IMPORTANT POINT
Where the nature of relief as orginally sought has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit it is but fair that relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in light of updated facts.

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the common judgment of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The three appeals which disposed of by the judgment were preferred under Section 72(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 (for short the Act) wherein challenge was to the common judgment and order dated 12-11-2003 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Nos. 60-62/2000 on the file of the Court of the Second Additional District Judge, Bijapur. The dispute relates to the elections claimed to have been conducted by two rival groups for the Managing Committee of the Vidya Vardhak Sangh, Bijapur, which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (in short the "Societies Act"). It is also a registered body under the provisions of the Act. The dispute arose because names of 38 persons were included in the electroal rolls for the election. While the appellants claim that the 38 persons whose names are included in the electoral roll were not eligible to participate in the process of election, the other group, that is, respondents 1 to 12 contested the claim. Initially after the election, the elected Committee started functioning in October 1996, as the date of election was 6-10-1996. There is no dispute that subsequent committees have been elected as the term of office is 3 years. But the basic dispute about the eligibility of the 38 persons still continues to haunt the society. We need not go into the various disputes both factual and legal in detail. Two points have been urged by learned counsel for the appellants. They pointed out that the High Court lost sight of the fact that by passage to time the dispute as regards the validity of the election in October 1996 became non est. Secondly, the High Court erroneously came to the conclusion that the 38 persons were legally inducted as members. Such conclusion was arrived at by proceeding on erroneous premises. The High Court committed a faux pas by holding that the application filed by the respondents 1 to 12 for adducing additional evidence was not dealt with by the Charity Commissioner thereby prejudicing case of the respondents. It was pointed out by the appellant that the application was not pressed by the applicants and it is not as if the Charity Commissioner had not dealt with the application in the proper perspective.

3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 12 submitted that the dispute did not become infructuous by passage of time as these basic issues regarding eligibility remained. Further, the materials relied upon by the High Court to conclude that 38 persons were legally inducted as members cannot be faulted because of the materials considered by the High Court.

4. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its importance to create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of the relief, as orginally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson vs. State of Alabama [(1934) 294 U.S. 600, 607], illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal (1940 FCR 84=AIR 1941 FC 5)