IMPORTANT POINT
A period of 15 years is apparently too long a period to make a reference of industrial Dispute to labour Court but if on the date of reference an industrial dispute was in existence for adjudication such a long period will not entitle High Court to quash the reference as non existent.

Headnote:U.P. Industrial Disputes Act-Section 4K-Reference of dispute to Labour Court or Tribunal (= Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947)-Appellant appointed as clerk in respondent Board on 1.1.74-His services terminated on 17.7.75-He raised dispute-State Government referred it to Labour Court on 29.3.1993-High Court quashed the reference as there was 15 years delay in reference which was quite inordinate delay-Appeal against to Supreme Court-Whether there was an Industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? (Yes)-Case law referred-Appeal allowed as on the date of reference in this case the conciliation proceedings were not concluded and inordinate delay of reference was properly explained.
       Held : The real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Government s power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which lapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the government in this regard cannot be listed on the possibility of what another party would think whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the government. If the government decides to make the reference there is a presumption that in the opinion of the government there existed such a dispute. In considering the factual position whether the dispute did exist on the date of reference the Government could take into account factors, inter alia, such as the subsistence of conciliation proceedings. It is of no consequence that conciliation proceedings were commenced after a long period. But such conciliation proceedings are evidence of the existence of the industrial dispute. It is an admitted fact that on the date of reference in this case the conciliation proceedings were not concluded. If so, it cannot be said that the dispute did not exist on that day. (Paras 9 and 10)
       After reviewing case law held : There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach its legal culmination. For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. (Paras 15 and 16)

JUDGMENT

Thomas, J.-Leave granted.

2. A period of fifteen years is apparently too long a range, even for a Government to make reference of industrial dispute for adjudication. At the first blush it looks inordinate a delay and so was felt by the High Court of Allahabad which consequently quashed the reference order passed by the Government solely on the ground of such delay. The aggrieved workman has therefore approached this Court challenging the aforesaid judgment of the High Court. According to him the High Court should not have bypassed the explanation offered by him as to why the Government did not make a reference earlier.

3. Appellant was appointed as a clerk on 1.1.1974 in the Electricity Distribution Division, Mathura of the U.P. State Electricity Board (for short the Board ). But his services were terminated on 17.7.1975. He raised an industrial dispute that the termination of his services was illegal. The State Government by an order dated 29.3.1993 referred the following dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication as per Section 4-K of the UP Industrial Disputes Act (for short the UP Act ) :

"Whether termination of the appellant on 17.7.1975 by the employer was proper and legal; if so, to what reliefs the workman is entitled."

4. The Labour Court took up the reference as Adjudication Case No. 158 of 1993. The respondent Board filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court assailing the aforesaid reference order and also praying for quashing the adjudication case pending in the Labour Court. The appellant was arrayed as respondent No. 5 in the said writ petition. A single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad took the view that the delay is so inordinate that the dispute has ceased to exist by efflux of time and hence no reference under the U.P. Act should have been made. Accordingly, the order of reference passed by the Government was quashed by the High Court. Learned Single Judge made the following epilogistic remarks :

"On consideration of various authorities, I am of the view that normally a dispute which is an industrial dispute be referred by the State Government under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act so long such a dispute exists or the Government apprehends that such a dispute is likely to exist. However, in case there is undue and inordinate as well as unexplained delay, presumption may arise on the facts and circumstances of a particular case that no dispute exists in present and in such cases the reference made by the Government may be quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the respondent No. 5 kept silence for more than 15 years and he woke up only after the petition of other co-workmen was allowed and he made no efforts to get his dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court. Now he cannot be allowed to raise such a dispute after lapse of such a long time."

5. It is not a case that appellant woke up at the end of fifteen years like a Rip Van Winkle and raised an industrial dispute. His version of what transpired during the long interval needs to be mentioned here. It reads like this : Along with the appellant the Board retrenched 10 other workmen. Those 10 belonged to a union (U.P. Bijali Karmachari Sangh, Mathura). The said union raised the dispute on 16.9.1976 and the State Government referred the matter of the Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur. The Board gave an assurance to the appellant that in the event of any of the claims of the 10 workmen was upheld by the Labour Court the same benefit would be extended to the appellant, no matter that he did not take up his cause to any legal forum. By the time the Industrial Tribunal decided the case of 10 workmen the Board had re-absorbed two of them. However, the Industrial Tribunal passed an award on 10.11.1979 holding that those retrenched persons were entitled to retrenchment compensation. The Tribunal further held that in view of the liberalised policy of the Board the workmen concerned should be given an

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2001 Supreme(SC) 961

Cases Referred (3)