ORDER

The appellant herein is aggrieved by the decision of the High Court which had partly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent against the decree of the trial Court which was in favour of the appellant.

2. The facts which unfold from the pleadings and the evidence which were led before the trial Court are that the respondent No. 1 is a manufacturer of cement. It had entered into an agreement with the State Trading Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the STC ) to supply 1,20,000 tonnes of cement which the STC was to export to Iran. The said respondent agreed to act on behalf of STC to arrange for the actual loading and shipping of the cement from the port of Tuticorin.

3. Pursuant to this agreement between the respondent No. 1 and STC, the appellant herein by agreement dated 5.12.1974 was appointed by the said respondent as the forwarding and handling agent. Clause 1(d) of the agreement stipulated the rate of loading. Clause 7 specifies the handling and another charges which were payable by the said respondent to the appellant. Clause 14 with which we are concerned in this appeal related to the preparation of laytime statement and the said clause reads as follows :

"14. Immediately after the sailing of the vessel you should send us laytime statement prepared together with all certificates for stoppage of work etc. to enable us to take with agents/owners for settlement.

You will endeavour to furnish us the laytime calculations etc. in about 3 weeks time from the date of sailing of each vessel and we would make efforts to have the claim settled by the ship owners in about 3 months from the date."

4. It was the case of the appellant that the said respondent had stipulated the quantum of cement to be loaded per day. If the required speed was not maintained then the said respondent was entitled to claim demurrage from the appellant. On the other hand, if the loading was done in the quicker time then the amount of time saved would be calculated and the appellant would get despatch money for the time so saved. It was in this connection that aforesaid clause 14 required the preparation of laytime statements. It appears that the said respondent, in turn, was entitled to reimbursement of the amounts payable to the appellant and on the receipt of the laytime statements, contemplated by clause 14 the said respondent would make a claim from the owners of the vessels or their agents. From the very nature of things the statements were to be furnished only after the date of sailing of each vessel. Clause 14 contemplated that these statements would be furnished within three weeks of the date of sailing and the respondent No. 1 would make efforts to have their claim settled by the ship owners in about three months time from that date.

5. It seems that on the basis of this laytime statement so prepared the appellant made a claim for Rs. 3,06,665.53 as being payable to the appellant in terms of the said agreement dated 5.12.1974. In the plaint it was inter alia stated the respondent No. 1 had wanted three months time to pay the despatch money on its acceptance of the laytime calculations and this was reflected in clause 14 of the agreement wherein it is mentioned that the said respondent would endeavour to have, the claim settled with the vessel owner in about three months time from the date of the receipt of the laytime calculations.

6. The case of the respondent No. 1 was that it was the liability of the ship owner to make payment to the appellant and it is for this reason clause 14 contemplated, the furnishing of the laytime statements by the appellant to the said respondent who in turn was to realise money from the vessel owner and then pay the same to the appellant. It was also contended that necessary parties had not been impleaded as defendants and it was obligatory on the part of the appellant to implead the ship owners who alone were held to be liable to pay despatch money.

7. On the basis of the pleadings the trial Court framed t