IMPORTANT POINT
The petitioner is confusing the issue of rejection of his promotion despite orders of Apex Court to consider it by treating the direction as a mandate for his promotion. There was no mandate to offer promotion to the petitioner. Petitioner s case was duly considered but he was not found eligible and fit for promotion. This is not contempt of an order of the Court. The same is thus dismissed.

Headnote:(i) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Purpose-Onus-Standard of proof-Primary and basic ingredient-Case Law referred.
       Held : The introduction of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in the statute book has been for the purposes of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the country. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of the law courts by reason wherefor the exercise of jurisdiction must be with due care and caution and for larger interest. As regards, the burden and standard of proof, the common legal phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the standard of proof , be it noted that a proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt. (Paras 1 and 2)
       After referring case law :
       Held : This Court went on to record that the wilful conduct is a primary and basic ingredient of such an offence. (Para 4)
       (ii) Contempt petition by petitioner before Apex Court-Issue of complainant s eligibility to promotion in the year 1980 finally settled by Apex Court in C.A. No. 5889 of 1999 on 8-10-1999-Complaint against respondent-2 of its deliberate violation-Whether correct? (No)-Result -Contempt petition dismissed.
       Held : This Court by reason of the order dated 8th October, 1999 did not issue a mandate but issued a direction for consideration only. In the event however, the matter being not considered or in the event, consideration was effected in a manner to whittle down the claim of the petitioner, initiation of the proceedings cannot but be said to be justified. But in the event however, contextual facts depict that the consideration was effected in accordance with the normal rules, practice and procedure and upon such consideration, no promotion could be offered to the petitioner, question of there being any act of contempt would not arise. (Para 8)
       Consequently held : On the wake of the recordings as above, and having duly considered the submissions of the parties and on proper reading of the order of this Court dated 8th October, 1999 we do not feel inclined to record any concurrence with the submissions of the learned Advocate in support of the petition. The petition has no merit. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed without however any order as to costs. (Para 9)

JUDGMENT

Banerjee, J.-The introduction of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in the statute book has been for the purposes of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the country. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of the law courts by reason wherefor the exercise of jurisdiction must be with due care and caution and for larger interest.

2. As regards, the burden and standard of proof, the common legal phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the standard of proof , be it noted that a proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt.

3. Lord Denning [in Re Bramblevale1]. lends concurrence to the aforesaid and the same reads as below:

"A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time-honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence.... Where there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt."

4. Before adverting to the factual score, one further decision may be of some consequence and as such the same is noticed at this juncture only. The decision being that of V.G. Nigam [V.G. Nigam & Ors. v. Kedar Nath Gupta & Anr.2]. wherein in the similar vein this Court also stated that it would be too hazardous to sentence in exercise of contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. This Court went on to record that the wilful conduct is a primary and basic ingredient of such an offence.

5. Adverting to the facts of the matter under consideration, it appears that the issue of applicant/complainant s eligibility for promotion in the year 1980 was finally settled by this Court in CA No. 5889 of 1999 dated 8th October, 1999 wherein this Court allowed the appeal with the observations as below:

"It is true that Rule 9 of the Haryana Service of Engineers Class II (Public Works Department, Irrigation Branch) Rules says that the cut-off date will be the 1st of January of the concerned year and here the cut-off date will be 1.1.1980. In a situation, where a person takes an examination before the cut-off date and the result is declared after the cut-off date the above said administrative order dated 23.7.1973 clarifies as to what is to be done. In our view the said clarification is not in conflict with the statutory rules, in as much as it only states that where by the date on which the Departmental Promotion Committee meets, the result is also declared, may be subsequent to the cut-off date, the person must be considered to be eligible with reference to the date of the examination if the examination had been conducted before the cut-off date. We do not therefore, see any conflict between the clarification dated 23.7.1973 and the statutory rules. Giving effect to the above said clarification, it must be held that the appellant was qualified as on September, 1980 when the DPC met. We therefore, order that the case of the appellant be considered on the basis that he was qualified by the cut-off date 1.1.1980. If he is considered fit for promotion as in September, 1980, he shall be given the necessary promotion and other consequential benefits. In case the Department feels that any other persons are likely to be affected in the seniority it will be open to the De

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2001 Supreme(SC) 1162

Cases Referred (1)