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2000 Supreme(SC) 813

2000(3) Supreme 395
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madras High Court)
K.T. Thomas & M.B. Shah, JJ.
M. Ramalinga Thevar -Appellant
versus
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2721 of 2000
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3229 of 2000)
Decided on 19-4-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : N. Sundaravaradan, Sr. Advocate, R.N. Keshwani, Chandra Kanta Nayak and Ramlal Roy, Advocates.

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the acquisition proceedings lapsed.

Headnote:Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 11-A r/w Section 6-Time limit for passing award-Exclusion of time during which proceedings stayed-Even when dispossession alone is stayed by Court period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from time fixed for passing award.

       Held : As per Explanation to Section 11-A the period of exclusion from the time is the period during which "any action or proceedings" to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. We have no doubt that one of the actions contemplated pursuant to the declaration is taking possession of the land, though such action is a post-award step in normal circumstances and in emergent circumstances it can as well as be a pre-award step. Nonetheless, taking possession is one of the actions to be adopted as a follow-up measure pursuant to the declaration envisaged in Section 6 of the Act. The consequence mentioned in Section 11A is a self-operating statutory process and, therefore, it can operate only when the conditions specified therein conjoin together. The consequence would step in only when there is fusion of all the conditions stipulated therein. If there is any stay regarding any of the actions to be taken pursuant to the declaration then the consequence of lapse would not happen. (Para 6)

       The position is now well settled that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the acquisition proceedings lapsed. (Para 10)

       

JUDGMENT

Thomas, J.-Leave granted.

2. A Land Acquisition Collector passed award only after the expiry of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the "Act"). The owner of the land wanted a declaration that proceedings for acquisition covered by the said publication stood lapsed on the expiry of the said period of two years. But a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras which the owner of the land approached for such a relief, repelled his contentions. The High Court took into account the time during which proceedings for taking possession of the land were stayed by an order passed in a writ petition. When that period was excluded from the time fixed for passing the award the Division Bench held that the award was passed within the permitted range of time. The owner of the land challenges the said judgment in this appeal.

3. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant we did not find the necessity to issue notice to the respondent State as the appeal can be disposed of without resorting to such a course.

4. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the gazette on 27.2.1991. That notification was challenged by the appellant in writ petition No. 9715 of 1991 which he filed before the High Court of Madras on 16.7.1991. On the same day an order was passed by the High Court staying dispossession of the appellant from the property involved. Despite the pendency of the said writ petition the Government published declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 10.4.1992. But the award was passed only on 16.9.1994. Thus, there is no doubt that the award was passed only after the expiry of two years from the date of declaration.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since there was no stay for passing an award the period of two years should have been counted from 10.4.1992 which had expired on 9.4.1994 and by such expiry the proceedings had become lapsed. Section 11A and the Explanation thereto (omitting the proviso which is not material in this case) are extracted below :

"11A. Period within which an award shall be made.-(1) The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.

Explanation.-In computing the period of two years referred to in this section the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded)."

6. As per the Explanation the period of exclusion from the time is the period during which "any action or proceedings" to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. We have no doubt that one of the actions contemplated pursuant to the declaration is taking possession of the land, though such action is a post-award step in normal circumstances and in emergent circumstances it can as well as be a pre-award step. Nonetheless, taking possession is one of the actions to be adopted as a follow-up measure pursuant to the declaration envisaged in Section 6 of the Act. The consequence mentioned in Section 11A is a self-operating statutory process and, therefore, it can operate only when the conditions specified therein conjoin together. The consequence would step in only when there is fusion of all the conditions stipulated therein. If there is any stay regarding any of the actions to be taken pursuant to the declaration then the consequence of lapse would not happen.

7. A three judge bench of this court had considered the scope of the Explanation to Section 11A of the Act in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat1:

"The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the aw









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