, if the words “arising out of settlement” were employed by the legislature in the aforesaid clause, then it could have been said that any grievance regarding non-implementation of the terms of the settlement would have its origin in the settlement. However, as such a phraseology is conspicuously absent in the said clause, it must be held that the legislature in its wisdom wanted to indicate a situa­tion where parties to the binding settlement cannot resort to strike or lock-out, as the case may be, in connection with these matters which were not expressly so covered and referred to in the settlement and thus matters which were expressly not so covered could be made the subject matter of grievance by the parties concerned during the arriv­ing of such settlement and if a strike is resorted to by the union of workmen on that ground, it could not be said that the said strike would be hit by the provisions of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act. (Para 16)

       (v) Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 —Section 24(1)(i)—Illegal strike—Strike in respect of matter covered by settlement—Settlement in question pro­vided for medical check-up to workmen who got afflicted occupational ailments—Demand notice for prevention medical check-up—Strike in that respect—Not illegal—Matter in issue not covered by settlement. (Para 17)