1999 Supreme(SC) 11

1999(1) Supreme 236
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
S.B. Majmudar & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
State of Andhra Pradesh -Appellant
versus
Vatsavyi Kumara Venkata Krishna Verma -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 272 of 1983
Decided on 6-1-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Anil Kumar Tandale, Advocate.
For the Respondent : P.S.R. Murthy, Ms. Sudha Gupta and B. Kanta Rao, Advocates.

Important Points
1. Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act, 1973 is pari materia with Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure; while exercising pari materia jurisdiction under Section 21, the High Court cannot interfere with pure findings of fact reached by the Appellate Tribu­nal.
2. Before any transaction is upheld under Section 7(1) of the Act, it is to be shown that the transfer was not only genuine but also had to be effected for some compelling reason and was backed up by some sort of necessity.

Headnote:(i) Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Hold­ings) Act, 1973-Section 21-Revision-Scope of jurisdiction of High Court-Section 21 is pari materia with Section 115 of CPC-Jurisdic­tion u/s 21 is not appellate jurisdiction-Pure finding of fact reached by lower authority cannot be interfered with.

       Held : A mere look at the Section 21 shows that it is pari materia with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is identically word­ed. So far as Section 115 is concerned, the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction under the said Section as conferred on the High Court is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court. It is obvious that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC or for that matter under pari materia provision of Section 21 of the Act is not an appellate jurisdiction and pure finding of fact reached by the court of appeal could not be interfered with. The Court can interfere in revision only when it is satisfied that the findings reached by the court below suffer from any jurisdictional errors. In this connection, we may usefully refer to two decisions of this Court. In the case of Hari Shankar & Ors. v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury reported in AIR 1963 SC 698, Hidayatullah, J. speaking for two other learned Judges distinguished revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC with revisional jurisdiction under other Acts which conferred wider jurisdiction on the High Court. (Paras 11 & 12)

       While exercising pari materia jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act, the High Court could not have interfered with pure findings of fact reached by the Appellate Tribunal. It cannot be said that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to take a contrary view than the view taken by the Land Reforms Tribunal in connection with the legality and genuineness of the said four transactions entered into by the respondent and his wife. The findings of fact reached by the final court of fact could not have been set aside by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the High Court has acted in a more liberal way and accordingly the decision rendered by the High Court may not be interfered with. That might have been the earlier approach of the High Court but once the question is raised before us we cannot ignore the limited scope and ambit of Section 21 of the Act as enacted by the Legislature. (Para 14)

       The attempt made by learned counsel for the respondent to enlarge the scope of Section 21 of the Act by resorting to rule 17(2) of the A.P. Land Reforms Rules also cannot be of any avail. A mere look at the said rule shows that it deals with the procedure in filing revision applications to the High Court under Section 21 of the Act. So far as the first part of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 is concerned, it deals with the period for filing applications in the High Court and the amount of court fees to be affixed. So far as sub-rule (2) is con­cerned, it says that the rules issued by the High Court from time to time for filing applications for revision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the revision under Section 21 of the Act. Therefore, the procedure laid down by the Appellate Side Rules for filing revision application under Section 115, CPC or under any other Act may apply to revision application under Section 21 of the Act. It is obvious that by such procedural rules, the scope and ambit of Section 21 as enacted by the Legislature cannot either be extended nor can be curtailed. (Paras 15 & 16)

       (ii) Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Hold­ings) Act, 1973-Section 7 read with Section 21-Transfer effected in anticipa­tion of/with a view to avoiding or defeating object of law -Four sale deeds executed bet­ween 24.1.1971 and 2.5.1972-Land Reform Tribunal held that transactions not hit by Section 7-Appellate Tribunal came to conclusion that sales were in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding provisions of Act though two of the transactions were genuine-Tribu­nal rejected plea that sales were necessitated for purpose of construction of house-High Court, however held that trans­actions were not hit by Section 7-Not sustainable-Factual findings of Appellate Tribunal that transfers were in anticipation of and to avoid provisions of Act were based on relevant evidence-High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction under Section 21-Judgment of High Court set aside.

       Held : Before any transaction is upheld under Section 7(1) of the Act, it is to be shown that the transfer was not only genuine but also had to be effected for some compelling reason and was backed up by some sort of necessity. (Para 18)

       All these transactions were scrutinised by the Appellate Tribunal and it came to the conclusion that the first two transactions entered into by the respondent were nominal in nature and the last two transactions which were entered into by respondent’s wife though were genuine were not backed up by any real necessity and therefore, they could be said to have been entered into with a view to circumvent the provisions of the Ceiling Act. In view of the fact that these four transactions were entered into by the respondent and his wife in a span of only 15 days and that too one of them was in favour of the respondent’s own father and again three of them pertain to wet lands which are naturally more valuable than dry lands as found by the Appellate Tribunal and by the last one large areas of dry land was tried to be shielded off, they were rightly held to be effected by the declarant and his wife in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding and defeating the provisions of the Ceiling Act. These factual find­ings cannot be said to be in any way uncalled for or not based on relevant evidence. These findings were clearly supported by evidence on record. The case of the respondent that out of the sale consideration obtained from these four transactions a house was con­structed at Kakinada was rightly rejected by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the respondent himself had given facility to the vendee of some of the transactions to pay up the consideration money by instalments, spread over years and even the permission to construct the house was obtained years thereafter in 1973-74 and the respondent constructed the house only in 1975. Therefore, there was no real nexus between the sale deeds and the necessity to construct the house. Hence, the finding reached by the Appellate Tribunal that all these four transactions were effected with a view to defeat the provisions of the Ceiling Act cannot be said to be in any way erroneous. Conse­quently the High Court was not justified in reversing these findings even on merits. (Para 17)

       On facts, we have found that these transactions in question were entered into in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding and defeating the provisions of the Act as held by the Appellate Tribunal. This finding is found by us to be well sustained on the basis of evidence on record. Once it is so held, it is obvious that any attempt to get out of the sweep of such a legislation like the present which is meant to subserve the common good, cannot be countenanced and by refusing to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India we cannot put imprimatur on such an illegal act. Celining Act is a piece of legislation enacted with a view to achieve a more equitable distribution of land for common good so as to subserve the Directive Principles contained in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. The provisions of such a legislation have to be so interpreted as to further the object of the legislation and not defeat the same. Any request on the part of the respondent for our non-interference in the present proceedings would clearly amount to defeating the object of such a beneficial legislation. No question of granting any relief to the respondent under Article 142 of the Consti­tution of India would survive in this view of the matter. (Para 21)