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2000 Supreme(SC) 108

2000(1) Supreme 209
Supreme Court of India
(From Madras High Court)
V.N. Khare & S. Santosh Hegde, JJ.
Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani & Ors. —Appellants
versus
H.P.A. International & Ors. Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7386 of 1994
Decided on 13-1-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, H.N. Salve, S. Ganesh, Sr. Advocates, P.H. Parekh, Amit Dhingra, Jayesh Dolia, Harish Y. Shankar, Sameer Parekh, V. Balachandran, Raju Ramachandran, Joseph Pookkat, R.A. Perumal, N.C. Ramesh, N.S. Varadachari, Advocates.
For the Respondents : K. Parasaran, Sr. Advocate, V. Balachandran, S. Aravindh, Santhel Jagadeesan, V. Rama Subramaniam, T.K. Sharedri, Advocates.

Important Points

Important point
Where judgment was delivered after five years after conclusion of hearing of the appeal, Supreme Court set aside judgment for deciding the appeal on merit holding that the party whose appeal had been dismissed may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment.

Subject

Civil Law - Specific Performance

Act Referred

Headnote

Judgment Delay in delivering Consequences of Hearing of appeal concluded on 22.3.1989 Judgment delivered on 24.1.1994 Long delay gives rise to unnecessary speculation in minds of parties to case Party who failed may have apprehension that argument raised at the bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating judgment nearly after five years Judgment set aside for deciding appeal afresh on merit. (Para 3)

       

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • practice and procedure
    • civil procedure
      • delivery of judgment (Para 3)
  • civil law
    • property law
      • specific performance (Para 1, 2)

Table of Contents

1. Agreement for transfer of life interest — subsequent transfer to third parties — suit for specific performance — decree affirmed by High Court. (Para 1 , 2 )

2. Long delay in delivery of judgment by the High Court after conclusion of hearing is sufficient ground to set aside the judgment. (Para 3 )

3. Long delay in delivering judgment creates speculation and apprehension that arguments raised at the bar were not reflected or appreciated during dictation. (Para 3 )

4. Excessive delay in the delivery of a judgment may justify setting it aside and remitting the case for a fresh decision on merits. (Para 3 )

5. Judgment set aside — case remitted to High Court for fresh decision on merits — interim directions regarding possession and rent income. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 )

6. Does a significant delay in delivering a judgment after the conclusion of hearings justify setting aside the decision?

Yes, long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations and apprehension that arguments raised at the bar were not reflected or appreciated, which may warrant setting aside the judgment and remitting the case for a fresh decision. (Para 3 )

7. How may a court protect the interests of parties when a case is remitted for a fresh hearing?

The court may issue interim directions, such as prohibiting the creation of third-party rights and requiring the deposit of rental income in court, to protect the interests of the parties pending the fresh decision. (Para 4 )

Order

The defendant-appellants, who are the subsequent purchasers, are in appeal. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Madras High Court dated 24th January, 1994 whereby the decree for specific performance of the agreement passed by the trial Court was affirmed.

2. On 26th June, 1977 respondent No. 2 entered into an agreement with first respondent herein, for transfer of his life interest in the property in dispute. On 29.12.79. respondent No. 2 transferred the rights in favour of the defendant-appellants who are the subsequent pruchasers for consideration of Rs. 4.40 lakhs. Under such circumstances, plaintiff-respondent No.1 brought a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial Court and the appeal preferred to the High Court was dismissed. It is in this way the defendant-appellants are before us.

3. Learned Attorney General appearing for the appellants urged that, before the High Court, the hearing of the appeal was concluded on 22nd March, 1999 but the judgment was delivered on 24th January, 1994—nearly five years after the hearing was concluded, and this long delay in delivery of judgment by itself is sufficient to set aside the judgment under appeal. Learned Attorney General has also relied upon decision of this Court in the case of Kunwar Singh and others v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj1. At present, we are not deposed to go into this broad question as urged by the learned Attorney General. However, it is correct to this extent that long delay in delivery of judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculations in the mind of parties to a case. Moreover, the appellants whose appeals have been dismissed by the High Court may have the apprehension that the arguments raised at the bar have not have been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment-nearly after five years. This is fairly not disputed by learned senior counsel, Shri K. Parasaran, appearing for respondent No. 1. We, therefore, on this short question, set aside the judgment under appeal without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and remit the case to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh, on merits. In view of the fact, that the matter has been pending for a considerable period of time, we request the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously, if possible, within six months.

4. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that when this appeal was filed in this Court, the interim relief prayed for by the appellants was refused. As a consequence, respondent No. 2 executed a sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1, and respondent No. 1 came in possession of the property and since then, he continues to be in possession. Under such circumstances, respondent No.1 being the lawful owner, so long the decree remains intact, is entitled to continue in possession over the property in dispute. Learned Attorney General urged that, in case respondent No.1 is to continue in possession over the property, the interest of the appellants may also to be protected. It is then, learned counsel for the parties made an agreed statement that during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court respondent No.1 shall not create any third party right in respect of the property in dispute and further shall deposit the rent income received from that property in the High Court after deducting the maintenance charges and tax liabilities which shall be subject to the decision of the appeal in the High Court. We order accordingly.

5. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. All the I.As. are disposed of accordingly.

(C.R.) Appeal allowed.

*************

Parallel Citations of other Journals :

Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani & Ors. v. H.P.A. International & Ors., 2000(1) Supreme 209 : 2000(1) JT 266 : (2000) 2 SCC 813 : 2000 SCFBRC 47 : AIR 2000 SC 775 : 2000(2) Civ. L.J. 590

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