1999(10) Supreme 38
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
S.B. Majmudar, M. Srinivasan and Umesh C. Banerjee, JJ.
Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad (dead) by LRs. -Appellants
versus
Kothuri Venkateswarlu (dead) by LRs. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 425 of 1982
Decided on 24-11-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : R. Sundaravaradan, Sr. Advocate, K. Ram Kumar, Ms. Shantinarayan, Advocates.
For the Respondents : L. Nageshwara Rao, C. Mohan Rao, Azim H. Laskar, G. Ramakrishna Prasad, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Advocates.
Held : While there is no amount of doubt that by reason of the well settled law as laid down by this Court, to the effect that a limited right of maintenance permeated into an absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act but would the effect be the same, in the event of there being a re-marriage of the widow prior to 1956? The Act of 1956, incidentally is prospective in its operation and no element of retrospectivity can be attributed therein. The effect of re-marriage is available in the Act of 1856. (Para 16)
Section 2 of the Act 1856 has taken away the right of widow in the event of re-marriage and the Statute is very specific to the effect that the widow on re-marriage would be deemed to be otherwise dead. The words “as if she had then died’ (emphasis supplied) are rather significant. The legislature intended therefore that in the event of a re-marriage, one looses the rights of even the limited interest in such property and after re-marriage the next heirs of her deceased’s husband shall thereupon succeed to the same. It is thus a statutory recognition of a well reasoned pre-existing shastric law. (Para 18)
It has to be kept in view that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, in the light of the explanation thereto, clearly indicates that if a Hindu widow is given in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance, any property with limited interest, the said interest would mature into full ownership under Section 14(1) of the Act. It has further to be kept in view that under the will of Rosaiah, the first wife’s pre-existing right of maintenance was recognised and in recognition of the very same right by the compromise decree she was given limited interest to recover maintenance from the earmarked properties mentioned in the same decree. It has, therefore, to be held in the light of the judgment in Tulasamma’s case that if her right of maintenance had survived till the coming into operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, then her limited interest on the properties concerned over which the said right was exercised as per consent term could have matured under Section 14(1) of the Act. However, in the light of the admitted fact on record on re-marriage of Rosaiah’s widow in 1953, her right to claim maintenance from the ex-husband’s properties got extinguished prior to 1956 (Para 24)
Since the factual situation of re-marriage of Lakshmamma in the year 1953, stands proved, it has to be held that Section 2 of the Hindu Widow’s Re-marriage Act, 1856 gets attracted. As a result thereof, Defendant No. 1’s right to get maintenance from her deceased husband’s property came to an end on her civil death qua her ex-husband’s estate latest by 1953. Hence, there was no subsisting legal right of maintenance available to Defendant No. 1 qua her deceased husband’s estate in any of his properties nor was there a subsisting limited interest of hers in any of those properties which get married into full ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act when it came into force. (Para 45)
The contention that the re-marriage spoken in Section 2 of the Hindu Widow’s Re-marriage Act means a valid marriage and a marriage which was void in view of Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949 so as to attract disentitlement to inheritance, cannot be accepted the reasons for the same being as below :
I. In the contextual facts, the doctrine of sincerity has its due application. Lakshmamma cannot take advantage of her own immoral conduct and illegality to confer upon herself a right to continue to get maintenance from the properties of her deceased husband under the consent decree.
II. The Act of 1949 being penal in nature, was introduced in the Statute Book to prohibit bigamous marriages and to provide for a right of divorce on certain grounds as mentioned therein statutory prohibition cannot be treated to be in aid of conferment of right: it is a prohibitory statute and not a conferring statute.
III. Any mechanical and literal applicability of the Act of 1949 would lead to incongruity as well as absurdity since in the event the widow is married to a person without having a spouse living - the widow divests herself of any right to deceased’s properties by reason of Section 2 of the Act of 1856, but in the event the widow is married to a person with a spouse living, the same tantamounts to no marriage and resultantly entitlement under the general law would be available to the widow : what has been prohibited would, in effect, amount to conferment of a right of inheritance on the deceased husband’s property - this is contrary to all cannons of law. (Para 25)
The Succession Act of 1956 obviously is prospective in operation and in the event of a divestation prior to 1956, question of applicability of Section 14(1) would not arise since on the date when it applied, there was already a re-marriage disentitling the widow to inherit the property of the deceased husband. The Act of 1856 had its full play on the date of re-marriage itself, as such Succession Act could not confer the widow who has already re-married, any right in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. The Succession Act has transformed a limited ownership to an absolute ownership but it cannot be made applicable in the event of there being a factum of pre divestation of estate as a limited owner. It there existed a limited estate or interest for the widow, it could become absolute but if she had no such limited estate or interest in lieu of her right of maintenance from out of deceased husband’s estate, there would be no occasion to get such non-existing limited right converted into full ownership right. (Para 46)
(ii) Interpretation of Statutes-Legislations having socio-economic perspective-Should be interpreted with widest possible connotation-Interpretation of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
It is now a well-settled principle of law that legislations having socio-economic perspective ought to be interpreted with widest possible connotation as otherwise, the intent of the legislature would stand frustated. Recognition of Rights and protection thereof thus ought to be given its full play for which the particular legislation has been introduced in the Statute Book. Gender bias is being debated throughout the globe and the basic structure of the Constitution permeates equality of status and thus negates gender bias. Gender equality is one of the basic principles of our Constitution. The endeavour of the law court should thus be to give due weightage to the requirement of the Constitution in the matter of interpretation of statutes wherein specially the women folk would otherwise be involved. The legislation of 1956 therefore, ought to receive an interpretation which would be in consonance with the wishes and desires of framers of our Constitution. We ourselves have given this Constitution to us and as such it is a bounden duty and an obligation to honour the mandate of the Constitution in every sphere and interpretation which would go in consonance therewith ought to be had without any departure therefrom. (Para 12)
(iii) Interpretation of Statutes-Courts ought always to adopt a construction which will enure to benefit of society-Construction which may adversely affect society has to be eschewed.
