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2003 Supreme(SC) 629

2003(5) Supreme 105
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
V.N. Khare, CJI., S.B. Sinha, J.
Sayeda Akhtar -Appellant
versus
Abdul Ahad -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 5010 of 2003
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13938 of 2002)
Decided on 18-7-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Anis Ahmed Khan, Advocate.
For the Respondent : B.S. Banthia, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
Under Section 13 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, Court does not extend time or condone delay for depositing rent arrears on mere sympathy but has to exercise discretion judicially and on a finding of existence of sufficient cause.

Headnote:(i) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Section 13-Eviction suit on ground of default in payment of rent-Suit decreed by trial Court and confirmed in appeal-High Court reversed decree in second appeal holding that default deserved to be condoned and Courts below ought to have granted further time to deposit rent arrears-Appeal-Court s jurisdiction to extend time for depositing rent-Discretion is to be in exercised judicially and on a finding of existence of sufficient cause-Court does not extend time or condone delay on mere sympathy-Impugned order deserved to be set aside.

       Held : A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly go to show that although the court has the jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the rent both for the period during which the tenant had defaulted as well as the period subsequent thereto but therefor an application is to be made. The provision requiring an application to be made is indisputably necessary for the purpose of showing sufficient cause as to why such deposit could not be made within the time granted by the Court. The court does not extend time or condone the delay on mere sympathy. It will exercise its discretion judicially and on a finding of existence of sufficient cause. (Para 4)

       Further held : The High Court in its impugned judgment did not point out as to how the court of appeal committed an error of records in arriving at the said finding. Admittedly, there had been two defaults i.e. rent for the month of November 1985 and rents for the months of May and June 1988. The High Court purported to have recorded that the appellant had applied for condonation of delay in payment of rent on 5-2-1990 in relation to default to deposit rent for the month of November 1985 and for the months of May and June 1988. An application for condonation of delay could not have been entertained on 5-2-1990 for commission of default in depositing the rent. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. (Para 6)

       (ii) M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Section 13-Eviction petition on ground of default and nuisance-Trial Court did not frame specific issue on nuisance -Parties however had adduced evidence on point-Court of appeal formulated question on point and gave finding in favour of landlord-High Court set aside judgment without adverting to question and only on ground that no issue was framed by trial Court-High Court could not have without sufficient and just reason interfered with concurrent findings of fact of Courts below. (Paras 7 to 9)

       

ORDER

Leave granted.

Heard counsel for the parties.

With the consent of the parties, we dispose of this appeal finally at this stage.

2. The appellant herein is the landlord of premises bearing No. 505, Ward No. 15, Arif Nagar, Bhopal, whereas the respondent herein is the tenant. The landlord filed a suit for eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent as well as nuisance. Admittedly, the tenant neither deposited the rent within the stipulated period nor any application was moved for extension of time to deposit the same. Consequently, the trial Court decreed the suit and passed an order of eviction. The first appellate Court affirmed trial Court s decree. However, the High Court allowed the second appeal and reversed the decree. Consequently, the suit for eviction stood dismissed. The High Court was of the view that default committed by the tenant deserved condonation and the Court below ought to have given further time to deposit the arrears of rent. It is against the said judgment and order that the appellant-landlord is in appeal before us.

3. Section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 reads as under:

"13. (1) On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in Section 12, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf, deposit in the Court to pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit."

4. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly go to show that although the court has the jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the rent both for the period during which the tenant had defaulted as well as the period subsequent thereto but therefor an application is to be made. The provision requiring an application to be made is indisputably necessary for the purpose of showing sufficient cause as to why such deposit could not be made within the time granted by the Court. The court does not extend time or condone the delay on mere sympathy. It will exercise its discretion judicially and on a finding of existence of sufficient cause.

5. In Nasiruddin and Others vs. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2 SCC 577], this Court noticed the said provision as well as the decision in Shyamcharan Sharma vs. Dharamdas [(1980) 2 SCC 151] and observed that the court has been conferred power to extend the time for deposit of rent but on an application made to it.

The finding of the court of appeal in this behalf is:

"The appellant has not moved any application before the court below for condoning the delay in depositing of rent, by this Court the relevant application had already been dismissed. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the protection of Section 12(i)(a), 12 (iii) and 13(v) as has been laid down in 1989 M.P.R.C.J. 155."

6. The High Court in its impugned judgment did not point out as to how the court of appeal committed an error of records in arriving at the said finding. Admittedly, there had been two defaults i.e. rent for the month of November 1985 and rents for the months of May and June 1988. The High Court purported to have recorded that the appellant had applied for condonation of delay in payment of rent on 5-2-1990 in relation to default to deposit rent for the month of November 1985 and for the months of May and June 1988. An application for condonation of delay














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