Important point
When the disciplinary authorityy differs from the finding of the Inquiry officer it is not imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the Inquiry officer.

Headnote:Service Law-Judicial Service-Disciplinary proceedings - Voluntary retirement-High Court on administrative side differed from findings of inquiry officer and ordered compulsory retirement of a judicial magistrate-Judicial side of High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of Constitution aside order holding that when disciplinary committee differed from finding of inquiry officer it was imperative to discuss materials in detail and contest conclusion of inquiry officer-Unsustainable-Findings of inquiry officer are only his opinion on materials-Findings not binding on disciplinary authority-It is not necessary that disciplinary authority should discuss materials in detail and contest conclusion of inquiry officer-High Court overstepped its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution.
       Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 2266 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for convassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. (Para 16)
       The inquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such inquiry as well as the views expressed by the Inquiry Officer thereon. The findings of the Inquiry Officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authorityy can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed by the Inquiry Officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority should “discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer.” Other wwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level. (Para 19)
       It is constitutional duty of every High Court, on administrative side, to keep guard over the subordinate judiciary functioning within its domain. While it is imperative for the High Court to protect honest judicial officers against all ill conceived or motivated complaints, the High Court cannot afford to bypass any dishonest performance of a member of the subordinate judiciary. Dishonesty is the starkk antithesis of judicial probity. Any instance of a High Court condoningor compromising with a dishonest deed of one of its officers would only be contributing to erosion of the judicial foundation. Every hour we must remind ourselves that judiciary floats only over the confidence of the peopple in its probity. Such confidence is the foundation on which pillars of the judiciary are built. The Judges, at whatever level they may be,, represent the State and its authority, unlike the bureaucracy or the members of the other service. Judicial service is not merely an employment nor the Judges merely employees. They exercise soveriegn judicial power. They are holders of public offices of great trust and responsibility. If a judicial officer “tips the scales of justice its rippling effect would be disastrous and deleterious.” Dishonest judicial personage is an oxymoron. (Paras 22 & 23).

Judgement Key Points

Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is not an appellate review of the merits or decision of a disciplinary authority, but is limited to scrutinizing the decision-making process for defects such as violation of natural justice principles, non-compliance with statutory inquiry procedures, influence of extraneous considerations, or patently arbitrary conclusions that no reasonable authority could reach. [1000042030015][1000042030016][1000042030017][1000042030020][1000042030023]

The disciplinary authority remains the sole judge of facts if the inquiry is properly conducted, and courts cannot reassess the adequacy, reliability, or sufficiency of evidence supporting the findings.[1000042030015][1000042030016]

Judgment

Thomas, J.-A judicial magistrate has been disrobed of his judicial vestment by a penal of five judges of the Bombay High Court on the administrative side. This was sequel to an innocent litigant being wrongfully arrested, handcuffed and paraded in public. But two other judges of the same High Court, on the judicial side, ordered him to be rerobed with full chasuble. That judgment of the Division Bench is now being challenged by the Registrar of the Division Bench is now being challenged by the Registrar of the High Court of Bombay (on behalf of the said High Court) by special leave.

2. First respondent was Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) of the Maharashtra Judicial Service. While functioning as a Judicial Magistrate pronounced judgment in the case acquitting the accused on 7.11.1985. But the complainant sent a petition to the District and Sessions Judge, Ahmadnagar on 4.1.19866, alleging that he was wrongfully arrested by the police on 15.10.1985 as per a warrant of arrest issued by the magistrate;; and that he was handcuffed and paraded through the streets of his locality; and that he was kept in the lock-up during the night; and that on the next day (16.10.1985) he was produced before the magistrate. It was further alleged that the first respondent magistrate, when the complainant was produced in open court, retired to his chambers and ordered release of the complainant. It was further alleged in the complaint that the said arrest was knavely manpulated at the behjest of the accused in the criminal case through an illegal warrant of arrest surreptitiously stage managed.

3. After holding a preliminary enquiry the High Court framed charges against the first respondent and appointed Shri K.J. Rohee, Joint District Judge (as the inquiry officer) to conduct a formal inquiry into the charges. He submitted a report on 1.3.1994 exonerating the first respondent of the charges. But the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court (consisting of five judges of the Bombay High Court) after a scrutiny of tghe report of the inquiry officer, was not disposed to approve the findings therein. The Committee differed from the findings and proposed to proceed into the matter. A notice was thereupon issued to the first respondent calling upon him to show cause as to why the findings of the inquiry officer on the crucial points be not repudiated, and a major penalty of dismissal from service be not imposed on him.

4. First respondent submitted his representation to the aforesaid notice. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court considered the said representation and decided to reject the same as it arrived at the conclusion that the charges framed against him stood proved. So the Committee decided to recommend of punishment of compulsory retirement on the first respondent. The Governor later issued orders on the said recommendation compulsorily retiring the first respondent.

5. The Division Bench of the High Court quashed the order of imposition of compulsory retirement on the first respondent mainly on the premise that the Disciplinary Committee had not put forward adequate reasons for differing from the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It was further held that the Disciplinary Committee did not discuss how the Inquiry Officer went wrong and why his findings were not acceptable to the Committee. The Division Bench had upheld the contention of the first respondent that “when the Disciplinary Authority differed from teh findings entered by an Inquiry Officer, it is imperative to discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and then record their own conclusions.”

6. The Division Bench of the High Court has propounded a legal proposition as follows :

“It is an established principle in disciplinaryu jurisprudence that when the disciplinary authority differes from the findings of the Inquiry Officer, it has to discuss the entire case threadbare and establish that each finding of the Inquiry Officer was tot

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1999 Supreme(SC) 1269

Important pointWhen the disciplinary authorityy differs from the finding of the Inquiry officer it is not imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the Inquiry officer.

Cases Referred (5)

Important point
When the disciplinary authorityy differs from the finding of the Inquiry officer it is not imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the Inquiry officer.