The Courts ought always to adopt a construction of the statute which will enure to the benefit of the society and eschew such a construction which may adversely affect the society. Morality and law cannot but be equated with each other : what is legal is moral and as such morality cannot be differentiated from the law. (Para 32)
(iv) Hindu Succession Act, 1956-Widows right of inheritence -Subsequent unchastity will not make a widow forfeit property which she has succeeded to her husband on his death. (Para 45)
(v) Hindu Marriage Act-Section 11 r/w Section 16-Void marriage-Voidness stated in Section 11 is limited voidness and not a nullity.
Held : Voidness of marriage cannot be termed to be an absolute nullity. Hindu Marriage Act provides annulment of the marriage under Section 11 and the same statute under Section 16 legitimised the children of otherwise void marriages. It is thus a statutory recognition of limited voidness and not a nullity. (Para 39)
JUDGMENT
Banerjee, J. -Two specific questions arise for determination in this appeal by the grant of special leave against a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court: Firstly, whether re-marriage of a widow prior to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would divest her of even the limited ownership of her deceased husband’s property, having due regard to the provisions of Section 2 of Hindu Widow’s Re-marriage Act, 1856 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1856’); and secondly, whether disqualification of inheritance, if any, by reason of re-marriage would stand obliterated by reason of the provisions of the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949.
2. The factual score in the Appeal presently before us reveals that one Rosaiah was the owner of a large extent of properties. He died in February, 1937 leaving behind him his wife Lakshmamma and mother Venkayamma. Rosaiah executed a will on 11th January, 1937, wherein he bequeathed all his properties to his mother Venkayamma. Apart from providing some maintenance, Rosaiah did not provide anything else to his wife Lakhmamma. As a matter of fact in the will he stated that his wife Lakshmamma was not obedient to him and that her father with her aid was trying to knock off all his properties and that his wife was also not living with him. He however in the will provided that, in case his wife was prepared to take a boy of his mother’s choice, in adoption, she could do so but the boy so adopted should be under the guardianship of his mother until attainment of majority and in that event would be entitled to certain properties as specified in the will.
3. Factual score further depicts that after the death of Rosaiah, Lakshmamma filed a suit (OS No. 52 of 1939) for a declaration as regards her entitlement to all the properties of her husband. The mother, in her turn, also filed another suit for administration of the estate, on the basis of the will mentioned above (OS No. 42 of 1940). It appears from the records that there was in fact a compromise decree between both the mother and the wife of Rossiah which was recorded by the Court on 19th April, 1942. In the compromise memo Lakshmamma has been referred to as the plaintiff, while Venkayamma, the mother as the first defendant. Clause (a) of the said compromise expressly affirmed the will put forward by the mother, Venkayamma as true and valid and the properties of Rosaiah were categorised into three schedules appended to the said Memo of compromise. Properties mentioned in Schedule-1 were jointly given to both the said ladies with absolute rights. While properties mentioned in Schedule-II were given to both of them jointly with a life estate only. Schedule-III contains three items. Items 1 and 2 were given to the mother, while item 3 was given to the wife. Clause (f) of the said memo of compromise provided as follows :-
“(f) The 1st defendant is agreeable that plaintiff shall continue the lineage of late Rosaiah by adopting a boy of her choice within 7 years from now, from the family of Velamuri people or from the family of any other person of the (same) Gotram or from out of the boys of her younger sister as provided within the will executed on 11.1.1937 by the late Rosaiah and receiving him as the adopted son of her husband. As soon as the adoption takes place, the immovable property mentioned in Schedule-II, attached hereto and retained by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant with life-interest the 2nd item in its entirety and half of 3rd item mentioned in Schedule III other than the portion necessary for the residence of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant till their life-time and the plate and cup being used by the plaintiff and the iron safe, pot ( ) and `Panakapu Binde’ being used by the 1st defendant at present out of the silverage given to late Rosaiya at the time of the marriage shall be developed on the adopted son himself and be himself shall have absolute rights to the said items....”
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