VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Power under Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial, nor can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial.

Headnote:(i) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Section 20-A -Impleadment of manufacturer, distributor or dealer-Condition precedent/stage for impleadment-Power under Section 20A cannot be invoked before stage of adducing evidence in trial, nor can it be invoked after conclusion of trial-Order of impleadment before recording of any of accused held to be premature and hence without jurisdiction.
       The essential conditions for invoking the power under Section 20-A are that (1) the trial should have begun already; (2) the trial must be of any offence under the Act allegedly committed by a person other than the manufacturer or distributor or dealer of the food article; (3) the court must have been satisfied that such manufacturer or dealer or distributor is also concerned with the offence; (4) such satisfaction must have been formed "on the evidence adduced before the court". (Para 7)
       Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the court to proceed against any person who is not being made an accused already, if it appears from the evidence collected in the inquiry or trial of an offence that such person has committed an offence for which he could be tried together with the already arraigned accused. One of the differences between Section 319 of the Code and Section 20-A of the Act is that, while in the former even if it appears to the court from the evidence (either during inquiry or trial of the offence), that another person is to be tried along with the already arraigned accused, then the court can proceed against that other person, while in the latter the satisfaction of the court that such manufacturer (distributor or dealer) is also concerned with that offence must be gathered from "the evidence adduced before it during the trial". In other words, the power under Section 20-A cannot be invoked until the trial begins and after the trial ends. (Para 8)
       The term "trial" cannot be given a fixed meaning to be applied in all cases uniformly. The connotation of that word changes with the difference in which the term is employed in a particular provision of any statute. The trial of offences under the Act begins when the magistrate asks the accused whether he pleads guilty or not as envisaged in Section 251 of the Code, if the magistrate opts to hold summary trial. Hence, evidence in a trial under the Act can be adduced only after recording the plea of the accused as envisaged in the said section. Thus, it is clear that a magistrate can implead any person under Section 20-A of the Act only after reaching the stage envisaged in Section 254(1) of the Code. (Paras 10 & 12)
       Thus power under Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial, nor can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial. (Para 16)
       (ii) Criminal Trial-Trial, connotation of-When trial could be said to be commenced. (Paras 10, 11 & 12)

JUDGMENT

Thomas, J.-Leave granted.

2. Appellant is a firm. It has now been impleaded as the 6th accused in a prosecution case launched by the Food Inspector, Cochin Corporation, for the offence under Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short "the Act"). Appellant moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") to quash the order by which the appellant was impleaded as an accused in the criminal case. A learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition as per the order which is now being challenged before us.

3. The skeletal facts, for dealing with the questions raised, are these :

Food Inspector of Cochin Corporation filed a complaint before a judicial magistrate court at Ernakulam, against five persons shown as accused alleging that on 16.9.1995 another Food Inspector, who was attached to the mobile vigilance squad, had visited the business premises of the first accused and took sample of 750 grams of Toor Dhall and divided it into three parts as prescribed by the Rules; when one of the parts of the sample was analysed by the Public Analyst it was found not conforming to the standards prescribed for Toor Dhall and that it contained Kesari Dhall which is a prohibited substance. As the first accused told the Food Inspector that he purchased the article from second accused the Food Inspector sent a letter to the second accused (third accused is the Managing Partner of the second accused firm). In reply to the letter the third accused informed that he purchased the food article from the 4th accused firm (of which 5th accused is the person in charge of the business). Thus the Food Inspector has arrayed all the above five persons as accused in the complaint.

4. The 5th accused soon after entering appearance in the court filed a petition to implead the appellant firm as an accused in the case on the premise that 5th accused purchased the Toor Dhall from the appellant company. On 23.1.1998 an order was passed by the learned magistrate on the said petition on the following lines :

"Heard the Petitioner and the other accused persons. Since A.P.P. is not available, he could not be heard. However the Bill No. OS/td/046 Dated 7.4.1995 produced by the petitioner shows that they purchased Toor Dhall from M/s. Omprakash Shivprakash Akola. Hence, for the ends of justice it is necessary that they shall be impleaded as an accused in this case. Hence the petition is allowed and M/s. Omprakash Shivprakash Ltd., Kiranabazar, Akola, represented by Sanjay Kumar is impleaded as an accused in this case. Issue summons to him."

5. Learned single judge repelled the contention of the appellant that it could not have been impleaded at that stage and in support of such stand learned Single Judge relied on the decisions in M/s. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration1 and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of M.P. and Ors.2, besides two other decisions of the same High Court. Learned Single Judge has observed thus :

"It is clear from the above noted decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court that the manufacturer can be impleaded at any stage of the trial and it need not be after framing charge under Section 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the case is tried as a summons case, instituted otherwise than on a police charge. Therefore, the arguments advanced by the senior counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the decision of a two judge bench of the Supreme Court while considering the commencement of trial under general provisions of the Criminal, Procedure Code, has no application to the commencement of trial of a case for the purpose of the special provision in Section 20-A of the P.F.A. Act. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that Annexure-C order passed by the learned Magistrate, impleading him as accused before commencement of the trial in this case is not sustainable is of no force."

6. It can be pointed out now that the plea of

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1999 Supreme(SC) 1285

VERY IMPORTANT POINT Power under Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial, nor can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial.

Cases Referred (4)

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Power under Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial, nor can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial.