IMPORTANT POINT
In an appeal against acquittal the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record but having done so if it finds that the view taken by the trial Court is a possible reasonable view of the evidence on record, it will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial Court.

Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 302, 304-I-Criminal Procedure Codes, 1973-Section 378-Killing by firearm injuries-Prosecution case that A1 exhorted his son to kill deceased and A2 thereafter fired at him injuries him on his forehead-Injuries were sufficient to cause death-Trial Court acquitted A2 of all the charges but found A1 guilty of offence u/s 304 Part I-High Court reversed acquittal of A2 and convicted him of offence under Section 302 IPC-Eye witnesses made significant changes while deposing in Court-It was with a view to bring their case in consonance with medical evidence on record-Change of version being deliberate-Whether High Court was justified in reversing acquittal recorded by the trial Court-(No).
       Held : By its impugned judgment the High Court reversed the order of acquittal in so far as Shingara Singh, A-2 is concerned and convicted him of the offence under section 302 IPC. It further convicted accused No. 1 Suba Singh of the offence under section 302 read with section 34 IPC instead of section 304, Part I for which he was convicted by the trial court. We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of acquittal of A-2 under section 302 IPC having regard to the facts of the case. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record but having done so if it finds that the view taken by the trial court is a possible reasonable view of the evidence on record, it will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court. Only in cases where the High Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial court are unreasonable or perverse or that the court has committed a serious error of law, or where the trial court had recorded its findings in ignorance of relevant material on record or by taking into consideration evidence which is not admissible, the High Court may be justified in reversing the order of acquittal. We do not find this case to be one where the High Court was justified in reversing the findings recorded by the trial court. At best, it may be contended that the view taken by the High Court is also a reasonable view of the evidence on record. However, we cannot say that the view taken by the trial court was not another reasonable view of the evidence on record. It is well settled that where two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the one that favours the accused must be accepted. In any event in a case of acquittal if the view of the trial court is a possible reasonable view of the evidence on record, interference by the High Court may not be justified. (Para 25)
       We are, therefore, of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of acquittal passed in favour Shingara Singh, A-2. On appreciation of the evidence on record it appears to us that the occurrence in all probability may have taken place in the manner alleged by the defence, and not in the manner alleged by the prosecution. If that be so we must hold that Shingara Singh, A-2 was not even present when the occurrence took place. He, therefore, is entitled to acquittal. However, so far as the case of Suba Singh, A-1 is concerned, we agree with the findings of the trial court that he had exceeded the right of private defence. In the facts and circumstances of the case there was no justification for using his gun in such a manner as to cause the death of the deceased. We, therefore, find him guilty of the offence under section 304 Part I IPC but in the facts and circumstances of the case sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine he shall undergo imprisonment for further period of one year. (Paras 29 & 30)

JUDGMENT

B.P. Singh, J.-The appellants in these appeals and special leave petitions are Suba Singh (A-1) and his son Shingara Singh (A-2). They were both tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa in Sessions Trial No. 46 of 1991 charged variously of offences under Sections 302, 307, 302/34, 307/34 IPC and under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act. The learned Additional Sessions Judge by his judgment and order dated March 6, 1992 acquitted A-2 of all the charges levelled against him but found A-1 guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part I holding that he had exceeded his right of private defence. Accordingly, he sentenced A-1 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. Both the appellants were acquitted of other charges levelled against them.

2. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Criminal Appeal No. 375-DBA of 1992 was preferred by the State of Haryana before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh against the acquittal of A-2 under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC. Suba Singh preferred Criminal Appeal No. 105-SB of 1992 against his conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC, while the informant Balbir Singh preferred a Criminal Revision No. 68 of 1993 against the same impugned judgment and order acquitting the appellants of the other charges levelled against them. The two Appeals and the Criminal Revision have been disposed of by a common judgment and order of the High Court dated March 6, 1992. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the State and held A-2 guilty of the offence under sections 302 and 307 IPC. A-1 was found guilty and convicted under Section 302/34 and 307/34 IPC. A-1 was also found guilty of the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. A-2 has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years. He has also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years under Section 307 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. A-1 has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302/34 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for ten years. Under Section 307/34 IPC he has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. While so allowing the appeal preferred by the State the High Court has in a mechanical manner allowed the Criminal Revision preferred by the informant, which in effect had become infructuous since an appeal had been preferred by the State which was ultimately allowed. In any event a Criminal Revision preferred by a private party against an order of acquittal could not result in the conviction of the accused.

3. The Criminal Appeal preferred by A-1 against his conviction under Section 304 Part I was also disposed of in the above terms.

4. The appellant Shingara Singh has preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 682-683 of 1996 while A-1 Suba Singh has preferred Special Leave Petition Nos. 2106-2108 of 1996. In the Special Leave Petition notice was issued with the direction that the manner be heard along with Criminal Appeal Nos. 682-683 of 1996 preferred by A-2. In fact, there was no need for A-1 to file a Special Leave Petition since the view of the provisions of Section 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appealable judgment and order having been passed against co-accused Shingara Singh, A-2, appellant Suba Singh, A-1 also had a right of appeal to this Court. However, we grant special leave to Suba Singh and proceed to dispose of these appeals by this common judgment and order.

5. A-1, Suba Singh and Gurdeep Singh (father of the deceased) lived in adjoining h