1999(7) Supreme 311
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
S. Saghir Ahmad & R.P. Sethi, JJ.
M/s. Style (Dress Land) etc. etc. -Appellants
versus
Union Territory Chandigarh & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4540 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13471 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4541-4557 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10676-10692 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal No. 4558 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13472 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal No. 4559 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13475 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4560-4573 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 16266-16279 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4574-4575 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 17894-95 of 1998)
With
Civil Appeal No. 4576 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12188/99 (CC 902/99) )
Decided on 18-8-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : D.A. Dave, & H.N. Salve, Sr. Advocates, Ms. Minakshi Vij, Naresh Bakshi, Nidesh Gupta, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General, Sunil Gupta, Ms. Kavita Wadia, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Advocates.
Held : The combined reading of Sections 3 and 22 of the Act would indicate the existence of an obligation on the Central Government to make rules for the purposes of regulating the terms and conditions relating to the transfer of property including leasing it out. However, failure to make the rules would not render the transfer of the property made under the terms of the lease as illegal, void or inoperative. Power to transfer the property including leasing it out is authorised by Section 3 itself and its terms and conditions left to the satisfaction of the Central Government. Though, not legally obliged to make the rules, the Central Government was obliged to take steps in making the rules regulating the transfer of properties contemplating transfer of properties by the modes envisaged under the section, for allaying apprehensions of the citizens regarding discrimination and arbitrariness. It would have been in the interests of the Central Government itself to frame the rules for infusing confidence and rationality, reasonableness and fairness in their actions. We trust and hope that the Central Government would not loose any further time in making the rules as mandated by the Section and embark upon enhancement of rent, if deemed necessary, only under such rules, as and when made for the purposes of carrying on the objects of the Act to their logical conclusions. In the absence of the rules, the action of the respondents regarding imposition of terms and conditions of the lease including the enhancement of rent is required to be fair and reasonable and not actuated by considerations which could be termed as arbitrary or discriminatory. The government cannot act like a private individual in imposing the conditions solely with the object of extracting profits from their lessees. Governmental actions are required to be based on standards which are not arbitrary or unauthorised. (Paras 8 & 9)
Even the administrative orders and not quasi judicial are required to be made in a manner consonance with the rules of natural justice, when they affect the rights of the citizens to the property or the attributes of the property. While exercising the powers of judicial review the Court can look into the reasons given by the Government in support of its action but cannot substitute its own reasons. The Court can strike down an executive order, if it finds the reasons assigned were irrelevant and extraneous. The courts are more concerned with the decision making process than the decision itself. (Para 10)
The High Court examined the matter in depth and rightly concluded that the procedure adopted and made the basis for enhancing the rent could not be termed to be either arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable. We agree with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court and find no infirmity in the action of the respondents in raising the rate of rent on the basis of the grounds noticed by us hereinabove. Such an action is stated to have been uniformly applied with respect to all the shopkeepers similarly situated and placed. Mere inaction in respect of certain tenants could not be made the basis for setting aside the action initiated against the appellants and others. The respondents assured and the High Court rightly issued appropriate directions for initiating similar actions against those who are left out. It is not the case of the appellants that the favour done to those whose rent has not been enhanced is legal or valid. Such an omission is also not referable to any lawful action of the respondents. The question of discrimination would arise only if it is found that the order in favour of the left over was legal and valid and that the case of the writ petitioners was similar in material respects to the case of such persons. No such allegation has been made or arguments addressed. There is, therefore, no basis for the appellants to urge the violation of Article 14 alleging discrimination against them. (Para 12)
It is settled principle of law that as and when a party applies and obtains a stay from the Court of law, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. Mere passing of an order of stay cannot be presumed to be the conferment of any additional right upon the litigating party. The High Court was, therefore, not wrong in directing the payment of interest on the amount of arrears of rent for the period when the stay order was obtained till the period the writ petitions were dismissed. We, however, feel that awarding of interest @ 18 per annum from the aforesaid period was on the excessive side. The respondent-authority could not be equated with private commercial institutions and conferred with an amount of compensation in the form of interest which, in the judicial parlance, may amount to penalty, despite the fact that the persons found to have jeopardised the process of law were rightly held liable to compensate the respondent - authority by way of interest. In our opinion 15 per annum interest for the aforesaid period would have been just and proper. We, however, agree with the findings of the High Court that the respondents are free to charge appropriate interest on the amount of arrears of rent between 1.3.1992 to the date when the stay orders were passed by the High Court. We are sure that in determining such rate of interest the respondent-authority would act fairly and justly. (Paras 13 & 14)
(ii) Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952-Sections 3 and 22-Enhancement of leased out property-Shops leased out by Administration on a monthly rent of Rs. 1090 for a period of three years-Enhancement of rent before expiry of three years period - Not permissible - After expiry of three years Administration is at liberty to enhance rent. (Paras 15 & 16)
Judgment
Seth, J.-Delay condoned in SLP (C) No. 12188/99 (CC 902/99).
