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2003 Supreme(SC) 628

2003(5) Supreme 208
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Delhi High Court)
Doraiswamy Raju & Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
Union of India -Appellant
versus
Rajiv Kumar -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 5007 of 2003
(Arising out of SLP (C) 4491 of 2003)
With
Civil Appeal No. 5008 of 2003
[Arising out of SLP (C) 12703 of 2003 (CC 5872/2003)]
Decided on 18-7-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : S.B. Sanyal, Sr. Advocate, K.S. Bhati, B.V. Balaram Das, Ms. Binu Tamta, Advocate for P. Parmeswaran, M.Z. Choudhary, Anis Ahmed Khan, P. Chakravarty, Ms. Manita Verma, Advocates.
Caveator-in-person.

IMPORTANT POINT
Order of suspension in terms of Rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, is not restricted in its point of duration or efficacy to the period of actual detention only. It continues to be operative unless modified or revoked.

Headnote:(i) Service Law-Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965-Rule 10(2)-Scope and ambit-Employee arrested and detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours-Order passed that concerned employee is deemed to have been suspended-Continued detention challenged-Whether an order of suspension after release of petitioner on bail could be sustained under sub rule (2) of Rule 10-(Yes)-Order continues to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority-Rule 10(2) is a deemed provision-It does not speak of any period of its effectiveness-Inapplicability of Rule 10(5).

       Held : Rule 10(2) is a deemed provision and creates a legal fiction. A bare reading of the provision shows that an actual order is not required to be passed. That is deemed to have been passed by operation of the legal fiction. It has as much efficacy, force and operation as an order otherwise specifically passed under other provisions. It does not speak of any period of its effectiveness. Rules 10(3) and 10(4) operate conceptually in different situations and need specific provisions separately on account of interposition of an order of Court of law or an order passed by the Appellate or reviewing authority and the natural consequences inevitably flowing from such orders. Great emphasis is laid on the expressions "until further orders" in the said sub-rules to emphasise that such a prescription is missing in Sub-rule (2). Therefore, it is urged that the order is effective for the period of detention alone. The plea is clearly without any substance because of Sub-Rule 5(a) and 5(c) of Rule 10. The said provisions refer to an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made. Obviously, the only order which is even initially deemed to have been made under Rule 10 is one contemplated under Sub-Rule (2). The said provision under Rule 10(5)(a) makes it crystal clear that the order continues to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority competent to do so while Rule 10(5)(c) empowers the competent authority to modify or revoke also. No exception is made relating to an order under Rules 10(2) and 10(5)(a). On the contrary, specifically it encompasses an order under Rule 10(2). If the order deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2) is to loose effectiveness automatically after the period of detention envisaged comes to an end, there would be no scope for the same being modified as contended by the respondents and there was no need to make such provisions as are engrafted in Rule 10(5)(a) and (c) and instead an equally deeming provision to bring an end to the duration of the deemed order would by itself suffice for the purpose. Thus, it is clear that the order of suspension does not loose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. It could be modified and revoked by another order as envisaged under Rule 10(5)(c) and until that order is made, the same continues by the operation of Rule 10(5)(a) and the employee has no right to be re-instated to service. (Paras 14 and 15)

       The inevitable conclusion therefore is that the order in terms of Rule 10(2) is not restricted in its point of duration or efficacy to the period of actual detention only. It continues to be operative unless modified or revoked under Sub-Rule 5(c), as provided under Sub-rule 5(a). (Para 26)

       Further held : Rule 10(5)(b) deals with a situation where a government servant is suspended or is deemed to have suspended and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during continuance of that suspension irrespective of the fact whether the earlier suspension was in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise. Rule 10(5)(b) can be pressed into service only when any other disciplinary proceeding is also commenced than the one for and during which suspension or deemed suspension was already in force, to meet the situation until the termination of all such proceedings. In contradiction, Rule 10(5)(a) has application in relation to an order of suspension already made or deemed to have been made. Rule 10(5)(b) has no application to the facts of the present case and no inspiration or support could be drawn for the stand taken for the respondents or the decision arrived at by the High Court. It is Rule 10(5)(a) alone which has application and the deemed suspension would continue to be in force till anything has been done under Rule 10(5)(c). Similarly, Rules 10(3) and 10(4) operate in different fields and merely because a specific provision is made for its continuance, until further orders in them itself due to certain further developments taking place and interposition of orders made by Court or appellate and reviewing authority to meet and get over such specific eventualities, in given circumstances and that does not in any way affect the order of suspension deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2). (Para 27)

