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2001 Supreme(SC) 1373

2001(7) Supreme 378
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Calcutta High Court)
S. Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju, JJ.
Chairman and Managing Director, Indian Airlines -Appellant
versus
Binod Kumar Sinha & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No.1458 of 1994
With
C.A. Nos. 1459-1459A of 1994
Decided on 4-10-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, C.A. Sundaram, V.R. Reddy, Sr. Advocate (AC)/Senior Advocates, Ms. Nina Gupta, Uday Gupta, Ms. Arpita Mahajan, Ms. Shikha Sachdev, Vineet Kumar, Tara Chand Sharma, S.N. Terdol, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, P.S. Narasimha, Ms. Sarla Chandra, Advocate (NP), Lalit Bhasin, R.P. Wadhwani and K. Bhirava Swamy, Advocates.

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Indian Airlines, Air India pilots need No Objection Certificate to join foreign Air Taxis.

Headnote:Haryana Urban Development Authority, 1988—Section 30—Legality of allotment of plots made under the discretionary quota—In S.R. Dass v. State of Haryana, 1988 PLJ 123 formulated certain principles on which such allotment could be made with certain conditions followed by Govt. of Haryana for a decade—Then Anil Sabharwal v. State of Haryana & Ors. dated 21.3.1997—New principles set out—Whether doctrine of prospective overruling be applied?— High Court showed its inability—Matter went to Apex Court—In HUDA v. Anil Sabharwal & Ors., 1998(5) Supreme 324, Apex Court, directed to avoid any discrimination between allottees subsequent to 31.10.1989 —Scope of that direction—Doctrine of prospective overruling applied from 23.4.96—Appeals allowed accordingly.

       Held : The question for consideration now is in what manner discrimination between the allottees subsequent to 31.10.89 can be avoided. In relation to classification made by the High Court, the grievances are made before us that the same does not take note of cases of (i) bona fide purchasers, who did not have sufficient funds with them to start the construction and who have not acquired these plots without any profit motive; (ii) allottees to whom possession was not handed over in time for them to commence construction who stand on the same footing as those in respect of whom exception is made, who have made construction on the plots in question; (iii) members of armed forces and Indian Administrative Officers who are also involved in an operation like ‘Blue Star’, the allotments could not be cancelled and the matters will have to be examined in the light of the same principles as had been done with reference to those who were in the armed forces and fighting for the defence of the country; (iv) certain other classes still who are disabled either on account of serious ill health or such as blindness. These instances are taken by way of sample by us to indicate that the classification made by the High Court in respect of whom exception is made will have to be reclassified or sub-classified or further classifications will have to be made. That would be carving out too many exceptions involving a very lengthy and treacherous exercise to be sucked in a quagmire from which to extricate oneself will be well nigh impossible. Further when the decision of the High Court in S.R. Dass v. State of Haryana, 1988 PLJ 123 had held the field for nearly a decade and the Government, the HUDA and the parties to whom the allotments have been made have acted upon and adjusted their affairs in terms of the said decision to disturb that state of affairs on the basis that now certain other rigorous principles are declared to be applied in Anil Sabharwal’s case would be setting the rules of the game after the game is over, by which several parties have altered their position to their disadvantage. Therefore, we think that in the larger public interest and to avoid the discrimination which this Court had noticed in the order dated 5.12.1997 the decision of the High Court in Anil Sabharwal’s case should be made effective from prospective date and in this case from the date on which interim order had been passed on 23.4.1996. Therefore, it would be appropriate to fix that date as the date from which the judgment of the High Court would become effective. If this course is adopted, various anomalies pointed out in respect of different parties referred to above and other instances to which we have not adverted to will be ironed out and the creases smoothened so that discrimination is avoided. Prospective declaration of law is a device innovated by this Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a device adopted to avoid uncertainty and avoidable litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law, prior to the date of the declaration are validated. This is done in larger public interest. Therefore, the subordinate forums which are bound to apply law declared by this Court are also duty bound to apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future. Since it is disputable that a court can overrule a decision there is no valid reason why it should not be restricted to the future and not to the past. Prospective overruling is not only a part of constitutional policy but also an extended facet of stare decisis and not judicial legislation. These principles are enunciated by this Court in Baburam v. C.C. Jacob & Ors., 1999(3) SCC 362, and Ashok Kumar Gupta & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1997(5) SCC 201 : 1997(4) Supreme 450. These appeals, therefore, stand allowed to the extent indicated above and declaring that the judgment of the High Court in Anil Sabharwal v. State of Haryana & Ors. shall be effective from 23-4-1996. In the event in any of the cases any allotment has been cancelled, the same shall be brought in conformity with the order made by us whether those allottees are parties in these proceedings or not. The declaration made by us will have a general application. It is also made clear that allotment orders made prior to 23-4-1996 can be cancelled if they are not made in conformity with the decision in S.R.Dass v. State of Haryana (supra), after following due procedure. The appeals are allowed accordingly modifying the order made by the High Court in the manner stated above. (Paras 5 to 9)

