1999 Supreme(SC) 691

1999(6) Supreme 39
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar and R.C. Lahoti, JJ.
Bank of India & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Degala Suryanarayana -Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 3053-54 of 1997
Decided on 12-7-1999.
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Raj Birbal, Sr. Advocate, R. Khanna, Advocate for Surya Kant, Advocate.
For the Respondent : P.S. Mishra, Sr. Advocate, G.R. Prasad, Ms. K. Sen, Ms. U. Dubey, Chandra Shekhar, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Vishnu Sharma, V. Sreedhar Reddy, Advocates.

Important point
Where disciplinary authority disagreeing with findings of Inquiry Officer, gave his own finding on basis of evidence in inquiry report and awarded punishment, Court’s interference with findings of Disciplinary Authority could not be sustained.

Headnote:Service Law-Domestic enquiry -Disciplinary action - Scope of juris­diction of Court to interfere with-Inquiry Officer gave finding that charges not proved-Discipli­nary authority disagreed with findings and gave his own finding on basis of inquiry report and imposed punish­ment of reduction of pay by one stage-High Court set aside punish­ment holding that findings of disciplinary authority were perverse -Not sustainable-Court cannot embark upon reappreciating evidence or weigh same as appellate authority - Disciplinary authority recorded his own finding giving reason - Findings immune from interference (Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976-Regulations 7 and 27).

       Held : The law is well settled. The Disciplinary Authority on receiving the report of the Enquiry Officer may or may not agree with the find­ings recorded by the latter. In case of disagreement, the Disciplinary Authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and then to record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the Enquiry Officer for further enquiry and report. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental en­quiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the de­partmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of malafides or perversity i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objec­tivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appel­late authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. (Paras 9 and 10)

       In the case at hand a perusal of the order dated 5.1.1995 of the Disciplinary Authority shows that it has taken into consideration the evidence, the finding and the reasons recorded by the Enquiry Officer and then assigned reasons for taking a view in departure from the one taken by the Enquiry Officer. The Dis­ciplinary Authority has then recorded its own finding setting out the evidence already available on record in support of the finding arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority. The finding so recorded by the Disciplinary Authority was immune from interference within the limited scope of power of judicial review available to the Court. We are therefore of the opinion that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were not right in setting aside the finding of the Disciplinary Authority and restoring that of the Enquiry Officer. The High Court has clearly exceeded the bounds of power of judicial review available to it while exercising writ jurisdiction over a departmental disciplinary enquiry proceeding and therefore the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Divi­sion Bench cannot be sustained to that extent. (Para 12)

       Service Law - Promotion -Sealed cover procedure-Respon­dent was found to be fit for promotion with effect from 1.1.1986 but not given effect on account of pendency of criminal case against him -Criminal case ended in his favour in 1988-High Court s order thereafter to promote him on ad hoc basis - Subsequent departmental enquiry in 1991 and punishment of reduction of pay by one stage-High Court ordering regularisation of promotion-Appeal thereagainst -Held, when respondent became due for pro­motion no departmental enquiry pending-Sealed cover procedure could not have been resorted to-Promotion could not have been withheld-Punishment could not deprive benefit of promotion.

       Held : The sealed cover procedure is now a well established concept in service jurispru­dence. The procedure is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc. but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against him and hence the findings as to his entitlement to the serv­ice benefit of promotion, increment etc. are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over. (Para 13)

       As on 1.1.1986 the only proceedings pending against the respondent were the criminal proceed­ings which ended into acquittal of the respondent wiping out with retrospective effect the adverse consequences, if any, flowing from the pendency thereof. The departmental enquiry proceedings were initi­ated with the delivery of the charge-sheet on 3.12.1991. In the year 1986-87 when the respondent became due for promotion and when the promotion committee held its proceedings, there were no departmental enquiry proceedings pending against the respondent. The sealed cover procedure could not have been resorted to nor could the promotion in the year 1986-87 withheld for the D.E. proceedings initiated at the fag end of the year 1991. The High Court was therefore right in di­recting the promotion to be given effect to which the respondent was found entitled as on 1.1.1986. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of punishment made in the year 1995 cannot deprive the respondent of the benefit of the promotion earned on 1.1.1986. (Para 13)