IMPORTANT POINT
The question of prior approval of the competent Authority under section 16(3)(a) of U.p. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, in case of an order of termination of an employee of a minority institution like that of appellant, does not arise.

JUDGEMENT

Pattanaik, J.-This appeal is directed against the Judgement ofthe Allahabad High Court, allowing the writ petition filed by the private respondents. The respondents who were the employees of the appellant institution, filed the writ petition, challenging the orders of termination dated 13.1.1989 passed by the Management. The Sole ground of attack was that the prior approval of the competent authoroty, as required under section 16G(3)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter reffered to as the Act ), not having been taken, the order of termination, is invalid and inoperative. The High Court, following the majority judgement of the said court in the case of J.K. Kalra vs. R.I.G.S. and Ors.1 set aside the order of termination of the services of the private respondents, passed by the managing comitee. The institution is a minority institution within the ambit of Article 30 of the constitution, is not disputed. In the circumstances, the question that arises for consideration is whether thw provisions of section 16G(3)(a) of the act would have application to the minority institutions. The full bench of Allahabad High Court in Kalra in its majority judgement, after considering the provisions of Section 16G(3)(a) of the act and the regulations framed thereunder, came to hold that there are sufficient guidelines availaible to the authority under the said provision for according or refusing the approval to the decision of the committee of Management, and, therefore, there is no reason to hold that the provision will have no application to the minority institution.

2. Mr.P. P. Rao, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, contented that the conclusion of the High Court that Regulation 44 provides enough guidelines for exercise of the powers for approval or disapproval of the decision of the Management, is on the face of it unsustainable ianasmuch as the Regulation 44 merely prscribes the time period within in which the appropriate authority is required to communicate his/or her decision to the management and further provides that ifcomplete papers have not been received, then the approving officer may require it to resubmit its proposal in complete form. But there is o whisper, indicating the criteria on which the approving officer is required to take his decision, and, therefore, the High Court committed error in relying upon the aforesaid Regulation, as the guidelines for exercise of power by the approving authority. Mr. Rao further contended that provisions of Section 16G(3) of the Act, conferring power of approval on the District Inspector of schools, having been found to be inadequate, the Uttar Pradesh legislature enacted Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982), Under the 1982 Act, the power of approval has been conferred on the Commission that is to say the U.p. Secondary Education Services Commission, established under Section 3 of the said Act and no teacher would be dismissed or removed from the service or reduced in rank unless prior approval of the Commission had been obtained. Section 30 of the aforesaid Act of 1982, exempts the applicaility of the said Act to the minority institutions. The legislative intent, therefore, is crystal clear that the provisions regarding the prior approval of any competent authority in a case where teacher of an institution is dismissed, removed or reduced in tank, will not apply to a minority institution. This being the position, the impugned judgment of the High Court, interfering with the order of termination of the employee of the minority institution, passed by the Board of Management, is wholly unsustainable and, therefore, the said judgment is liable to be interfered with by this Court.

3. Mr. O.P. Sharma, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondents, on the other hand contended that the provisions of Section 16 G(3)(a) of the Act is merely a provision