2002 Supreme(SC) 575

2002(4) Supreme 370
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Mumbai High Court)
S. Rajendra Babu and Mrs. Ruma Pal, JJ.
Union of India -Appellant
versus
Shree Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 2727 of 1998
With
Civil Appeal No. 5393/1998
And
Writ Petition (C) No. 632/2000)
Decided on 29-4-2002
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : T.L.V. Iyer, H.W. Dhabe, Sr. Advocates, Sanjay R. Hegde, S.M. Matto, R.N. Poddai, Ms. Priya Hegde, Y.P. Mahajan, Arvind Kumar Sharma, A.K. Sanghi, A.R. Patil, Kiran Suri, R.M. Lambat and B.V. Balram Das, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Although High Court on account of long lapse of time not to enforce clause (c) of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 changing definition of "Industry" cannot issue writ of mandamus to enforce it but can ask the Government to consider as to when it would be feasible to give effect to the provisions of Amending Act.

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 2(j)-Definition of Industry -In Bangalore Water Supply case, 1978(2) SCC 213 Industry included charitable trust -In Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 by clause (c) definition Act of Industry excluded "charitable trust"-All clauses of Amending Act were enforced by Central Government under Section 1(2) of the Amending Act excepting clause (c)-More than 18 years elapsed-Writ to High Court-High Court issued writ of mandamus to enforce Cl. (c) of Amending Act and made certain observations-Appeal against-Can High Court issue writ of mandamus? (No)-Result-That part of the order deleted rest of the order maintained-Appeal partly allowed.

       Held : The High Court took the view that the Central Government, in notifying the date when the provisions of the Act will come into force will have to examine the attending circumstances before bringing the same into force and such a power would not empower the Central Government to decide whether to bring a particular provision into force or not. However, the High Court was of the view that when the Amending Act was adopted by Parliament the difficulties put forth by the appellants were prevalent and, therefore, it authorised the Central Government to notify the appointed day. It is in these circumstances the High Court felt that it is obligatory for the Central Government to examine whether difficulties as expressed still subsist and what steps the Central Government had taken to surmount them and when more than 18 years had elapsed the appellant ought to examine and decide as to when it would he feasible to give effect to the provisions of the Amending Act. In this appeal the order made by the High Courts is in challenge. (Para 3)

       (In A.K. Roy case) : This Court observed that no mandamus could be issued to the executive directing it to commence the operation of the enactment, that such a direction should not be construed as any approval by the Court of the failure on the part of the Central Government for a long period to bring the provisions of the enactment into force; that in leaving it to the judgment of the Central Government to decide as to when the various provisions of the enactment should be brought into force, the Parliament could not have intended that the Central Government may exercise a kind of veto over its constituent will by not ever bring the enactment or some of its provisions into force; that if only the Parliament were to lay down an objective standard to guide and control the discretion of the Central Government in the matter of bringing the various provisions of the Act into force, it would have been possible to compel the Central Government by an appropriate writ to discharge the function assigned to it by the Parliament. It was further contended that an amendment can be bad because it vests an uncontrolled power in the executive in bringing an enactment into operation. This Court, however, noticed that such power cannot be held to give an uncontrolled power to the executive inasmuch as there are practical difficulties in the enforcement of laws and those difficulties cannot be foreseen. It, therefore, became necessary to leave the judgment to the Executive as to when the law should be brought into force. When enforcement of a provision in a statute is left to the discretion of the Government without laying down any objective standards no writ of mandamus could be issued directing the Government to consider the question whether the provision should be brought into force and when it can do so. Delay in implementing the will of the Parliament may draw adverse criticism but on the data placed before us, we cannot say that the Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of the Parliament. In the circumstances set out in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it would not be feasible for Government to set out any definite day as to when they can take action as indicated by the High Court and, therefore, the order made by the High Court cannot be given effect to at all. Though there has been a sense of urgency on the part of the Government in this regard, it has not been able to take a decision in the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. Hence, while noticing that appropriate action has to be taken by the Government to bring into effect the Amending Act as indicated by the High Court, we also take note of the various circumstances which come in the way of the Government to give effect to the Amending Act immediately. That part of the order of the High Court by which writ of mandamus has been issued to the Government to take action and to indicate as to when it would be feasible to appoint a date for bringing into force the Amending Act stands deleted. In other respects, the order made by the High Court is maintained. Appeal is partly allowed accordingly. No costs. (Paras 7, 8 and 9)