IMPORTANT POINT
High Court was not right in holding that acquisition of school building with its appurtenant land by State was an action liable to be quashed being malicious in law .

Headnote:Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 4(1)-Acquisition of school building of which State was tenant and landlord had a decree of eviction on ground -That it had become dilapidated and required reconstruction-Public purpose stated was fulfilling educational needs of children in the old city of Hyderabad-High Court quashed it holding it malicious in law -Appeal to Supreme Court-Whether High Court was right? (No)-Appeal allowed.
       Held : The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held the action of acquisition of the property by the State as malicious in law only because before passing of the adverse orders by the court against it, no action for acquisition of the building which was in its occupation since 1954, was initiated. In our opinion, even if that be the situation that the State as tenant of the school building took no step to acquire the land before order of eviction and direction of the High Court, it cannot be held that when it decided to acquire the building, there existed no genuine public purpose. If only the possession of the property could be retained as a tenant, it was unnecessary to acquire the property. The order of eviction as well as the direction to vacate issued by the High Court only provide just, reasonable and proximate cause for resorting to acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. Resort, therefore, to acquisition at a stage when there was no other alternative but to do so to serve a genuine public which was being fulfilled from 1954 signify more a reasonable and just exercise of statutory power. Such exercise of power cannot be condemned as one made in colourable or mala fide exercise of it. (Para 17)
       The last submission made on behalf of the respondent/owner also does not commend to us. Merely because as a temporary arrangement the school building has been shifted to an alternative place apparently to avoid the unpleasantness of facing any contempt proceedings, this Court cannot uphold the order of the High Court and leave the matter to the State Government to reconsider the question whether the school building is still required for its purposes. Admittedly, the school building was hundred years old, dilapidated and in dangerous condition. Shifting school building to the alternative site had, therefore, become necessary to avoid any possible catastrophe by collapse of the building. On this ground, however, it cannot be held that the public purpose for acquiring the building no longer exists. The last prayer made on behalf of the respondent/owner also, therefore, cannot be accepted. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh are set aside. In the circumstances aforesaid, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal. (Paras 23 to 26)

JUDGMENT

Dharmadhikari, J.-This appeal has been preferred by the State of Andhra Pradesh and its Authorities against the Division Bench judgment dated 22.7.1999 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 652 of 1999. The Division Bench upheld the order dated 29.12.1998 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court.

2. On the basis of the facts and circumstances the High Court came to the conclusion that the acquisition of the school building with its appurtenant land by the State was an action liable to be quashed being malicious in law.

3. The school building which is in the heart of old city of Hyderabad was in possession of the State as tenant of the respondent from the year 1954. In the year 1977, respondent/ landlord approached the Rent Controller, Hyderabad for eviction of the State from school building on the ground that it had become dilapidated and required reconstruction. By order dated 15.12.1979, the Rent Controller, Hyderabad dismissed the eviction petition. The Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes, Hyderabad by its order made on 15.3.1989 in the appeal of the tenant granted eviction of the State from the school building. During pendency of appeal, the respondent/owner approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 6487 of 1988 seeking early eviction of the State on the ground that the condition of the building was dangerous for the school. The High Court on 12.8.1988 allowed the Writ Petition and directed the State Government to vacate and hand over the possession of the school building to the owner within a specified period. The period of vacating the building by the State was later on extended upto 30.4.1989 on an alleged undertaking given by the State authorities to deliver the possession before the expiry of the extended period.

4. It is the case of the respondent that only in order to frustrate the decree of eviction and to avoid the delivery of possession of the land and school building to the owner in compliance with the directions made by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 6487 of 1988 and in breach of undertaking given by the State to vacate, the State hurriedly issued on 26.4.1989 notifications under Section 4(1) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the building and premises of the school. Later in the proceedings of acquisition, an Award was passed on 08.5.1992 granting compensation in the sum of Rs.2,60,968.68/- to the respondent.

5. The respondent/owner assailed the acquisition proceedings by Writ Petition No. 6876 of 1989 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge and upheld in appeal by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court quashing the acquisition proceedings, the State of Andhra Pradesh is in appeal to this Court.

6. The learned Single Judge, on taking into consideration the time and manner of the acquisition proceedings, came to the following conclusion:-

"In my view, the said exercise of power under Section 4(1) of the Act is to circumvent the Civil Court decree and the High Court order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The exercise of power under Section 4(1) of the Act is not fair and it is only to scuttle a valid decree passed by the Civil Court which amounts to malice in law . The power under Section 4(1) of the Act cannot be exercised to thwart a valid decree passed by the Civil Court".

7. By the impugned order, the Division Bench also in Writ Appeal came to the same conclusion which in its language is:-

"Acquisition suffers from lack of bona fides and is only an arbitrary act and an attempt to undo the consequences of the judicial decision".

8. The Division Bench in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition initiated by the State were not fair and bona fide also took into consideration the fact that minimum norms fixed by State itself for setting up a school with facilities like play grounds, lecture hall and open space were no

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2003 Supreme(SC) 1085

IMPORTANT POINTHigh Court was not right in holding that acquisition of school building with its appurtenant land by State was an action liable to be quashed being malicious in law .

Cases Referred (5)

IMPORTANT POINT
High Court was not right in holding that acquisition of school building with its appurtenant land by State was an action liable to be quashed being malicious in law .