IMPORTANT POINT
Proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, is not conferring a larger right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are occupying different parts of the same premises.

Headnote:(i) Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973-Hryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules-Rule 4-Eviction petition-Requirement to give material particulars-Rule 4 is not mandatory -It is only directory-Fact that landlord did not give all material particulars of his requirement in first instance-Whether can be made a ground for rejection of his application -Held No. (Para 7)
       (ii) Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973-Section 15(6)-Revisional jurisidction-Scope -Held, power vested in High Court under Section 15(6) is much wider than the power conferred on High Court under Section 115 CPC-High Court can go into the finding of fact arrived at by Courts below and, if found necessary, reverse such a finding of fact-However, this power not to be used in a routine manner-If High Court comes to the conclusion that finding of first Appellate Court is based on no eivdence-It is open to the High Court to interfere with such finding of fact. (Para 7)
       (iii) Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973-Section 13(3)(i)(b), proviso-Scope-Words entitled to apply again -Meaning of-Whether bar under the proviso is applicable only to filing of eviction application or is it a bar on right of landlord-Held, bar imposed is in fact a bar on right of landlord to seek actual eviction-Restriction contemplated under the proviso extends upto the stage when court or tribunal is considering case of the landlord for actual eviction-It is not confined to stage of filing of eviction petition only.
       Held : A careful perusal of the various provisos found in sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act clearly shows that the Legislature intended to further restrict the right of a landlord to seek eviction under the clauses mentioned in that sub-section apart from the restrictions imposed in Section 13 of the Act. For example, if the landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground that the same is required for the use of his son then, in view of the proviso applicable to that sub-section, he can seek eviction of the premises only once. Similarly, if the landlord is seeking eviction for his own occupation under Section 13(3)(b) of the Act then by virtue of the proviso applicable to that sub-section, the landlord can seek such eviction only once in regard to the premises of the same nature. Therefore, in our opinion, the bar imposed by the proviso is in fact a bar on the right of the landlord to seek actual eviction and not confined to the filing of the application for eviction. On behalf of the landlord, it is contended that while interpreting a Statute the courts should apply the rule of literal construction and if it is so interpreted then the wordings of the proviso would show that the restriction imposed by the proviso is restricted to the stage of filing of the application for eviction only. We agree with this contention of the landlord that normally the courts will have to follow the rule of literal construction which rule enjoins the court to take the words as used by the Legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies. But, there is an exception to this rule. That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in the Statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which the words are used or by reading the Statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning. In our opinion, if the expression "entitled to apply again" is given its literal meaning, it would defeat the very object for which the Legislature has incorporated that proviso in the Act inasmuch as the object of that proviso can be defeated by a landlord who has more than one tenanted premises by filing multiple applications simultaneously for eviction and thereafter obtain possession of all those premises without the bar of the proviso being applicable to him. We are of the opinion that this could not have been the purpose for which the proviso is included in the Act. If such an interpretation is given then the various provisos found in clause (3) of Section 13 would become otiose and the very object of the enactment would be defeated. Any such interpretation, in our opinion, would lead to absurdity. Therefore, we have no hesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the restriction contemplated under the proviso extends even up to the stage when the court or the tribunal is considering the case of the landlord for actual eviction and is not confined to the stage of filing of eviction petition only. (Para 11)
       (iv) Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973-Section 13(3)(i)(b), proviso-Scope-Eviction petition in respect of scheduled land for personal use and occupation -Landlord seeing eviction of a part of premises owned by it which was leased to appellant-Eviction of three other tenants from premises which were parts of same premises-On date of filing of present eviction petition, landlord had not obtained possession of any other tenanted premises-Subsequent possession obtained during pendency of these proceedings-Whether it would be an embargo for landlord to claim possession of present petition scheduled premises-Held, Yes-Whether landlord can file eviction petition seeking part of premises after having evicted other tenants-Held, No-Bar under the proviso held applicable if eviction of other tenants from premises, forming parts of same premises-Proviso not conferring larger right on landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are occupying different parts of same premises-Brij Lal Puri s case, (1979) 1 Rent Law Reporter 58 (P & H) : Overruled.
       Held : The proviso does not make any such distinction between a landlord seeking possession of the premises held by more than one tenant occupying the same building or the tenants occupying different independent buildings under the same landlord. As we have observed, the object of the proviso like any other provisions of the Act, is to further restrict the right of the landlord to seek eviction, if that be so, we do not find any justification in reading into the proviso something as conferring a larger right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are occupying different parts of the same premises. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the High Court in the above referred case does not lay down the correct law. (Para 13)
       When we find that the interpretation of the proviso by the High Court is wholly contrary to the object of the Statute, merely because it had remained to be the interpretation of the High Court for a considerable length of time, the same cannot be permitted to continue to be so when it is erroneous and it is so brought to our notice. We will be failing in our duty if we do not declare an erroneous interpretation of law by the High Court to be so, solely on the ground that it has stood the test of time. Since, in our opinion, in regard to the interpretation of the above proviso, no two views are possible, we are constrained to hold that the law declared by the Punjab & Haryana High Court with reference to the proviso is not the correct interpretation and hold that the said judgment is no more a good law. On behalf of the landlord, another argument based on equity was addressed before us giving various examples of the hardship that could be caused to the landlords by the interpretation we have now given to the said proviso. We do find that the proviso, as interpreted by us, may cause some hardship to the landlords in some cases but that is the intention of the Legislature which the courts have to take to its logical end so long as it remains in the Statute book. Merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat its object. We may notice at this stage that constitutional validity of the proviso is not in challenge before us, therefore, we will have to proceed on the footing that the proviso, as it stands, in intra vires and interpret the same as such. (Para 14)
       (v) Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973-Section 13(3)(i)(b), proviso-Applicability-It being a mixed question of law and fact-Eviction petition under Section 13(3)(i)(b)-Three premises already got vacated by landlord-Tenant did not specifically invoke proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b)-No issue was raised by Rent controller-Trial Court did not advert to this question-Tenant raised this objection before Appellate Authority-No evidence in regard to nature of building/land-Certain factual matrix has to be established to come to the conclusion that premises/land eviction whereof has been obtained by landlord, belong to same class of building or tenanted land-Litigation pending since 1979-Issue framed-Case remitted to trial Court for recording evidence and its decision-Rent Contoller directed to decide case within a period of three months. (Para 15)
       (vi) Interpretation of Statutes-Rules of-Normally courts will have to follow rule of literal construction-However, when application of literal construction of words in the Statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency-Object of the statute to be taken into consideration. (Para 12)
       (vii) Constitution of India-Arts. 133, 134-Appeal-Erroneous interpretation of law by High Court-It cannot be permitted to continue to be so, solely on ground that it had stood test of time. (Para 14)

