1999 Supreme(SC) 312

1999(3) Supreme 230
Supreme Court of India
(From Himachal Pradesh High Court)
K.T. Thomas and S.S. Mohammed Quadri, JJ.
State of Himachal Pradesh -Appellant
versus
Jeet Singh -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 263 of 1991
Decided on 15-3-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Anil Soni and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Advocates.
For the Respondent : S.N. Mehta, R.A. Mishra, R.L. Vashisht, Advo­cates.

Important Points
1. It is not the requirement of law that unless prosecution establishes a motive of the accused to murder the deceased prosecution must necessarily fail.
2. There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if re­covery of the articles was made from any place which is ‘open or accessible to others’; the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others.

Headnote:(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 302 - Uxoricide-Convic­tion for-Allegation that accused administered some kind of insecticide and smothered her-Circum­stantial evidence-Accused and deceased closeted in same room in previous night and deceased found dead in morning-Bottle containing green insecticide, a steel Kauli and Steel glass and some ground ‘misri’ recovered at instance of accused-Rela­tionship between spouse strain­ed as accused mistook a white patch on accused to be a form of leprosy-Doctors who had done post mortem ex­pressed opinion that deceased died of asphyxia due to suffocation caused by smothering-Chemical examination of viscera showed that it contained halogena­ted organic phosphorous compound-Trial Court convicted accused-High Court holding it to be a suicide acquitted accused-Not justified-Injuries found on legs and body proved it was homicidal smothering - Circumstantial evidence proved that ‘it was accused who caused death-Conviction and sentence passed by trial Court restored.

       Held : The High Court has totally overlooked the features of the victim which are consistent with the consequence of her having been subjected to smothering. The injuries found on both the legs of the dead body are proof positive that it was a homicidal smothering. We can place reliance on the opinions of both sets of doctors that even without seeing the Chemical Examiner’s report the doctors could say that death of the deceased might be due to smother­ing, and after seeing the Chemical Examiner’s report a doctor could say that poison would also have worked fatally in the victim. It is more realistic to conclude that it was a homicide either by smothering alone or by poisoning alone or that both causes worked independently and reached the common result. It is quite possible that the killer after administering poison, would have felt that the victim might expel the poison by vomitting and then he would have smothered her to see that the venom did not get evacuated and in that endeavour the smothering became fatal. (Paras 17 & 18)

       The court cannot ignore the large number of external injuries particularly those on the legs. When they are counted in association with the findings regarding the internal organs, they all would cumu­latively lead to the one conclusion in favour of the theory of forci­ble smothering. In view of such external injuries, a conclusion that deceased would have committed suicide is a preposterous inference. We therefore unhesitatingly dissent from the finding of the High Court on that score. (Para 19)

       The formost circumstance which stares at him is that the couple were closetted together in the same “Overy” (bedroom) during the fateful night. P.W. 10-Birbal, who is the uncle of accused Jeet Singh and who is residing in the adjoining house, has said in his evidence that Jeet Singh and Sudarshana Devi were together in the same “Overy” on that particular night and that on the next morning he found Sudarshana’s dead body lying on the floor of the “Overy”. The resi­dence of P.W. 10-Birbal and accused Jeet Singh has only one common courtyard. P.W. 10 said that he slept on the said courtyard during that night. Except a feeble suggestion put to P.W. 10 during cross-examination that he had a property dispute with Jeet Singh’s father (that suggestion was strongly denied by the witness) nothing else is shown to doubt the truth of his version. (Para 20)

       The High Court committed a grave error in reaching the conclusion that Sudarshana Devi had committed suicide. Due to gross misappreciation of evidence and misreading of the circumstances proved in this case, the High Court caused a miscarriage of justice by clearing the accused who committed such a heinous crime by liquidating his hapless female partner. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Court on the accused. (Paras 39 & 40)

       (ii) Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Recovery of weapons-Proof of disclosure-It is not necessary that other witnesses should be present when accused was interrogated by Investigating Officer-Nothing in Section 27 to render statement of accused inadmissible if recovery of articles was made from any place which is ‘open or accessible to others’.

       Held : It is not necessary that other witnesses should be present when the accused was interrogated by the Investigating Officer. On the contrary, investigating officers used to interrogate accused persons without the presence of others. So the mere fact that any witness to the recovery did not overhear the disclosure statements of the accused is hardly sufficient to hold that no such disclosures were made by the accused. There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made from any place which is “open or accessible to others”. It is a fallacious notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a place which is open or accessible to others it would vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in places which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is disintered its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person. Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others. (Paras 25 & 26)

       It is now well settled that the discovery of fact referred to in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact embraces the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused as to it. (Para 27)

       In the present case, the fact discovered by the police with the help of (1) the disclosure statements and (2) the recovery of incrimi­nating articles on the strength of such statements is that it was the accused who concealed those articles at the hidden places. It is immaterial that such statement of the accused is inculpatory because Section 27 of the Evidence Act renders even such inculpatory state­ments given to a police officer admissible in evidence by employing the words: “whether it amounts to confession or not”. (Para 28)

       (iii) Criminal trial-Conviction for offence-Motive for Commission of offence-Whether sine quo non for conviction.

       Held : It is not the requirement of law that unless prosecution establishes a motive of the accused to murder the deceased prosecution must necessarily fail. No doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every criminal act was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no criminal offence would have been committed if prosecution has failed to prove the precise motive of the accused to commit it. When the prosecution succeeded in showing the possibility of some ire for the accused towards the victim the inability to further put on record the manner in which such ire would have swelled up in the mind of the offender to such a degree as to impel him to commit the offence cannot be con­strued as a fatal weakness of the prosecution. It is almost an impos­sibility for the prosecution to unravel the full dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the person whom he offended. (Paras 30 & 33)