VERY IMPORTANT POINT
When an eviction petition is pending u/s 14(1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and by amendment of 1988 the premises are exempted from the operation of Rent Act then landlord has by virtue of Section 6(c) of General Clauses Act, 1897 to continue the pending proceedings before the Rent Controller or file a suit for possession in Civil Court under general law after properly determining the tenant s tenancy. But he cannot continue with two parallel proceedings one under the general law (i.e. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 r/w CPC 1908) and other before the Rent Controller (i.e. u/s 14(1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958).

Headnote:(i) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (as amended in 1988)-Section 3(c)-Rent Act not to apply if monthly rent exceeds 3500/- w.e.f. 1.12.88-Eviction petition on ground of unlawful subletting pending when said amendment came-Whether the landlord and tenant are relegated to seek their remedies under the common law once the protection given to a tenant under rent control legislation is withdrawn through amendment (which is not retrospective)?-Effect of Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 on repeal.
       Held : A landlord or tenant are relegated to seek their rights and remedies under the common law once the protection given to a tenant under the Rent Act is withdrawn, except in cases where Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 1897 is applicable. [Para 37(1)]
       (ii) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Section 14(1)(b)-Petition of eviction on ground of illegal subletting under-Pending trial Rent Act was made not applicable by prospective amendment-Whether a ground of eviction based on illegal subletting u/s 14(1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 can be claimed by a landlord as a vested right?-Effect of Section 6(a) of General Clauses Act, 1897 as such a right.
       Held : A ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under proviso (b) to Section 14 of the Rent Act would not constitute to be a vested right of a landlord, but it would be a right and privilege accrued within the meaning of Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act in a matter if proceeding for eviction is pending. [Para 37(2)]
       (iii) Protection to tenant under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Withdrawn by 1988 amendment in Section 3(c)-Protection against eviction-Is said to be not a vested right in tenant and if that protection is withdrawn as in this case, can a landlord claim that ground of eviction under the Rent Act to be a vested right? Effect of clause (c) of Section 6 of General Clauses Act.
       Held : When tenant has no vested right under a Rent Act having only protective right, withdrawal of such protection would not confer on a landlord a vested right to evict a tenant under Rent Act except where sub-clause (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable. [Para 37(3)]
       (iv) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Sections 14(1)(b) and 3 (as amended in 1988)-Petition for eviction by landlord appellant against tenant respondent-Pending-1988 amendment making Rent Act not applicable-Landlord filing suit for possession in Civil Court under Common Law-What is the effect-Landlord s Common Law Right and Right under Rent Act compared-Choice given-Exercise of choice left on landlord.
       Held : The case of tenant-appellant is that amendment covers pending cases while respondent landlord case is it does not cover hence it would not apply to the pending cases. (Para 11)
       Held on the basis of case law : The aforesaid decision holds that tenants have no vested right under the Rent act. In effect, the law is well settled. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Act the relationship between the landlord and the tenant is governed by the general law, may be Transfer of Property Act or any other law in relation to the property. The Rent Act merely provides a protection to a tenant as against unbridled power of the landlord under the general law of the land. The Rent Act gives protection to the tenant from being ejected except on the grounds referred under the Rent Act. In other words, it protects the tenant from ejectment, it protects a tenant from the drastic enhancement of the rent by the landlord which may otherwise landlord could do under the general law. Thus the right of a tenant under the Rent Act at the best could be said to be a protective right which cannot be construed to be a vested right. In effect, in view of this special enactment of the Rent Act, the right and remedies available to a landlord under the general law remains suspended. In other words the landlord s vested right under the general law continue so long it is not abridged by such protective legislation, but the moment when this protection is withdrawn the landlord s normal vested right reappears which could be enforced by him. (Para 17)
       Held also : In our considered opinion by no stretch of imagination it could be held that the landlord has any vested right by virtue of Section 14 of the Rent Act. (Para 22)
       But held : As a general rule, in view of Section 6, the repeal of an statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not prima facie affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed enactment were still in force. In other words such repeal does not effect the pending cases which would continue to be concluded as if the enactment has not been repealed. In fact when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties gets crystalised on that date. The mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is simply to leave the pending proceedings unaffected which commenced under the unrepealed provisions unless contrary intention is expressed. We find Clause (c) of Section 6, refers the words "any right, privilege, obligation.... acquired or accrued" under the repealed statute would not be affected by the repealing statute. We may hasten to clarify here, mere existence of a right not being acquired or accrued , on the date of the repeal would not get protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. At the most such a provision can be said to be granting a privilege to the landlord to seek intervention of the Controller for eviction of the tenant under the Statute. Such a privilege is not a benefit vested in general but is a benefit granted and may be enforced by approaching the Controller in the manner prescribed under the statute. On filing the petition for eviction of the tenant the privilege accrued with the landlord is not affected by repeal of the Act in view of section 6(c) and the pending proceeding is saved under section 6(e) of the Act. (Paras 26 & 27)
       Thus we find Section 6 of the General Clauses Act covers wider field and saves wide range of proceedings referred to in its various sub-clauses. We find two sets of cases, one where Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable and other where it is not applicable. In cases where Section 6 is not applicable, the courts have to scrutinise and find, whether a person under a repealed statute had any vested right. In case he had, then pending proceedings would be saved. However, in cases where Section 6 is applicable, it is not merely a vested right but all those covered under various sub-clauses from (a) to (e) of Section 6. We have already clarified right and privileges under it is limited to those which is acquired and accrued . In such cases pending proceedings is to be continued as if the statute has not been repealed. In view of the aforesaid legal principle emerging, we come to the conclusion since proceeding for the eviction of the tenant was pending when repealing Act came into operation. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable in the present case. As it is Landlord s accrued right in terms of Section 6. Sub-section (c) of Section 6 refers to "any right" which may not be limited as a vested right but is limited to be an accrued right. The words any right accrued in Section 6(c) is wide enough to include landlord s right to evict a tenant in case proceeding was pending when repeal came in. Thus a pending proceeding before the Rent Controller for the eviction of a tenant on the date when the repealing Act came into force would not be affected by the repealing statute and will be continued and concluded in accordance with the law as existed under the repealed statute. (Paras 34, 35 and 36)
       Held consequently : In view of these findings we hold landlord has a right under the repealed Rent Act by virtue of Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act, which would save the pending proceedings before the Rent Controller, which may continue to be proceeded with as if repealed Act is still in force. In view of our aforesaid findings, since Rent Controller has the jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it will not be right for the landlord to continue with two parallel proceedings; one under the General Law and other before the Rent Controller. Hence we further order that the respondent-landlord to withdraw one of the two proceedings within a period of 6 weeks from today. (Paras 38 and 39)
       Held finally : For the aforesaid reasons, the present appeals fail and are dismissed. Costs on the parties. (Para 40)

