IMPORTANT POINT
Under Section 3(j)(vi) of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, Mine would include two kinds of property (1) properties which belong to the mine and (ii) which do not belong but which are used by the mine for the proper functioning of the mine. The concept of user which stands accepted by Calcutta High Court thus needs no interference in Appeal under Article 136 of Constitution.

Headnote:(i) Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972-Section 3(j)-Definition of mine-To include building etc. belonging to or in, or about a mine-Interpretation - Properties which belong to the mine or which are used by the mine for a proper functioning of the mine (see paras 11 to 17).
       (ii) Nationalisation of Coking Coal Mines-The right, title and interest vesting in Central Government transferred to Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Dhanbad (the appellant)-Appellant issuing notices to respondents to make over possession of properties mentioned in the enclosure to Sub-Area Manager of Colliery-Respondents filing writ petition that the property neither belonged to mine nor used for mine and it belonged to them-High Court allowing writ petition restraining appellant on the basis of concept of user i.e. the properties were not used for a proper functioning of the mine-Appeal against-Contention that High Court was wrong in applying concept of nexus or user for proper functioning of mine to quash the notices-Whether sustainable? (No).
       Held : It is trite that there must be some co-relation with the activity of a coal mine - the user must be there for the purposes of the coal mine, be it a weighbridge, be it a Director s bungalow or be it even a Union s office, but it must relate to be affairs of the coal mine concerned and not de hors the same. The nexus concept introduced by the High Court cannot in our view be taken exception to since there is no factual justification in support of the issuance of the notice on the wake of the reply to the show-cause notice by the Respondent No. 1 herein. In any event the user being the requirement of the statute and since the contextual facts did not have the factual support to prove the same, question of vesting within the meaning of the Act of 1972 would not arise. (Para 22)
       (iii) Constitution of India-Article 136-Scope of interference-Question of fact-Whether property was used for proper functioning of mine-No such allegation in notice by appellant to respondents to taking over possession of their property-High Court quashing notices applying concept of nexus or user -Appeal to Supreme Court-Whether appeal involves more of a factual issue than a legal issue and as such intervention under Article 136 is not warranted?-Rejected-Appeal dismissed.
       Held : Adverting to the other aspect of the matter, to wit, that the appeal involves more of a factual issue than a legal issue and as such intervention under Article 136 is not warranted - be it noted that intervention under Article 136 can be had when the judgment is tainted with serious legal infirmities or is founded on a legal construction which cannot but be attributed to be otherwise wrong. The jurisdiction under Article 136 stands out to be extremely wide but that does not, however, warrant intervention having concurrent set of facts and an appeal therefrom on the factual issue. The Article has been engrafted by the founding-fathers of the Constitution for the purposes of avoiding mischief of injustice on the wrong assumption of law. The justice delivery system of the country prompts this Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution when the need of the society stands established and the judgment, if left outstanding, would not only create prejudice but would have an otherwise adverse effect on to the society - it is this solemn objective of administration of justice with which the Constitution-makers thought it prudent to confer such a power on to the Apex Court of the country. It is the final arbiter but only when the dispute needs to be settled by the Apex Court so as to avoid injustice and infraction of law. (Para 23)
       Held consequently : In the contextual facts we do not find such an infraction. By reason whereof the appeal, in any event, cannot be sustained. (Para 24)
       Held finally : There is no merit even otherwise. As such this appeal fails and is dismissed. (Para 25)

JUDGMENT

Banerjee, J.-Leave granted

2. It is for the purposes of protecting, conserving and promoting scientific development of the resources of coking coal being a need to meet the growing requirements of iron and steel industry and for that matter connected therewith or incidental thereto, the right, title and interest of the owners of such coke oven plants have vested in the Central government w.e.f. 1st May, 1972 and by an order dated 17th August, 1972, the Central Government have directed that the right, title and interest thereto shall stand transferred to Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Dhanbad.

3. The word vest in common English acceptation mean and imply conferment of ownership of properties upon a person and in the similar vein it gives immediate and fixed right of present and future enjoyment. Significantly, however, the expression vest is a word of variable import since it has no fixed connotation and the same has to be understood in different contexts under different set of circumstances. The decision of this court in The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust (AIR 1957 SC 344) lends concurrence to the same. It is in this context a later decision of this Court (Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui, etc. v. Union of India & Ors. : AIR 1995 SC 604 at 645) ought also to be noticed, wherein this Court stated:

"The vesting of the said disputed area in the Central Government by virtue of Section 3 of the Act is limited, as a statutory receiver, with the duty for its management and administration according to Section 7 requiring maintenance of status quo herein under sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The duty of the Central Government as the statutory receiver is to hand over the disputed area in accordance with Section 6 of the Act, in terms or the adjudication made in the suits for implementation of the final decision therein. This is the purpose for which the disputed area has been so acquired.

The power of the courts in making further interim orders in the suits is limited to, and circumscribed by, the area outside the ambit of Section 7 of the Act.

The vesting of the adjacent area, other than the disputed area, acquired by the Act in the Central Government by virtue of Section 3 of the Act is absolute with the power of management and administration thereof in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act, till its further vesting in any authority or other body or trustees of any trust in accordance with Section 6 of the Act. The further vesting of the adjacent area, other than the disputed area, in accordance with Section 6 of the Act has to be made at the time and in the manner indicated, in view of the purpose of its acquisition.

The meaning of the word "vest" in Section 3 and Section 6 of the Act has to be so understood in the different contexts.

Section 8 of the Act is meant for payment of compensation to owners of the property vesting absolutely in the Central Government, the title to which is not in dispute being in excess of the disputed area which alone is the subject matter of the revived suits. It does not apply to the disputed area, title to which has to be adjudicated in the suits and in respect of which the Central Government is merely the statutory receiver as indicated, with the duty to restore it to the owner in terms of the adjudication made in the suits."

4. Adverting to the contextual facts be it noted that vide notices dated 19.8.1972 and 30.8.1972, the Appellant herein directed the Respondent to make over possession of the properties mentioned in the enclosure to the Sub-Area Manager of the Colliery by end August 1972 under intimation to the Head Office.

5. Significantly, by letter dated 8th September, 1972 from the Oriental Coal Company Ltd. being a party -respondent herein, it has been specifically made clear that as regards the lands and buildings referred to in the enclosure to the notice, question of vesting of the same would not arise since the said properties belong t

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2002 Supreme(SC) 1113

Cases Referred (3)