IMPORTANT POINT
The doctrine of estoppel has its fullest play in the contextual facts of this case. Since there is existing no justifiable reason for change of quantum of land as mentioned in Section 6(3) notice under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, the State Government cannot but be said to be bound by its own notice.

Headnote:West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953-Section 6(3)-Acquisition of land situated in a Tea Estate of the appellant-Notice issued on 1.11.62-Informing that land of Appellant s Tea Garden vested in State Govt. free from all encumbrance-It also informed that out of total land only a part was proposed to be acquired-Objections were filed against proposed retention of an area of 1451.40 acres-No action for 4½ years-Another Notice issued on 21-6-67 and then on 26-8-69 reviewing earlier notice-Changing quantum of land-Order passed on 15-12-77 adversely affecting appellant-Challenged in writ petition-Set aside by Single Judge but reversed by Division Bench on appeal-Appeal against to Supreme Court-Supreme Court finding Appellate Court misread Section 6(3) (Para 14)-It also found complete error in appreciating even factual aspect of the matter (Para 22) Whether Notice of 26-8-1989 is mala fide? (Yes)-Is State Government estopped? (Yes)-Appeal allowed-D.B. reversed and Single Judge s order restored.
       Held : The notice dated 26th August, 1969 cannot possibly be issued otherwise then a notice to reopen the issue. The change of stance as regards the finality of the order has been very strongly criticised by Mr. Ranjit Kumar and ascribed to be totally mala fide in order to obtain the benefit of the compensation money and if we may say so, we find some justification in such a criticism. The notice dated 26.8.69 does not bear any provision of law under which the notice was issued - governmental action must always be in accordance with law, at least it is so expected rather than de hors it. The notice itself records "in suppression of notice No. 13942-L.Ref., dated 1st November, 1962" - why this supersession!! Mr. Ranjit Kumar answers it as being unlawful gain of compensation amount and thus the action smacks of mala fide motive. Let us however examine this issue in slightly more greater detail upon a deeper probe on to the admitted factual parameters : Section 6(3) notice was served upon due compliance with all the requirements and orders passed thereon, but after a lapse of about 9 years the notice itself stands superseded! Why so? What was the reason for this sudden change - Mr. Ray however answered the same more in avoidance rather than in factual situation! Obviously there was neither any option left: statutory authorities are authorised to act in terms of the statute only - Under what provision can an earlier notice, assuming of course, that there was no order as such, though however as noticed above, the same is an admitted state of affairs, be superseded - There was in fact no provision of review even on the date of the notice - Thus resultantly no provision of law could be recorded therein! Needless to record that the notice dated 26th August, 1969 was challenged before the High Court and the High Court directed the State Government to dispose of the pending Section 6(3) proceedings within two months from the date of the order: But what happened thereafter is not only interesting but note-worthy: The learned Single Judge of the High Court directed the disposal of the Section 6(3) notice which admittedly referred 1151 acres. But the order passed was for 3059 acres!! Is it justified? Can the government act on its own ipsi dixit - The answer obviously will be in the negative. What about the doctrine of estoppel - Would the governmental action beyond the approach of the doctrine of estoppel? The answer again cannot but be in the negative. Doctrine of estoppel is a doctrine of prudence - It is a doctrine of ethics, justice and equity. In this context reference may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2001(2) SCC 41 wherein this Court upon reliance on Phipson on Evidence (Fourteenth Edn.) has the following to state as regards estoppels by conduct.
       In modern times the doctrine has been extended so as to embrace practically any act or statement by a party which it would be unconscionable to permit him to deny.
       Since there is existing no justifiable reasons for change of quantum of land as mentioned in Section 6(3) notice, the State Government cannot but be said to be bound by its own notice : The doctrine of Estoppel has its fullest play in the contextual facts. (Paras 27,28,29, 30)
       Held also : We are not inclined to deal with the issue of malice and motive in detail, suffice however to record that accepted methodology of governmental working being fairness and the same is lacking in its entirety in the matter under consideration. Shortly put the situation seems to be the following : The word supersession has a definite connotation in English language and has also its due jurisprudential affect. The Governor of the State issues a notification, obviously upon consideration of all the relevant materials, that notification stands superseded by another Governor of the State without however, ascribing any reason whatsoever - as noticed earlier, formation of opinion ought to be with reasons and not de hors the same !! What was the reason for this change - Apparently there is no answer; the state of affairs existing in the year 1962-64 did not find any change in itself but the Government notification stands superseded - it is on this score that Mr. Ranjit Kumar severely criticised the governmental action as totally unfair, mala fide and devoid of any reason. His comments as regards motivation toward more money may not strictly be unjustified since time has now come for the payment of compensation. Assuming the proceedings were pending, why it was kept pending for such a long period of time? There seems to be no reason whatsoever. Governmental action must be based on utmost good faith, belief and ought to be supported with reason on the basis of the state of law - if the action is otherwise or run counter to the same the action cannot but be ascribed to be mala fide and it would be a plain exercise of judicial power to countenance such action and set the same aside for the purpose of equity good conscience and justice. Justice of the situation demands action clothed with bona fide reason and necessities of the situation in accordance with the law. But if the same runs counter, law courts would not be in a position to countenance the same. Action in the present context cannot be said to be in the category as noticed in the preceding paragraph but is otherwise as such cannot have the concurrence or acceptance from the Court. It appears prima facie to be tainted with motive and thus not sustainable - this aspect of the matter has been completely overlooked by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court and as such the same cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, these appeals succeed. The order of the Division Bench of the High Court stands set aside and quashed and that of the learned Single Judge stands restored. No order for costs. (Paras 33,34,35 and 36).

