2003(2) Supreme 445
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Karnataka High Court)
Y.K. Sabharwal & H.K. Sema, JJ.
K. Shamrao and Ors. -Appellants
versus
Assistant Charity Commissioner -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 1534 of 1995
Decided on 4-3-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Sanjiv Sen, R.N. Karanjawala, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Siddharth Dave, Satya Mitra and Sanjay R. Hegde, Advocates.
Held : The scheme of the Act, the powers conferred on the Assistant Charity Commissioner and the perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act clearly show that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has to be a judicial officer or an officer with a legal background; has to hear parties wherever dispute is raised with regard to existence of a public trust or with regard to a property being trust property or otherwise and then give a definitive judgment after taking evidence having regard to the facts of the case and by application of law. The judgment is final unless interfered with in appeal or thereafter tested in appeal before the High Court. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred in the matters inquired into and decided by the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The aforesaid provisions make it clear that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has not only the trapping of a judicial tribunal but also has power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. The Assistant Charity Commissioner, therefore, possesses all the attributes of a court. The fact that the Assistant Charity Commissioner has also to perform some administrative functions is not of any relevance for coming to the conclusion that he is not a court, having regard to the provisions of the Act which substantially confer on him the power to give a definite judgment subject to finality in appeal, after hearing all concerned. Functions of the Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly adjudicatory. The Assistant Charity Commissioner has almost all the powers which an ordinary Civil Court has including power of summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents, examining witnesses on oath and coming to a definite conclusion on the evidence induced and arguments submitted. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Assistant Charity Commissioner is a Court for the purposes of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. (Paras 16, 17 and 18)
JUDGMENT
Y.K. Sabharwal, J.-Whether Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (for short the Act ) as applicable to Karnataka is a court for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is the question involved in this appeal.
2. The contempt proceedings have been initiated against the appellants in the High Court on reference made by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Belgaum for taking contempt action as a result of publications in a daily newspaper. The three original appellants were the Managing Editor, Editor, Printer and Publisher respectively of the said publication. The first appellant died during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal in so far as the said appellant is concerned stands abated. The items published in the said newspaper on three dates were said to be scandalous and intended to interfere with the administration of justice, it is not necessary to go into the factual matrix since the present appeal has been filed against the judgment of the High Court deciding a preliminary objection raised by the appellants before the High Court. The objection was that the Assistant Charity Commissioner is not a Court and, therefore, contempt action cannot be initiated against them. The High Court, overruling that objection, has held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner under the Act is a court within the meaning of Sections 2 and 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The decision of the High Court on the preliminary objection is under challenge in the present appeal.
3. The Assistant Charity Commissioner was a Civil Judge working in the judicial department of the State. His services were placed at the disposal of the Government for being appointed as Assistant Charity Commissioner under the provisions of the Act. To determine whether the Assistant Charity Commissioner is a court, it would be necessary to find out, having regard to the provisions of the Act, whether the Assistant Charity Commissioner possesses the attributes of a court.
4. The expression court is not defined in the Contempt Act. The definition of the said expression in Section 2(4) of the Act is of no assistance or relevance for determining the question in issue.
5. Before we examine the provisions of the Act for the purposes aforesaid, certain decisions of this Court wherein similar question was considered albeit in different context, may be noticed.
6. In The Bharat Bank Ltd., New Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi & Anr. [(1950) SCR 459], while dealing with the question whether industrial tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was a Court for the purpose of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, it was observed by Fazal Ali, J. that the Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court.
7. In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain [(1955) 2 SCR 955] considering the question whether a Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was a Court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, reference was made to the decision in Bharat Bank s case (supra) and various other decisions and it was held by this Court that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
8. In Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab [(1955) 2 SCR 1013] it was laid down by this Court that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an
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