1999(6) Supreme 330
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
V. N. Khare & R.C. Lahoti, JJ.
Shiv Sarup Gupta -Appellant
versus
Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 4166 of 1999
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2666 of 1999)
Decided on 30-7-1999
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Ms. Syamla Pappu, Sr. Advocate, R. Krishnamoorthi, Ajay Agarwal, Dharam Bir Vohra, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Arun Jaitley, Sr. Advocate, Amir Singh Pasrich, Mahesh Prasad, Ms. Nandini Gore, Advocates.
Held : Section 25-B is a self-contained provision in the sense that remedy against an order passed by the Rent Controller thereunder is also provided by that provision itself. Sub-section (8) provides that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in Section 25-B; ‘provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law (or not), call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit’. The phraseology of the provision as reproduced hereinbefore provides an interesting reading placed in juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the Legislature in drafting Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the subordinate court having committed one of the three errors, namely (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is ‘for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is according to law’. The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 25-B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act is not so limited as is under Section 115 CPC nor so wide as that of an Appellate Court. The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of ‘whether it is according to law’. For that limited purpose it may enter into re-appraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached that conclusion on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray the lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding of the Controller ‘not according to law’ calling for an interference under proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act. (Para 10)
(ii) Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14(1)(e) - Bona fide requirement-Connotation of-Factors to determine bona fide requirement-Concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life-Court’s duty while drawing an inference to consider tenant s plea of availability of an alternate residential accommodation with the landlord.
Held : A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has imposed restrictions on the recovery of possession of any premises by landlord from a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary. However, an order for recovery of possession is permissible on one or more of the specified grounds. One such ground is the premises let for residential purposes being required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. What is a bona fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words ‘need’ and ‘require’ both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfilment. ‘Need’ or ‘requirement’ qualified by word ‘bona fide’ or ‘genuine’ preceding as an adjective - is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. ‘Bona fide or genuine need’ of the landlord or that the landlord ‘genuinely requires’ or ‘requires bona fide’ an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable in practise and carry the same meaning. (Para 11)
Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean ‘in good faith : genuine’. The word ‘genuine’ means ‘natural : not spurious : real: pure: sincere’. In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean ‘good faith, without fraud or deceit’. Thus the term bonafide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by ‘requires’ is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase ‘required bonafide’ is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. (Para 12)
The availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available than the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come. (Para 13)
If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself lightly into lesser premises protecting the tenant’s occupancy. (Para 21)
(iii) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order 1, Rule 27-Additional evidence at appellate stage-Documents filed to bring to notice of High Court subsequent events-Court took into consideration contents of documents without formally admitting same inevidence and affording parties opportunity of adducing evidence in proof and disproof thereof-Not justified. (Para 21)
Key Points: - The High Court's revisional power under Section 25-B(8) is not as narrow as Section 115 CPC nor as broad as an Appellate Court; it allows re-appraisal of evidence to determine if the Rent Controller’s conclusion is wholly unreasonable or not according to law. (!) - Bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) requires a genuine, real, honest, and practical need; mere desire is insufficient; the judge must assess the landlord’s true need and consider whether the evidence supports a sincere intention to occupy for residence. (!) (!) - Availability of alternate accommodation can affect bona fides: if reasonably suitable accommodation exists and the landlord unreasonably refuses to occupy it, the bona fides may be cast into doubt; the court may consider whether the alternative is reasonably suitable in comparison to the suit accommodation. (!) - The court should evaluate total circumstances including family size, convenience, safety, profession, and lifestyle of the landlord and family when assessing need. (!) - The landlord is not required to surrender comfort to protect tenant occupancy; if the landlord needs to live in a larger/better premises, the law does not compel him to remain in lesser premises. (!) - The availability or attribution of ownership to alternative properties (e.g., through wills) may be considered but must be adequately proven and relevant to determine actual availability for occupying the landlord’s need. (!) (!) - The decision of the High Court reversing a Rent Controller order can be upheld if the material supports a finding of bona fide need and the order is not "not according to law." (!)
Judgment
R.C. Lahoti, J.-The appellant, a tenant in a residential accommodation has sought for special leave to appeal feeling aggrieved by an order of the High Court of Delhi which has in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Section 25-B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 allowed a civil revision and directed the appellant to be ejected from the suit accommodation reversing an order of Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissing the landlord’s application for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter the Act, for short).
Leave granted.
2. The suit premises are situated at D-219, Defence Colony, New Delhi. The building has two floors and a Barsati. The accommodation in each of the two floors consists of two bathrooms, two bedrooms, a study room, a glazed verandah, a drawing-cum-dining room and a kitchen. There is a garage on the ground floor and a servant room on the Barsati floor. The landlord is occupying the ground floor. In July, 1978 the first floor and the Barsati were let out by the landlord to the tenant-appellant for residential purpose. There was some controversy whether one room of the suit premises had formed part of the tenancy or was illegally encroached upon and taken possession of by the tenant. However, that controversy is over and the parties before us have proceeded on assumption that the premises in occupation of the tenant are all included in the tenancy.
3. The landlord-respondent is a practising doctor presently about 78 years of age. In January, 1988 when the proceedings for eviction were initiated, the family of the landlord consisted of himself, his wife, a son-Munish (also a practising doctor), daughter-in-law and a grand son. The landlord has three other sons, namely, Dr. Sunil Gupta, Dr. Anil Gupta and Shri Deepak Gupta. Dr. Anil Gupta and one more - two sons are non-resident Indians settled abroad. The third one has his own business and is residing separately from the father. The need pleaded in the application for eviction was that the accommodation on the ground floor in possession of the landlord was not sufficient to meet his and his family’s residential requirement. The landlord had a mother-in-law, suffering from various ailments and was practically a dependent on the son-in-law, a doctor by profession. The two doctors in the family needed some accommodation as a part of their residential unit for attending to the patients who visited them either in emergency or with previous appointment at timings other than the fixed hours of the clinic which was being run at 2544, Sir Syed Ahmed Road, Darya Ganj. New Delhi in a part of a house belonging to Joint Hindu Family of the landlord which had many other members as well. Undisputedly, the joint family house is a commercial property and the portions other than the one occupied by the landlord for clinic are in possession of the tenants.
4. Admittedly, there is a house property situated at C-217, Sarvodya Enclave, New Delhi. The house there stands on a plot belonging to the wife of the landlord and had come up some time in the year 1986. Eversince the date of construction and also at the time of initiation of the present proceedings it was in occupation of a tenant and hence not available to the landlord or his wife for their residence. Before the Rent Controller, the plea taken and sought to be substantiated by some evidence by the landlord was that the landlord’s wife had executed a will whereby the Sarvodya Enclave property was proposed to be bequeathed to Dr. Anil Gupta, the NRI son and it is he who had invested his own funds in constructing the property.
5. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the mother-in-law of the landlord expired. The wife of the landlord also died. So far as the requirement of the landlord by reference to the need of the mother-in-law and of the wife as a mem
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