2002 Supreme(SC) 549

2002(3) Supreme 583
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Mumbai High Court)
Umesh C. Banerjee & Y.K. Sabharwal, JJ.
Girdhar Shankar Tawade -Appellant
versus
State of Maharashtra -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 463 of 1996
Decided on 24-4-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Shivaji M. Jadhav, Advocate.
For the Respondent : S.S. Shinde, Advocate for S.V. Deshpande, Advocate.

VERY IMPORTANT POINT
Acquittal of a charge under Section 306 IPC, on ground that death of woman was accidental, though not by itself a ground of acquittal under Section 498A IPC, but as in this case there is no evidence of demand of dowry by accused from deceased or her relatives, acquittal under Section 306 IPC will also lead to acquittal under Section 498A IPC.

Headnote:(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 498A-Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty-Purpose and meaning of cruelty in this section-Difference in Exp. (a) and (b).

       Held : The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid cruelty which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed herein before. Two specific instances have been taken note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word cruelty as is expressed by the legislatures : Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz., (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury: whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrace the attributes of cruelty in terms of Section 498(A). (Para 3)

       (ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 306 and 498A-Appellant charged for abetment of suicide and cruelty to his wife-Acquittal for abetment of suicide as death was found accidental but convicted under Section 498A on ground of cruelty-No demand of dowry found in documentary evidence-Oral evidence found contradictory-Dying declaration found of no use (Para 15)-Whether a charge under Section 498A IPC can be maintained though accused is acquitted under Section 306 IPC? (Yes) (Para 17)-Can it be maintained in present case? (No) (Para 18)-Result-Appeal allowed (Para 19)-Re-appreciation of evidence in case of perversity permissible under Article 136 of Constitution? (Para 13) (Constitution of India-Article 136-Scope of appreciation of evidence).

       Held : We have already noted Section 498-A hereinbefore in this judgment and as such we need not delve upon the same in greater detail herein excepting recording that the same stands attributed only in the event of proof of cruelty by the husband or the relatives of the husband of the woman. Admittedly, the finding of the trial Court as regards the death negated suicide with a positive finding of accidental death. If suicide is ruled out then in that event applicability of Section 498A can be had only in terms of explanation (b) thereto which in no uncertain terms records harassment of the woman and the Statute itself thereafter clarifies it to the effect that it is not every such harassment but only in the event of such a harassment being with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand - there is total absence of any of the requirements of the Statute in terms of Section 498-A. The three letters said to have been written and as noticed earlier cannot possibly lend any credence to the requirement of the Statute or even a simple demand for dowry. As regards the core issue as to whether charges under Sections 306 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code are independent of each other and acquittal of one does not lead to acquittal of the other, as noticed earlier, there appears to be a long catena of cases in affirmation thereto and as such further dilation is not necessary neither we are inclined to do so, but in order to justify a conviction under the later provision there must be available on record some material and cogent evidence. Presently, we have on record two inconsistent versions of the brother and the cousin, as such no credence can be attributed thereon - the documentary evidence (namely, those three letters), in our view, falls short of the requirement of the Statute. Even on an assumption of the fact that there is no contradiction in the oral testimony available on record, the cousin goes to the unfortunate girl s in-laws place and requests the husband to treat her well- at best some torture and a request to treat her well. This by itself would not bring home the charge under Section 498-A. Demand for dowry has not seen the light of the day. A faint attempt has been made during the course of submissions that explanation (a) to the Section stands attracted and as such no fault can be attributed to the judgment. This, in our view, is a wholly fallacious approach to the matter by reason of the specific finding of the trial Court and the High Court concurred therewith that the death unfortunately was an accidental death and not suicide. If suicide is left out, then in that event question of applicability of explanation (a) would not arise- neither the second limb to cause injury and danger to life or limb or health would be attracted. In any event the wilful act or conduct ought to be the proximate cause in order to bring home the charge under Section 498-A and not de-hors the same. To have an event sometime back cannot be termed to be a factum taken note of in the matter of a charge under Section 498-A. The legislative intent is clear enough to indicate in particular reference to explanation (b) that there shall have to be a series of acts in order to be a harassment within the meaning of explanation (b). The letters by itself though may depict a reprehensible conduct, would not, however, bring home the charge of Section 498-A against the accused. Acquittal of a charge under Section 306, as noticed hereinbefore, though not by itself a ground for acquittal under Section 498-A, but some cogent evidence is required to bring home the charge of Section 498-A as well, without which the charge cannot be said to be maintained. Presently, we have no such evidence available on record. On the wake of the aforesaid, conviction as recorded by the trial Judge as also by the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal, therefore, is allowed. The impugned orders stand set aside and quashed. The accused stands acquitted of the charge under Section 498-A of the Code. (Paras 16, 17, 18 and 19)