       Held (regarding writ petitions) : In the light of the order made by us in the above appeals, these writ petitions have become unnecessary as the authorities concerned are bound to bring their orders of cancellation of the allotments made or notices issued to them for cancellation of the allotments in conformity with the order made in the above appeals which we have disposed of just now. Therefore, these writ petitions have become unnecessary and shall stand disposed of accordingly. No costs. (Para 10)

       

JUDGMENT

Rajendra Babu, J.-These appeals arise out of an order made by the High Court of Calcutta in writ petition Nos. 488/1993 and 489/1993 filed in the High Court challenging the validity of Regulation 13(b), substituted by notification No. S.O. 134/(E) dated March 15, 1993, of the Indian Airlines Employees  (Aircraft Engineering Department) Service Regulations, 1959 [for short the Regulations ], which provides that no employee shall resign from employment of the Corporation without giving six months notice in writing to the Corporation of his/her intention to resign with provision for Managing Director of the Corporation to dispense with or reduce the period of notice on medical grounds or other special circumstances. A further proviso being to the effect that Corporation may refuse to accept termination if the same is sought to avoid disciplinary action contemplated or taken and a circular No. AIC/3/93 dated February 25, 1993 was issued by the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) by which a condition was added in relation to Air Taxi operator to the effect that "no Air Taxi operator shall employ anyone already serving any of the national carriers, namely, Air India, Indian Airlines, Vayudoot and Pawan Hans without obtaining a No Objection Certificate from the employer with whom they are working .

2. The writ petitions were filed by a Commander Pilot working under the Indian Airlines Corporation. He had been offered the post of Commander Pilot under M/s Damania Travels but on account of Regulation 13(b) and circular No. AIC/3/93 dated February 25, 1993 the respondent could not join the new post immediately which had placed an embargo on his employment and thus he sought for an interim order. A learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the matter cannot be effectively decided without the presence of M/s. Damania Travels, namely, the writ petitioner s prospective employer, and M/s Damania Travels was directed to be added as a party. Even thereafter the learned Single Judge refused to grant the interim order. The respondents preferred appeals against the said order of the learned Single Judge but on noticing that it would be more appropriate to dispose of the main matter itself, the Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the writ petitions along with the appeals arising out of the refusal to grant the interim orders thus necessitating these appeals by special leave.

3 Original Regulation 13(b) provided that "a Pilot could resign from his service after giving 30 days notice or offering one month s basic pay to the employer in lieu of the said 30 days notice" . However, in view of the substitution of Regulation 13(b) by notification No. S.O. 134/(E) dated March 15, 1993, the respondent offered to quit the post but the appellant-Airlines did not allow the release of the respondent. The High Court examined in great detail the scope of the provisions of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 [hereinafter referred to as the Air Corporations Act ] and the Rules framed thereunder with reference to the Regulation in question. The High Court discussed various aspects of the matter, however, it did not deal with the challenge to the validity of Regulation 13(b), as such. Even after very careful examination of the order of the High Court, we do not find any discussion or consideration on the question of validity of Regulation 13(b) in the entire order, except to allow the writ petitions in their entirety. When the contentions put forth on behalf of the parties or the arguments put forth by the learned Counsel on this aspect were not considered by the High Court, much less any reasons given in the order, we do not think, the High Court could have quashed the said Regulation. We do not wish to express any opinion on the validity or otherwise of the said Regulation inasmuch as the same has not been considered by the High Court in the impugned order, except observing that the High Court has not considered the same or

































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