2001(5) Supreme 484
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madras High Court)
K.T. Thomas and S.N. Variava, JJ.
K. Poonuswamy -Appellant
versus
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police, Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption South Range, Trichy -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 759 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1668 of 2001)
With
Criminal Appeal No. 760 of 2001
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 1622 of 2001)
Decided on 31-7-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : P.P. Rao, R. Thyagarajan, Rakesh Dwivedi, U.R. Lalit, K. Ramamurthy, Sr. Advocates, V. Balachandran, S. Jayakumar, E.C. Agarwala, Mahesh Agarwala, Rishi Agarwala, D. Selvaraj, R.K. Sharma, Ms. Purnima Bhat Kak, Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, Ms. Shweta Garg, Advocates.
Held : [the Money decrees passed against appellant before check period] clearly shows that before he became a Minister the Appellant s financial condition was very weak. (Para 6)
The prosecution has thus proved beyond reasonable doubt that substantial wealth was acquired by Accused Nos. 2 and 3 during the check period. The only explanation given for the acquisition of this wealth was that it had been gifted to them by Accused No. 4. Both the Trial Court and the High Court have disbelieved the story of gift and concluded that these were in fact the properties held by these persons on behalf of Accused No. 1. On this basis Accused No. 1 had been convicted. (Para 25)
Held after referring law, thus the fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it, the Court believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exits. In coming to its belief the Court may presume existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened having regard to the natural course of event, human conduct and public and private business, in relation to the facts of each case. Now, let us see the facts of this case. The prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt, that prior to the check period Accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had no real source of income, except some meager incomes, i.e. Accused No. 1 only earned a small salary as a Lecturer and Accused Nos. 2 had small agricultural and other income. Accused No. 3 being a student had no real source of income. Prior to the check period the financial condition of the family was such that Accused No. 1 could not even repay his small debts. The creditors had to recover their amounts by filing suits and executing decrees. We are presuming that Accused No. 4 had independent income. However prior to the check period Accused No. 4 had not been afflicted by any love and affection and had not made any gifts to any member of the family of the Accused No. 1. Prior to the check period Accused No. 4 did not even extend help to pay off the small debts of Accused No. 1 even after the decrees had been passed against Accused No. 1. Yet suddenly, during the check period, i.e. when Accused No. 1 is a Minister, Accused No. 4 donates large sums of money to Accused Nos. 2 and 3. The natural presumption, considering the common course of natural events and human conduct is that Accused No. 1 would have used his nephew Accused No. 4 to transfer his (Accused No. 1 s) monies to Accused Nos. 2 and 3. This is the supposition which any prudent man under these circumstances would act upon considering the natural course of events. The Trial Court and the High Court thus rightly took this as proved by legal evidence. The prosecution having established by legal evidence that the monies were transferred by Accused 1 to Accused Nos. 2 and 3 through Accused No. 4 and that these were monies of Accused No. 1 in the hands of Accused Nos. 2 and 3, it was for the Appellant to satisfactorily account for the gifts. He could have done so by showing that even before the check period Accused No. 4 had made gifts of substantial amounts. It has not been claimed by Accused 2 and/ or 3 and/or 4 that before the check period also Accused No. 4 had made any such gifts. It is also not their case that after the check period gifts were made. Thus the Trial Court and the High Court were right in not believing the case of gifts supposedly made out of a sudden brust of love and affection. Both the Trial Court and the High Court were right in convicting Appellant. As we are told that the State is going to file an appeal against the acquittal of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 we are not making any comments thereon. In our view, there is no infirmity in the Order of the High Court so far as the conviction of Appellant is concerned. We see no reason to interfere. Accordingly these Criminal Appeals stand dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs. (Paras 30, 31, 32 & 33)
JUDGMENT
S.N. Variava, J.-These SLPs are filed against the Judgment dated 12th April, 2001. When these SLPs were called out Mr. Ramamurthy, Senior Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu, prayed for an adjournment of four weeks. He submitted that, as Accused Nos. 2 to 5 have been acquitted by the impugned judgment, the State was going to prefer an Appeal against the same judgment. Mr. Rao opposed the Application on the ground that the Petitioner was in jail. He submitted that if the State wanted an adjournment, for such a long period, then the Petitioner should be released on bail. We, therefore, felt that the best course to follow would be to hear these SLPs today. When the State files its Appeal it can be heard separately.
2. Accordingly leave is granted.
3. Heard parties
4. By these Appeals the Appellant is challenging his conviction under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
5. Brief facts leading to these Appeals are as follows :
The Appellant was elected as a member of Legislative Assembly from Marungapuri constituency in June 1991. He became the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly on 3rd July, 1991. He was Minister of Education to the Government of Tamil Nadu from 17th May, 1993 to 9th May, 1996. For the sake of convenience this period from 17th May, 1993 to 9th May, 1996 will hereinafter be referred to as the check period.
6. Before the Appellant came to the political arena he was employed as a Lecturer in the Government Arts College. It has been shown that in 1973 the Appellant had taken a crop loan from the Bank of India for a sum of Rs. 13,000/-. That amount had not been repaid by the Appellant. Ultimately a Suit came to be filed and the amount had to be collected in execution of decree in that Suit. In 1985 the Appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from R. Palanivelu (P.W.16) who was also working as a Lecturer along with him. For this loan the Appellant had executed a promissory note. The financial condition of the Appellant was such that he was unable to repay the loan. Ultimately a Suit had to be filed against him and a decree came to be passed. Even after passing of the Decree the amount was not repaid. The Decree had to be executed. The decreetal amount had to be recovered from the salary of the Appellant. This clearly shows that before he became a Minister the Appellant s financial condition was very weak.
7. At this stage, it must be mentioned that Accused No. 2 is the wife of the Appellant. Accused No. 3 is his daughter. Accused No. 2 was and is merely a house-wife. She admittedly had only a small agricultural income and no other source of income. Admittedly Accused No.3 was a student before and during the check period. She had no source of income.
8. Accused No.4 is the son of the brother of the Appellant. Accused No. 5 is the brother of the Appellant. Accused No.6 is the Chartered Accountant who had submitted income tax and wealth tax returns of the Accused Nos. 2 to 5.
9. The case of the prosecution was that during the check period the Accused No. 1 acquired, in his name and in the names of Accused Nos. 2 to 5, pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to his known sources of income. The prosecution examined as many as 65 witnesses and got 297 exhibit marks. The Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence lead, acquitted Accused No.6. However, Accused No.1 (i.e. the Appellant) was convicted under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Accused Nos. 2 to 5 were convicted under Section 109 I.P.C. and also under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Trial Court, after convicting the Accused, directed confiscation of the pecuniary resources and properties to the extent of Rs. 77,49,337.77.
10. Appellant and Accused Nos. 2 to 5 filed Criminal Appeals before the High Court against the conviction as well as against the Order confiscating the pecuniary resources and properti
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