JUDGMENT

Santosh Hegde, J.-Respondent-landlord had filed an eviction petition before the Court of Rent Controller, Jagadhri in the year 1979 seeking eviction of the appellant herein from the petition scheduled land situated on Jagadhri Road, Yamuna Nagar under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) claiming that the petition scheduled land is required by it for its personal use and occupation. As required under that Act it also contended that it is not occupying in the urban area of Yamuna Nagar any other rented land for the purpose of its business not it has vacated any such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act. It also alleged in the said petition that the premises already in its possession are not sufficient for its requirement.

2. Appellant-tenant opposed the said petition on a number of grounds, primarily on the ground that the petition scheduled premises was not a rented land but was a building as contemplated under the Act and he also alleged that the landlord had not given material particulars in regard to its requirement of additional space. By an amendment of his objection, the tenant further pleaded that the landlord had filed several other applications against other tenants alleging personal requirement and during the pendency of the eviction petition in question, it had obtained possession of building and land from three other tenants, hence, the landlord s claim for his eviction is not bona fide. In its rejoinder petition, the landlord admitted that it had obtained possession of three premises through eviction proceedings and the same along with petition scheduled land was required for its extension of coal yard, the foundry and for storage of foundry material like sand, earth, fire wood, fire-bricks etc. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration :-

1. Whether the applicant Company is a private limited company and whether Ram Avtar is a competent to file the present application for ejectment? OPA.

2. Whether the property in dispute is a rented land and if so its effect? OPA.

3. If issues No.2 is proved in the affirmative whether the applicant company requires the premises in dispute for its bonafide use and occupation? OPA.

4. Whether the suit land is a non-residential building and as such the ground of ejectment for personal use is not available to the applicant? OPP.

5. Relief.

Additional issues framed on 15.10.1986:

4A. Whether the personal necessity of the applicant stands satisfied during the pendency of the present petition? OPP.

3. Trial Court accepted the case of the landlord and ordered eviction of the appellant.

4. In appeal, the Appellate Authority remanded the matter back to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision. This order of remand came to be challenged before the High Court and the High Court was pleased to accept this challenge and directed the appellate court to re-hear and decide the appeal itself. It, however, restricted the scope of re-hearing to be cofined to Issue Nos. 3 and 4A only. On remand the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the tenant and decided the said issues in favour of the tenant. Being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, the landlord preferred a revision petition before the High Court which came to be allowed in favour of the landlord by the judgment of the High Court pronounced on 26th of May, 1998. The tenant preferred a review petition before the High Court alleging certain specific omissions in the judgment of the High Court and the said review petition being dismissed by an order of the High Court dated 3rd of July, 1998, the tenant has preferred the above noted civil appeal.

5. Before us on behalf of the tenant Shri M.L. Verma, learned senior counsel has raised the following questions :--

(i) That on

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2000 Supreme(SC) 570

IMPORTANT POINTProviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, is not conferring a larger right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are occupying different parts of the same premises.

Cases Referred (1)

IMPORTANT POINT
Proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, is not conferring a larger right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are occupying different parts of the same premises.