2001(7) Supreme 870
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
Chief Justice of India, R.C. Lahoti & P. Venkatarama Reddi, JJ.
Siddaligamma & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Mamtha Shoenoy -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 729 of 2001
Decided on 18-10-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Joseph Pookkatt and Prashan Kumar, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Gaurav Agarwal and Chander Shekhar Ashri, Advocates.
Held : Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be allowed and while setting aside the order of the High Court, the order of the Trial Court deserves to be restored. (Para 8)
After referring case law
Held : The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the need of the appellant No. 1 who is now a widowed landlady was also in issue from the very beginning though in the then circumstances it was the need of her husband which was the center of emphasis. Unfortunately, the husband expired during the pendency of the petition. This changed circumstances shifted the emphasis contained in the reason for shifting from village habitat to the landlady s premises in the city of Bangalore; earlier it was on the consideration for health of the landlady s husband which now is on the consideration for health of the landlady herself. Medical prescription given by the doctor at Bettalasoor was produced in evidence referring the landlady for treatment at Bangalore as the facilities for orthopaedic treatment which the landlady needed to undergo were available in the city of Bangalore not in the village of present residence of the landlady. It is common knowledge that orthopaedic ailments render frequent travelling of the patient uncomfortable and difficult and therefore the desire of the landlady to shift to Bangalore for her own treatment is a felt-need in presenti and there is noting unnatural, un-real or insincere about it. In addition, the school going children residing with the landlady as members of her family need to be shifted to the city of Bangalore and stay there at in the interest of schooling in educational institutions with better ambience, facilities and standards. It is true that in the petition for eviction, as originally filed, the health condition of the landlady herseff and the factum of children residing with her not being her own grand-children were not pleaded, nevertheless evidence was allowed to be let in without objection and was recorded by the Trial Court. An application for amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC was moved and the deficiency in the pleadings stood removed by the amendment permitted by the Trial Court in exercise of its discretionery jurisdiction to do so. The order permitting the amendment was not put in issue promptly. Even the High Court in its impugned order has not found fault with the order of the Trial Court permitting the amendment nor has it expressed an opinion that leave granted by the Trial Court for amendment in the eviction petition suffered from any error of jurisdiction or discretion. On the doctrine of relation back, which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons the Court excludes the applicability of the doctrine in a given case, the petition for eviction as amended would be deemed to have been filed originally as such and the evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light of the averments made in the amended petition. The High Court though set aside the order of the Trial Court but it is writ large from the framing of the order of the High Court, especially the portions which we have extracted from the order of the High Court and reproduced in earlier part of this judgment, that the learned single Judge of the High Court also was not seriously doubting the genuineness of the landlady s requirement on the material available on record but was not feeling happy with the contents of the eviction petition as originally filed and an over-zealous attempt on the part of the landlady in projecting her sister s sons and grand-children as her own. The High Court did not doubt that the landlady was not in a sound state of health and that a large-size family was with her nor was it disputed by the tenant that the number of members in the family of the landlady residing with her was eleven. In such facts and circumstances, in our opinion, the High Court ought to have adopted a realistic and objective approach rather than feeling skeptical about the landlady s requirement it would not have given her the liberty of filing a fresh petition solely by "stating correct facts." In our opinion, driving the widowed landlady to the need of filing a fresh eviction petition and to the rigmarole of litigation would be subversive of the ends of justice. The need of the landlady is, as borne out from the amended pleadings and material brought on record, bona fide and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. In a civil case, once an amendment has been unreservedly permitted to the incorporated in the pleadings, the correctness of the facts introduced by amendment cannot be doubted solely on the ground that they were not stated in the original petition. So also genuineness of the landlady s statement, supported by medical prescription, that she needed to have treatment at Bangalore cannot be doubt by the Court forming an opinion that the ill-health of landlady was not so serious as to warrant her shifting to a city from a village and then substituting its opinion for the seriousness felt by the landlady. The requirement pleaded and proved was neither a pretext nor a ruse adopted by the landlady for evicting the tenant. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the order of the Trial Court deserves to be restored. On the question of comparative hardship as also on the issue of partial eviction, having ourselves evaluated the well-reasoned findings recorded by the Trial Court we a inclined to uphold the same more so when they have not been reversed by the High Court.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court restored. However, the respondent-tenant is allowed four months time to vacate the suit premises subject to her filing before the Trial Court the usual undertaking on her affidavit that she would deliver vacant and peaceful possession to the landlady on or before the expiry of four months and in between she would clear the arrears of rent, if any, and continue to pay rent falling due month by month and shall not induct any one else in the premises. Costs as incurred. (Paras 10 & 11)
JUDGMENT
R.C. Lahoti, J.-A decree for recovery of possession passed by the Trial Court against the respondent -has been reversed by High Court in a revision preferred by her. The aggrieved landlady has filed this petition seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
2. Leave granted.
3. The suit premises are situated in Rajaji Nagar, Bangalore. The appellant no.1 is admittedly the owner and landlady of the premises and respondent is holding the same as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1100/-. Appellant No. 2 was joined as plaintiff because she used to collect rent for and on behalf of appellant no.1. The respondent s eviction was sought for on the ground available under Section 21 (1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. It is not disputed that there are eleven members in the family of appellant No.1 and residing with her presently in a house situated in village Bettalasoor. In the petition filed on 25.2.1993 the requirement as set out in the petition was that appellant No. 1 s husband was suffering from asthma and respiratory problems and taking oxygen regularly from the cylinder and for medical treatment he was frequently required to be taken to Bangalore from Bettalasoor, a village situated at some distance from Bangalore. The appellant No.1 was having two sons and grand-children living at the village with her and the grand-children were required to he shifted to Bangalore for better education. The accomodation in occupation of appellant No. l and her family members was too small and inconvenient for all the family members to reside in. It was also submitted that the respondent was running a beauty parlour and also an ice-cream shop. She was financially sound and able to secure alternate accomodation. The respondent would not suffer any hardship if she was required to vacate the suit premises and in the event of eviction being denied the landlord would suffer great hardship. Thus comparative hardship of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant.
4. It appears that when the case was being tried appellant no. 1 s husband expired. It also appears that appellant no. 1 does not have any issue of her own. Those who are residing with her are not her own sons and grand children but her real sister s sons whom she treats as her adopted sons and their children. The petition for eviction was amended by moving an application on 22.1.1997 whereby it was submitted that the appellant no. 1 herself was not keeping well and she required better treatment which was available at Bangalore and therefore she intended to shift from the village house to her own house situated in the city of Bangalore along with her adopted sons. The prayer for amendment though contested by the respondent, was allowed by the Trial Court.
5. In a detailed judgment dared 4-3-1997, the learned Trial Judge held that the suit premises were required for the use of the appellant No. 1 and her family members. The appellant No. 1 was aged about 55 years, who was not maintaining good health and was referred by the doctor in village Bettalasoor for treatment to be taken at Bangalore and in the interst of better treatment of hers she needed to shift her residence to Bangalore.The younger children in the family of appellant No. 1 were also required by the appellant No. 1 to be shifted to Bangalore so that they could have the benefit of better schooling and better educational facilities at Bangalore. The Trial Court also found that the accommodation in Bangalore was better and sufficient for occupation by the appellant no. 1 and her family members who are presently residing in an accomodation not sufficient for their occupation in the house at Bettalasoor. The requirement of the appellant No. 1 of the suit premises having been found to be reasonable and bona fide the Trial Court held that the appellant no. 1 was entitled to decree for eviction of the tenant/respondent. The Trial Court further held that in case the evic
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