Leave granted.
2. Sector 17 is a commercial centre in Chandigarh, the city beautiful of India which is also the capital of Punjab and Haryana, the two most prosperous States of the country. Shopkeepers of this commercial centre are aggrieved of the enhancement of the rent of their leased premises from Rs. 2,671/- to Rs. 14,000/- per month which, according to them, is irrational, unwarranted by law and arbitrary being 600 per cent increase. The shops under their occupation are stated to have been initially leased out to them at a paltry rent of Rs. 525/- with effect from 10th May, 1968. Whereas the respondent Union Territory have steadily enhanced the rent from time to time, the appellants herein have unsuccessfully put all types of hurdles conceivable under the present legal system.
3. Almost admitted facts leading to the filing of the present appeals are that the appellants were leased commercial premises in Sector 17 of Chandigarh in or about the years 1963-64. However, formal lease deeds were executed between the Lessor and the Lessees in May, 1968 on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 525/- per mensem in advance by the 19th day of the month for which it fell due. The lease was initially for a period of five years from the date of the grant which could be terminated by the Lessor by giving one month’s advance notice in writing to the Lessees. The lease was renewable only once for another term of five years with 20 increase in the rent reserved under the deed. In the event of non payment of the rent on the due date or breach or non observance by the Lessee of any of the conditions of the lease deed it was lawful for the Lessor, notwithstanding the waiver of any previous cause or right for re-entry, to terminate the lease and enter into and upon the building or any part thereof and to re-possess, retain and enjoy the same and in that event the Lessee was not entitled to the refund of lease money or any part thereof or to any compensation whatsoever on account of such resumption. After the expiry of the initial period of 10 years, the rent of the leased premises was increased to Rs. 2,671/- per month with effect from 1.3.1982. Being aggrieved by the increase of rent, the Lessees filed writ petitions in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in which their plea was not accepted and a Division Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated 4th August, 1988 held that there was no evidence to show that the enhanced rent was, in any way, unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court further observed, “in fact we had a feeling that this is mush lower than the fair payable rent in respect of such premises”. However, as by then the Lessees had agreed to pay the enhanced rent with effect from 1st March, 1982 till the end of February, 1991, the Court set aside the orders of termination of their leases which had been passed on their failure to pay the enhanced rent. The petitions were disposed of holding:
“The result would be that he shall be deemed to continue to be lessee under the Estate Administration. We shall now execute a lease deed agreeing to pay rent as aforesaid. The rent shall be revisable for the period from March 1, 1991 as per the existing rules of the Estate Administration. The arrears for the period of March, 1, 1982 till July 31, 1988, shall be paid on or before September 30, 1988 and the rent for the month of August, 1988 shall be paid on or before the 10th of September, 1988 and for the month of September 1988, it shall be paid on or before the 10th October, 1988 and for every subsequent month on or before the 10th of each subsequent month.”
4. After the expiry of the period prescribed by the High Court, the Lessees were allowed to remain in possession but were slapped with a notice on 19th August, 1992 intimating them to renew the lease subject to enhancement of rent from Rs. 2,671/- to Rs. 14,000/- with effect from 1.3.1992 pending decision of the Chandigarh Adminis
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