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1999 Supreme(SC) 958

1999(7) Supreme 559
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
Dr. A.S. Anand, CJI., S. Rajendra Babu & R.C. Lahoti, JJ.
Mohd. Ali -Appellant
versus
Azad Mohd. -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 445 of 1998
Decided on 1-9-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : B.S. Malik, Sr. Advocate, Altaf Hussain, Dr. K.S. Chauhan, Advocates.
For the Respondent : J.S. Attri, S. Khan, Advocates.

An election petition is barred by limitation if filed on the reopening day of the High Court after summer vacations, provided a notification specifies the court was not 'closed' for such petitions during the vacation period, rendering Section 10 of the General Clauses Act inapplicable.

Headnote:Representation of People Act-Section 81-Election petition-Limitation for filing-Limitation period expired during summer vacation of Court-Petition filed on very day of reopening of Court-High Court summer vacation notification stated election petitions would be heard during summer vacations - Election petition barred by limitation-Notification of Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 27.11.1995 is not superseded by subsequent notification dated 27.5.1996. (Paras 3, 4 & 5)

       

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • practice and procedure
    • limitation
      • court closure (Para 2, 3, 4, 5)
  • election law
    • election petitions (Para 1, 2, 3)
  • administrative law
    • notifications (Para 2, 4, 5, 6)

Table of Contents

1. Election petition filed on the re-opening day of the High Court after summer vacations, where the limitation period expired during the vacation period. (Para 1 , 2 )

2. Whether a subsequent notification prescribing timings allows the benefit of Section 10, General Clauses Act, 1897, or if service condition laws imply court closure. (Para 4 , 6 )

3. Supplementary notifications prescribing timings do not supersede prior notifications containing exceptions; court business during vacations is governed by notifications, not service condition acts. (Para 5 , 6 )

4. Where a notification specifies that a court is not closed for certain purposes during vacations, the benefit of Section 10, General Clauses Act, 1897, is unavailable. (Para 3 , 5 )

5. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 7 )

6. Does Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, allow filing a petition on the re-opening day if the court is not considered closed during vacations?

No. If a notification specifies that the court is not closed for the purpose of hearing certain petitions during summer vacations, the petition is barred by time if filed on the re-opening day after the limitation period expires. (Para 2 , 3 )

7. Does a subsequent notification prescribing court and office timings supersede a previous notification containing specific exceptions regarding court closure?

No. A subsequent notification prescribing timings is supplementary to the previous one and clarifies how business is transacted; it does not whittle down or supersede the exceptions contained in the earlier notification. (Para 5 )

8. Does Section 23-A of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, determine whether a court is open or closed for business during vacations?

No. The High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, governs service conditions and not the transaction of court business, which is instead controlled by notifications issued by the High Court. (Para 6 )

ORDER

The election petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of the respondent was dismissed by the learned Election Judge of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana on the preliminary issue of limitation without trial on 4th July, 1997. The order of the High Court has been put in issue before us through this appeal.

2. The facts are not in dispute. The period of 45 days prescribed for filing an election petition expired during the period of summer vacations of the High Court i.e. June 1, 1996 to June 30, 1996 (both days inclusive). The election petition was admittedly filed on the re-opening day of the High Court after the summer vacations on July 1, 1996. The learned Election Judge considered the effect on Notification dated 27th of November, 1995 issued by the High Court and held that the election petition filed on the reopening day of the High Court was barred by time because for the purpose of hearing election petitions etc. the court was not "closed" during the summer vacations.

3. In Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal & Ors.1, this Court has considered the effect of the very same Notification dated 27th November, 1995 on the filing of an election petition on the re-opening day of the High Court after summer vacations, when the prescribed period of limitation expired, during the summer vacations. After taking note of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act as well as Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, this Court has come to the conclusion that the election petition, was barred by time, because of the exception contained in the Notification itself. The opinion expressed in the said case applies to this case with full force. We adopt the reasoning given by the Bench in Lachhman Das Arora s case (supra) to this case also.

4. Faced with this situation, Mr. B.S. Malik, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that another Notification had been issued by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh on 27th May, 1996 and since the later Notification did not contain any exception, the benefit of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, would be available to an election petitioner for filing the election petition on the re-opening day of the High Court after summer vacations. The Notification dated 27th May, 1996 on which reliance is placed reads thus :

"No. 207/Genl./XVII.3.--It is notified for general information that High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh shall observe summer vacations from 1st June to 30th June, 1996 (both days inclusive) and following timings shall be observed during the period of vacation i.e. 1st June, 1996 to 30th June, 1996.

Court timings : 10.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. with lunch break from 1.00 p.m. to 1.45 p.m.

Office timings : 10.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. with lunch break from 1.30 p.m. to 2.00 p.m.

By order of Hon ble the Acting Chief Justice and Judges

(Sd/)

Assistant Registrar (General)

For Registrar"

5. In our opinion, reliance on this Notification to save the period of limitation is misplaced. The Notification of 27th May, 1996 (supra) does not in any manner supersede the Notification issued by the High Court earlier on 27th November, 1995. The Notification dated 27th May, 1996 has to be read as supplementary to the Notification dated 27th November, 1995 because in the latter Notification court timings and office timings during the summer vacations have been prescribed. The effect of the Notification dated 27th November, 1995 has in no way been whittled down by the subsequent Notification dated 27th May, 1996 and on the contrary, the subsequent Notification, by prescribing the court and office timings, has clarified the manner in which the court business was to be transacted during the summer vacations. Both the Notifications have, therefore, to be read together.

6. Mr. Malik then submitted that under Section 23-A of the High Cou






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