       (ii) Service Law-Suspension-Suspension for a very long period-Whether it renders the suspension invalid-(No)-Merely because suspension is for a long period it does not invalidate the suspension-Though the period of suspension should not be unnecessarily prolonged-However, if plausible reasons exist and authorities feel that suspension needs to be continued, merely because it is for a long period that does not invalidate the suspension. (Para 29)

       (iii) Interpretation of Statutes-Language employed in a statute or any statutory provision is determinative factor of legislative intent-Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents-Courts cannot aid legislatures, defective phrasing of an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so-Question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. (Paras 18 to 25)

       

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-Delay condoned in SLP (C) No. 12703/2003 (CC 5872/2003).

Leave granted.

2. The basic issue in these two appeals relates to the scope and ambit of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (in short the Rules ) vis-a-vis other provisions of the said Rule.

3. Division Bench of the Delhi High Court by the impugned judgment in each case held that Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 does not contain any provision wherefrom it can be deduced that the deemed suspension for custodial detention exceeding forty eight hours would continue until it is withdrawn. It was further held that on a plain reading of the said provision it is clear that the same comes to an end by operation of law after release of the employee from detention.

4. Factual scenario is almost undisputed and needs to be noted in brief.

5. Respondent-employee in each case was arrested and detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. With reference to Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10, the order was passed in each case indicating that in view of the detention in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours, the concerned employee is deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of suspension and shall remain suspended until further orders.

6. The background facts of the appeal relating to respondent-Rajiv Kumar is referred for the purpose of adjudicating the issues involved as the factual position in the appeal relating to Bani Singh would not affect ultimate conclusions. Rajiv Kumar was arrested on 26.3.1998 for allegedly accepting bribe and was released on bail on 2.4.1998. The order purportedly under Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 to formally place on record was passed on 15.5.1998. On 2.7.2000 the order dated 15.5.1998 was assailed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short the CAT ) at its Delhi Bench on the ground that there was no reason for his continued suspension. The prosecuting agency filed challan on 2.9.2000. On 11.10.2000, Rajiv Kumar filed an application for interim relief. On 9.11.2000 and order was passed by the authorities continuing suspension. By judgment dated 14.3.2001 CAT directed the authorities to dispose of the matter by a reasoned and speaking order. An application for review was filed on 26.4.2001. It was rejected by an order dated 15.5.2001. In terms of the CAT s directions, an order was passed on 21.5.2001. The same is stated to be the subject matter of challenge before the Mumbai Bench of CAT. On 3.8.2001, Civil Writ Petition No. 4746/2001 was filed before the Delhi High Court challenging the aforesaid orders dated 14.3.2001 and 15.5.2001. At this juncture, it needs to be noted that there was no challenge to the order dated 9.11.2000.

7. By the impugned judgment, the Delhi High Court came to hold, as noted above, that CAT was not correct in remitting the matter back to the appointing authority for consideration of the matter afresh. It was, inter alia, observed that if a question of law had been raised before it, CAT was required to apply its mind and pass appropriate orders. The impugned order of suspension was quashed. It was held that the order dated 15.5.1998 cannot be treated to be one passed under Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10. It was held that an order of suspension after release of the petitioner on bail could not have been passed under Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 and such order could have been passed only in terms of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10. View expressed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chandra Shekhar Saxena and Ors. v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P., Lucknow and Anr. (1997 Allahabad Law Journal 963) was followed. It was further held that a combined reading of Rules 10(1), 10(2), 10(3), 10(4) and 10(5)(a) makes the position clear that the order of suspension was effective for the period of detention and not beyond it where by legal fiction a person is deemed to be under suspension for being in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours.

8. For the











































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