IMPORTANT POINTS
1. An appeal is only a continuation of the hearing of the suit and even if at the time of institution of the suit for eviction clause 13-A as introudced in the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, was not in force, but at the time of appeal such a clause was introduced, the tenant in appeal becomes entitled to its protection.
2. If the enactment comes into force during a period it only operates on those events occurring then but the presumption against retrospective legislation does not necessarily apply to an enactment merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing.

Headnote:(i) C.P. and Berar Regulation of Accommodation Act, 1947-Section 2-C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949-Clause 13-A, clause 2(4-A) House-Definition of-Suit for eviction on ground that premises is open land and provisions of that Order was not applicable to premises-Suit decreed -Finding of trial Court that premises in possession of tenant was an open plot and not a house as defined in Clause 13 of the Order-Appeal-Amendment of Order substituting word premises for the word house , wherever it occurs - Sub-clause (4-A) inserted in clause 2-Clause 13-A introduced w.e.f. 26-10-1989-Whether provisions of clause 13-A and 2(4-A) would be applicable to the case-Held, Yes-Tenant in appeal held, entitled to its protection -Appeal being a rehearing of the suit, word suit in the order to be understood to include an appeal-High Court held not justified in holding that no proceedings were pending against the tenant as on the date-View of the High Court that Clause 13-A is retrospective held incorrect.
       Held : In theory the appeal is only a continuation of the hearing of the suit. Accordingly, the word "suit" in the Order has to be understood to include an appeal. The result is that at the time of the institution of the suit for eviction clause 13-A was not in force, but at the time of appeal such a clause is introduced, the tenant in appeal becomes entitled to its protection. We draw support for these propositions from the three decisions of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in holding that there was no appeal filed or pending against the tenant in this case, although a decree for eviction had been passed in the suit, that decree was under challenge in a proceeding arising out of that suit in appeal and was pending in a court. Thus an appeal being a re-hearing of the suit, as stated earlier, the inference drawn by the High Court that no proceedings were filed or pending against the tenant as on the date would not the correct. (Para 7)
       (ii) C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 -Clause 13-A as introduced w.e.f. 29.10.1989-Caluse 2(4-A) as inserted on 27.6.1989-Applicability -Provisions came into force when appeal against eviction decree was pending-Held, though the provision is prospective in force, has retroactive effect -Tenant in appeal held, entitled to its protection.
       Held : The provision came into force when the appeal was pending. Therefore, though the provision is prospective in force, has "retroactive effect". This provision merely provides for a limitation to be imposed for the future in no way affects anything done by a party in the past and statutes providing for new remedies for enforcement of an existing right will apply to future as well as past causes of action. The reason being that the said statutes do not affect existing rights and in the present case, the insistence is upon obtaining of permission of the Controller to enforce a decree for eviction and it is, therefore, not retrospective in effect at all, since it has only retroactive force. (Para 8)
       (iii) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE -Appeal-It is a rehearing-In moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against-Suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (Para 5)
       (iv) AMENDMENTS-Applicability -Presumption against retrospective legislation-It does not necessarily apply to an enactment merely because a part of requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing-If the enactment comes into force during a period it only operates on those events occurring then-Clause 13A as introduced in C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, w.e.f. 26.10.1989-Whether retrospective in effect?-(No)-Tenant in appeal held entitled to its protection.
       Held : The problem concerning retrospectivity concerning enactments depends on events occurring over a period. If the enactment comes into force during a period it only operates on those events occurring then. We must bear in mind that the presumption against retrospective legislation does not necessarily apply to an enactment merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing. The fact that as from a future date tax is charged on a source of income which has been arranged or provided for before the date of the imposition of the tax does not mean, that a tax in retrospectively imposed as held in Commissioner of Customs and Excise v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd., 1975(1) WLR 1661. Therefore, the view of the High Court that clause 13-A is retrospective in effect is again incorrect. (Para 9)

JUDGMENT

Rajendra Baju, J.-Leave granted in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 6767-6768 of 1999.

2. Respondent No.1 filed a civil suit against the appellant regarding the plot in Civil Suit No. 268 of 1987 on the ground that the premises is open land and the provisions of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Order ) was not applicable to the said premises and that the tenancy of the appellant stood terminated by efflux of time followed by a notice dated 8th March, 1986 with effect from 1st April, 1986. The appellant took the stand that the premises in question is not an open plot but is a house as defined in the Order as the said land is a part and parcel of the residential house and the residential house cannot be used without the said land. Further it was contended that premission to construct a shed had been granted, the open land was no longer an open land as such shed had been constructed with permission. There is a will also situate in this land which is for the use of the occupants of the house in the premises and, therefore, clause 13-A of the Order would dis-entitle the respondent from obtaining the relief of a decree. The Civil Judge, Akola, passed a decree. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging the findings of the trial court that the premises in possession of the appellant is an open plot and not a house as defined in clause 13 of the Order. On 27th June, 1989 the Order was amended by substituting the word "premises" for the word "house", wherever it occurs, any by this amendment, sub-clause (4-A) was also inserted in clause 2 whereby lands not being used for agricultural purposes also stood included in the definition of the "premises". Thereafter the State of Maharashtra made another amendment which became effective from 26th October, 1989 and introduced clause 13-A in the Order to the effect that no decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceeding filed and pending against the tenant in any court or before any authority unless the landlord produces a written permission of the Conroller as required by sub-clause (1) of clause 13 . At that stage, the appellant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code to contend that in view of the amendment introduced by insertion of clause 13-A read with the definition of "premises" in clause 2(4-A) the Order stood extended to open plots and, therefore, even on the basis of the plaint allegations the same was liable to be rejected. In the meanwhile, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench challenging the validity of clause 2(4-A) and clause 13-A of the Order on the ground that the same are ultra vires Section 2 of the C.P. and Berar Regulation of Accommodation Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The High Court stayed the proceedings in the appeal pending before the District Court. A Division Bench of the High Court declared the said provisions in clause 2(4-A) and clause 13-A of the Order ultra vires the Act. The appellant preferred an appeal by special leave to this Court. This Court allowed the said appeal and the matter stood remanded to the High Court with a direction to restore to its file the original Writ Petition and to decide the question with regard to the applicability of clause 2(4-A) and clause 13-A of the Order to the facts as available in the present case and to dispose of the Writ Petition afresh as to the vires of the clauses, if so warranted. In the meanwhile, Joint District Court, Akola, allowed the appeal filed by the appellant and the suit filed by the respondent No.1 was dismissed. A revision application was filed before the High Court questioning the correctness of the order made in the appeal which is pending consideration by the High Court.

3. After remand in the writ petition, the High Court took the view that there was no appeal filed or pending against the tenant on 26th October, 1989 when the seco

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2000 Supreme(SC) 571

Cases Referred (8)