SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND V. KHALID, JJ.
Motiram Ghelabhai (deceased by L.R.), Appellant
Versus
Jagan Nagar (deceased by L.R.s) and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 239 of 1985 (arising out of SLP (C) No.10463 of 1982), D/-28-2-1985.
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Section 50, 12(2),(3),(1), 50 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 106 - Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939 - Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates Act, 1944 - Bombay Act 3 of 1949 - Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 - Section 7, 5(l1) - Non-Agricultural Land - Construction - Recover Vacant Possession - Suit for Ejectment - Respondents-plaintiffs gave a lease of an open plot admeasuring forming part of a non-agricultural land situated in village to appellant-defendant for a period of 10 years for purpose of running a flour mill after making necessary construction thereon at an yearly rent of Rs. 101 - There was a clause for renewal of term but if it was not renewed lessors were given right to recover vacant possession on removal of construction at expiry of the initial term - Admittedly, there was no renewal of the term and therefore on expiry of 10 years lessors became entitled to recover vacant possession but appellant-defendant was permitted to hold over - By a notice respondents plaintiffs called upon appellant-defendant to vacate and hand over vacant possession of suit plot but as notice was not complied with a suit in ejectment was filed against appellant-defendant - Whether a pending appeal would be governed by Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 upon Part II of Act being made applicable to area in which suit premises were situate during its pendency - Whether protection of sec. 12(1) of Act would be available in regard to a pending appeal when Part II is made applicable to particular area did not arise for consideration nor was decided in that case - Whether present case falls within or outside purview of proviso to S. 50 depends upon what is true nature and scope of proviso introduced at end of S. 50 - Whether Act applied only to transferred cases and not others - Whether on principle that appeal was in nature of a rehearing of suit same should be decided in accordance with provisions of 1947 Act which had come into force during its pendency – Held, Court took view that having regard to proviso, to S. 50 as it originally stood Act was given retrospective operation only to a limited extent and execution proceedings and appeals were excluded from this effect and were to be law in force at governed by time when the decrees were passed and therefore, tenant was not entitled to protection of 1947 Act and was liable to be evicted - Really speaking this decision had concluded point raised before court in present appeal - But since in Shah Bhojrajs case a distinction was made between sub-sec. (1) of S. 12 on one hand and sub-secs. (2) and (3) on other and it was held that former provision was retrospective in operation and latter prospective, Counsel for appellant defendant made valiant attempt to bring his clients case within purview of S. 12(1) by putting forward plausible contention that his case was not covered by proviso to S. 50 read with separate paragraph added thereto at all on ground that said proviso together with new separate paragraph added thereto was not an independent provision enacting any substantive law therein but was linked with main provision contained in S. 50 and had been introduced merely with a view to qualify or create an exception to what is contained in main provision but that attempt has failedin view of our conclusion on true nature and scope of said proviso read with new separate paragraph added to it - Appeal dismissed.
Judgment
TULZAPURKAR, J.:- The short question raised in this appeal is whether a pending appeal would be governed by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short the Act) upon the Part II of the Act being made applicable to the area in which the suit premises were situate during its pendency?
2. The material facts giving rise to the question are these : by a registered lease dated 3-6-1957 (Ext. 75) the respondents-plaintiffs gave a lease of an open plot admeasuring about 7,500 sq. ft. forming part of a non-agricultural land bearing Survey No. 70/4/1 situated in village Kalwada in Valsad District, Gujarat State to the appellant-defendant for a period of 10 years for the purpose of running a flour mill after making necessary construction thereon at an yearly rent of Rs. 101/-. There was a clause for the renewal of the term but if it was not renewed the lessors were given the right to recover vacant possession on removal of construction at the expiry of the initial term. Admittedly, there was no renewal of the term and therefore on the expiry of 10 years the lessors became entitled to recover vacant possession on 3-6-1967 but the appellant-defendant was permitted to hold over. By a notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act issued on 2-12-1970 the respondents plaintiffs called upon the appellant-defendant to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit plot after midnight of 2-6-1971.that is to say on 3-6-1971 but as the notice was not complied with a suit in ejectment was filed against the appellant-defendant on 12-7-1972. Since the suit premises were not governed by any rent legislation eviction on the ground of determination of tenancy under Transfer of Property Act was available to the respondents plaintiffs. The trial court negatived all the defences that were raised by the defendant-appellant and decreed the suit for ejectment in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs on 28-2-1977. On 20-6-1977 the appellant-defendant challenged the decree by filing an appeal to the District Court, Navsari being Civil Appeal No. 60 of 1977.
3. While aforesaid appeal was pending in the District Court the State of Gujarat by its Notification dated 26th March, 1980 applied Part II of the Act to village Kalwada where the suit premises were situated. Thereupon the defendant-appellant with the permission of the court raised the contention that he was entitled to the protection of Part II of the Act and since none of the grounds on which eviction could be had by the landlord under Part II had been made out by the respondents plaintiffs they were not entitled to recover possession of the suit plot by virtue of the decree passed by the trial court. That contention was refuted on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs on the ground that in view of the proviso to S. 50 of the Act and particularly the latter part thereof Part II of the Act had no retrospective operation so far as pending appeals were concerned and such appeals had to be disposed of as if Part II of the Act was not applicable. The learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal took the view that the proviso to S. 50 read with the latter part thereof expressly enacted that pending appeals arising out of decrees or orders passed before the coming into operation of the Act had to be disposed of as if the Act had not been passed and therefore the appellant defendant was not entitled to any protection as claimed by him and the respondents plaintiffs were entitled to the decree for possession; he therefore dismissed the appeal. The High Court confirmed the view taken by the learned Assistant Judge by dismissing the appellant-defendants second appeal summarily. The appellant-defendant has challenged before us the aforesaid view taken by the courts below in this appeal.
4. In support of the plea that his clients appeal pending in the Distiict Court was governed by Part II of the Act no sooner that Part was made applicable to village Kalwada, Counsel for
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