SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD CJI., V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK, D.P. MADON AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.*
Union of India and another, Appellants
Versus
Tulsiram Patel, Respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 6814 of 1983, 3484, 3512 of 1982 and Writ Petns. Nos 2267 to 2269, 2273, 3349 to 3353, 6500, 8120 of 1982 and 562 of 1983 with Civil Appeals Nos. 3231 of 1981 and 4067 of 1983 with Transferred Cases Nos. 6 to 70, 73, 74 and 85 of 1982, 34 to 40 of 1983 and Writ Petn. No. 1953 of 1981 (with W. P. Nos. 7393, 1392 and 2022 of 1981), D/- 11-7-1985.
AND
Union of India and others, Appellants
Versus
Sadanand Jha and others, Respondents.
AND
Union of India and others, Appellants
Versus
G. P. Koushal, Respondent.
AND
Biswaroop Chatterjee, etc., Petitioners
Versus
Union of India and others, etc., Respondents.
WITH
Achinta Kumar Biswas, etc., Appellants
Versus
Union of India and others, etc., Respondents.
WITH
Nabendu Bose and others, etc., Petitioners
Versus
Union of India and others, etc., Respondents.
AND
Laxmi Narayan and others, Petitioners
Versus
State of M.P., Respondent. 1417
-held, public has a vital interest in efficiency and integrity in civil services paid from public exchequer. It is also in public good that inefficient, dishonest , corrupt Govt. servants or who are security risk should not continue in public service and the protection granted under Acts and rules made under Art. 309 and by Art. 311 are not abused. If in appropriate case second proviso to Art.311(2) is applied properly when situation arises and the formal disciplinary enquiry is dispensed with, the Govt. servant cannot complain that he is deprived of his livelihood. Livelihood is a matter of concern to the individual and his family as also a matter of public interest and in appropriate case public good should prevail where taking away of livelihood provided by public exchequer, is in public interest.
Judgment
MADON, J. (for himself and on behalf of Y. V. Chandrachud CJI., Tulzapurkar, Pathak JJ. (Majority view):- The above Appeals by Special Leave granted by this Court and the above Writ Petitions filed either in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India or in different High Courts under Art. 226 and transferred to this Court raise a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of Arts. 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution and in particular of what is now, after the amendment of clause (2) of Art. 311 by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, the second proviso to that clause.
The Genesis of the Appeals and Writ Petitions
2. To understand what questions fall for determination by this Court in these Appeals and Writ Petitions, it is first necessary to sketch briefly how they have come to be heard by this Constitution Bench.
3. Article 311 of the Constitution confers certain safeguards upon persons employed in civil capacities under the Union of India or a State. The first safeguard (which is given by clause (1) of Art. 311) is that such person cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The second safeguard (which is given by clause (2) of Art. 311) is that he cannot be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The second safeguard is, however, not available to him when he is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in any of the three cases mentioned in the second proviso to Art. 311(2). These three cases are set out in clauses (a) to (c) of the second proviso. Under clause (a), such person can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without any inquiry on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Under clause (b), any of these three penalties can be imposed upon him where the authority empowered to impose any of these penalties is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. Under clause (c), any of the above penalties can be imposed upon him where the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
4. All the government servants in the above Appeals and Writ Petitions have been either dismissed or removed from service without holding any inquiry. They have not been informed of the charges against them nor been given any opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The penalty of dismissal or removal, as the case may be, has been imposed upon them under one or the other of the three clauses of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) or under similar provisions in rules made under the proviso to Art. 309 or in rules made under an Act referable to Art. 309, for instance, Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and Rule 37 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969, or under such a rule read with one of the clauses of the second proviso to Art. 311(2).
5. Aggrieved by these orders of dismissal and removal, several government servants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in different High Courts. Some of these writ petitions were allowed, mainly on the basis of a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T. R. Challappan (1976) 1 SCR 783 given on September 15, 1975, while a few were dismissed. Appeals by Special Leave against those judgments were filed in this Court. In three other similar appeals, namely, Civil Appeals Nos. 1088, 1089 and 1120 of 1975, another three-Judge Bench of this Court felt that there was a conflict between Challappans Case and an earl
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