Judgement Key Points

What is the effect of the 1988 amendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act on pending eviction proceedings and the jurisdiction of Rent Controller vs Civil Court?

What is the status of a landlord's or tenant's vested rights under the Rent Act when protective provisions are withdrawn, and how does Section 6 of the General Clauses Act apply to pending proceedings?

Can a ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act be construed as a vested right for a landlord in the context of pending proceedings?

JUDGMENT

Misra, J.-Leave granted.

2. It is unfortunate, an eviction petition which was filed on the 13th September 1985 still the parties are battling to find which court would have the jurisdiction. Whether the court of Rent Controller under Delhi Rent Control Act or ordinary Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue? As discipline and culture in every walk of life is essential for smooth functioning in all its activities, similarly judicial culture and discipline has to be followed in order to achieve the desired result viz. to give litigant justice in the shortest period of time. Every legislation legislates for the benefit of its subject but many a times, raising issues for every thing and stretching it too long percolates the very objective for which it is made. With the increasing complexities of laws coupled with faulty legislation, using inappropriate language, a stress is created which the courts through its judicial interpretations have been attempting to simplify it. In spite of this the hope for an early adjudication has been eluding like a mirage. With the advancement of legal studies there is sharpening of the acumen of advocacy. Every word of a statute, if interpreted when equipped with such dynamism, could be intellectually misused, hence interpreters including counsel, has to keep balance not to let this misuse surface. As knife in the hand of a murderer and doctor has different roles to play, so the interpreters have to select to play the role of a doctor to confer benefit to the subject. The words in a statute are dynamic, not static, hence has to be interpreted to subserve to the objectives of an Act. Such Judicial discipline in interpreting has to be followed for yielding legislative intent. Similarly judicial culture has to be cultivated even by counsels appearing for a cause, who has to see that the judicial system does not rust or get stains for a delayed justice.

3. To win a battle for a client is the legitimate expectation of all but in doing so deliberations should not be such which lengthens the litigation, even if it confers temporary gain to one s client in a lis. Every member of the judicial fraternity has to play its role with the main object to find the truth and render justice to the litigant. This judicial culture has not to be lost sight. The present case is one of such cases, which causes concern in this regard.

4. The aforesaid appeals raise an interesting but somewhat complex question for adjudication with reference to the jurisdiction of the court. The question for consideration is, what is the effect of the amendment which incorporated Section 3(c) in the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act in the pending eviction proceedings. Section 3(c) of the Rent Act was brought through amendment which became effective from 1.12.1988 which reads as under:

3. Act not to apply to certain premises -Nothing in this Act shall apply;

.............................................................

In effect it makes Rent Act inapplicable to the tenancies whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3500/-. It is not in dispute, in the present case, the rate of monthly rent is Rs. 8625/- per month and proceeding for the eviction was pending under the Rent Act when the said amendment came into force. In order to appreciate the controversy effectively we are hereunder giving certain essential matrix of facts.

5. The aforesaid two appeals arise out of judgment and order dated 29th November, 1999 passed by the High Court. The first being from an order in second appeal from order No. 5/1999 and the second being from an order in Civil Revision No. 10/1998.

6. The High Court allowed landlord s second appeal from order but dismissed the revision of the tenant. Hence both these appeals are filed by the tenant. The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition against

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2001 Supreme(SC) 1168

What is the effect of the 1988 amendment to the Delhi Rent Control Act on pending eviction proceedings and the jurisdiction of Rent Controller vs Civil Court?

What is the status of a landlord's or tenant's vested rights under the Rent Act when protective provisions are withdrawn, and how does Section 6 of the General Clauses Act apply to pending proceedings?

Can a ground of eviction based on illegal subletting under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act be construed as a vested right for a landlord in the context of pending proceedings?

Cases Referred (6)