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2001 Supreme(SC) 661

BRIJESH KUMAR, R. C. LAHOTI, A. S. ANAND
Union Of India – Appellant
Versus
Harjeet Singh Sandhu – Respondent


Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

  1. The exercise of power under Section 19 of the Army Act, 1950, read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954, cannot be solely based on the ground that Court Martial proceedings have not commenced within the prescribed limitation period of three years under Section 122 of the Army Act. The limitation does not automatically bar the exercise of such administrative powers (!) (!) .

  2. The term ‘impracticable’ in Rule 14(2) of the Army Rules is to be understood broadly, encompassing situations where trial by Court Martial becomes legally impossible, impermissible, or not practicable due to practical difficulties or other circumstances, including delay or procedural issues. It is not confined to absolute impossibility but includes circumstances where trial is not feasible in practice (!) (!) (!) .

  3. The concept of ‘impracticable’ is distinct from ‘impossible’ or ‘impermissible’ and involves some degree of reason and practical consideration. The assessment of impracticability is subjective and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, with the courts exercising judicial review to ensure the exercise of power is not mala fide, arbitrary, or based on extraneous grounds (!) (!) .

  4. The power under Section 19 can be exercised both before and after the trial by Court Martial, and even after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by Section 122, provided the circumstances justify the exercise of such power. The limitation period does not, on its own, deprive the authority of the power to take administrative action under Section 19 (!) (!) .

  5. The exercise of power under Section 19 is subject to judicial review, and courts will scrutinize whether such exercise was mala fide, based on irrelevant grounds, or a result of abuse of power. The courts will presume the validity of the administrative action but will interfere if illegality or unconstitutionality is clearly established (!) .

  6. The broad legal principles establish that the authority can invoke Section 19 and Rule 14 even when Court Martial proceedings are barred by limitation, delay, or procedural irregularities, provided the circumstances render the trial impracticable or not feasible. The decision must be made reasonably, fairly, and based on relevant facts, and not for extraneous or malicious reasons (!) (!) .

  7. The legal framework emphasizes the distinct and independent nature of disciplinary proceedings under Section 19 and judicial or Court Martial proceedings, with each having specific conditions and limitations. The power under Section 19 is an administrative measure that can be invoked independently of Court Martial proceedings, even if they are barred or have become impracticable (!) (!) .

  8. The interpretation of terms like ‘impracticable’ or ‘impossible’ must consider the context, legislative intent, and the purpose of maintaining discipline and high standards within the armed forces. The legislative scheme is designed to allow flexibility in disciplinary measures, especially in circumstances where Court Martial proceedings cannot be initiated or completed in time (!) (!) .

  9. Judicial review plays a crucial role in ensuring that the exercise of power under Section 19 is not abused, and that decisions are made based on relevant and sufficient material, with fairness and reasonableness. The courts will not re-evaluate the correctness of the material but will scrutinize for procedural fairness and absence of mala fide (!) .

  10. The legal principles clarify that the limitations prescribed by law do not necessarily bar administrative disciplinary actions, and each case must be assessed on its facts, considering delays, procedural irregularities, and the circumstances that may justify invoking Section 19 despite the lapse of time or procedural hurdles (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need further elaboration or specific legal advice based on these key points.


JUDGMENT

R.C. Lahoti, J.—Harjeet Singh Sandhu, the respondent in S.L.P. (C) No. 5155/1998 was a captain in the Army. On the night intervening 27th & 28th March, 1978, the respondent along with three other officers interrogated one Bhagwan Das, who was also a defence employee, in connection with an incident of theft. During the course of interrogation the respondent and his co-associates used third degree methods in orders to extract a confession as a result whereof Bhagwan Das died. A General Court martial (GCM, for short) was convened under Section 109 of Army Act, 1950 which tried the respondent and the other officers. On 26.12.1978 the GCM awarded the sentence of forfeiture of three years service for purpose of promotion and severe reprimand to the respondent. The confirming authority formed an opinion that the sentence passed on the respondent was very lenient and therefore vide order dated 19.4.1979, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 160 of the Army Act sent the case back for revision. On 10.5.1979, the GCM on revision, enhanced the punishment inflicted on the respondent to forfeiture of three years of service for the purpose of promotion and also for the purpose o



































































































































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