JUDGMENT

Banerjee, J.-These appeals for consideration before this Court are directed against a common judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court containing an order of reversal in favour of the State of West Bengal, has a chequered career, but before taking a run up as to its career being chequered, a brief factual reference needs to be adverted at this juncture for appreciation of the contentions raised in the matter.

2. The appellant is a registered partnership firm said to be the Proprietor of Tea Estate known as Rohini Tea Estate which stands purchased by the appellant in 1960 in a public auction held by the Official Liquidator attached to the High Court at Calcutta. The Tea Estate admittedly, comprised of a total area of 5042.86 acres of land. Though the appellant is said to have spent a substantial amount of money but we are not inclined to go on to the details thereof, neither the verasity of the same need to be gone into by reason by the peculiar factual situation and the issues involved in the appeal.

3. On the factual score it appears that on 1st November, 1962, a notice under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 was issued intimating thereunder that lands measuring more or less 4959.27 acres comprising the Tea Estate have vested in the State Government free from encumbrances under Section 5 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. While some submissions though advanced before the Court in regard to the effect of the statute but we need not dilate on this score since on a proper conspectus of the issue, this Court earlier categorically came to a conclusion that by and under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 pre-existing right, title and interest in the land stood extinguished and ceased to have effect on and from the notified dated i.e. June 1, 1956 and stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances (vide State of West Bengal v. Suburban Agriculture Diary & Fisheries Pvt. Ltd.1) and on the wake of the aforesaid, further deliberations on the issue are neither required nor we are entering the arena therefor and if we may so, fairness has prompted the learned Advocates to also reach unanimity in regard thereto.

4. The notice (dated 1st November, 1962) however, intended to inform that 1451.40 acres of land as described in the schedule appended therein, have been declared to be surplus to the requirement of the said tea garden and, therefore, 3544.17 acres were retainable by the tea garden as against 4994.57 (assuming the quantum of land to be correct as recorded in the notice). The notice further recorded that the State Government proposed to make an order to that effect and directed the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to take charge of 1451.40 acres in accordance with the provisions of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. Objection was asked for and by the return letter dated 22nd November, 1962, the appellant herein objected to the proposed retention of an area of 1451.40 acres with the request that retention for the governmental purposes can only be restricted to 777.12 acres from the concerned Tea Estate. Incidentally, 1451.40 acres have been arrived at on the basis of Field Inquiry Report under Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 and upon consideration thereof by the Tea Garden Advisory Committee at a meeting held on 9.7.1962. It is, however, convenient to note the relevant extracts from the report of the Advisory Committee for its proper appreciation:

"The Chairman of the Tea Board said that principle of two acres of other land for every one acre under Tea bushes should be applied to this garden as had been broadly done in several other cases. It was pointed out that if the entire area of 1,451.40 acres was resumed from the Tea Garden, as recommended by the Settlement Officer, Cooch Behar, the garden would be left with 2,378.89 acres of land in addition to 3,175.28 acres of land under Tea Bushes. Therefore, it was agreed that prima facie

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2001 Supreme(SC) 631

Cases Referred (2)