Judgment

S. M. FAZAL ALI, J :- These appeals by certificate arise out of a common judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi and will be disposed of by us by one judgment. In Appeals Nos. 152-153/72, one Gian Singh sold toffees to the Food Inspector and as the toffees were found to be adulterated, a prosecution was launched against him under S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Accused Gian Singh. After having acquitted Gian Singh, however, produced in course of the trial a warranty given by the distributors and manufacturers as a result of which the Magistrate acquitted Gian Singh, the Magistrate issued notice under S. 20-A against the respondents for being impleaded and prosecution on the ground that the articles manufactured by the distributors were adulterated. The respondents went up in revision to the Sessions Judge which was dismissed. But on further revision to the High Court the High Court allowed the petition and set aside the order of the Magistrate impleading the respondents. In the other two appeals i.e. Cri. Appeals Nos. 166 and 167/1972, the manufacturers were impleaded under S. 20-A before the acquittal of the last seller and that order was upheld by the High Court and, hence these appeals before us by the appellants.

2. The common question of law that arises for consideration in all these appeals is: whether or not the Magistrate is entitled to implead the distributors or manufacturers under S. 20-A even after acquitting the last seller on the ground that he is protected by a warranty. In other words, the question for decision in these appeals turns upon the interpretation of S. 20-A and S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. S. 20-A runs thus :-

"Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act, alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence, then the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of S. 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in Sec. 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under S. 20."

The opening lines of S. 20-A clearly contemplate a contingency where the discretionary jurisdiction under this Act can be exercised only during the trial of any offence, that is to say, the stage at which the Magistrate can exercise his discretion under this section must be before the trial has concluded and ended in acquittal or conviction. S. 20 which precedes S. 20-A runs thus :-

"S. 20 (1)-No. Prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or S. 14-A, shall be instituted except by or with written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government:

Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in S. 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.

(2) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under sub-section (1AA) of Section 16 shall be cognisable and non-bailable."

A combined reading of S. 20-A and Section 20 is that where a distributor or manufacturer or any other person is impleaded in the course of a trial, the obligation to get a fresh sanction for such person is dispensed with and the sanction obtained for the last seller in the trial will enure for the benefit of the prosecution of the other person impleaded also and no further sanction is necessary. It is manifest that this special statutory concession is given to the prosecution only if the