IMPORTANT POINTS
1. With reference to Order VII Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint and that there cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint.
2. A person without title but in settled possession, as against mere fugitive possession, can get back possession if forcibly dispossessed or rather, if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law.

Headnote:(i) Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Order VII Rule 11-Rejection of plaint -Relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application for rejection are the averments in the plaint-Requirement of law being reading the plaint in its totality-Order VII Rule 11 does not justify rejection of any particular portion of the plaint-Distinction between material facts and particulars -Duty on Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of defendant-Rejection of plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13.
       Held : There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. (Para 15)
       What is required in law is not the piecemeal reading of the plaint but in its entirety. Whether the reliefs would be granted on the pleaded facts and the evidence adduced is totally different from the relief claimed. All the reliefs claimed may not be allowed to a party on the pleadings and the evidence adduced. Whether part of the relief cannot be granted by the Civil Court is a different matter from saying that because of a combined claim of reliefs the jurisdiction is ousted or no cause of action is disclosed. Considering the reliefs claimed vis-a-vis the pleadings would not mean compartmentalization or segregation. (Para 16)
       The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, the Order X of the Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and by searching examination of the party in case the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised. (Para 17)
       The Order VII Rule 11 does not justify rejection of any particular portion of the plaint. Order VI Rule 16 of the Code is relevant in this regard. It deals with striking out pleadings . It has three clauses permitting the Court at any stage of the proceeding to strike out or amend any matter in any pleading i.e. (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or, (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or, (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. (Para 18)
       Rule 11 of Order VII lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised, and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word shall is used clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. In any event, rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13. (Para 20)
       (ii) Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Order VII Rule 11-Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950-Sections 50, 51 and 80-Rejection of plaint-Challenged-Appellants-plaintiffs, claimed to be tenants of respondent trust of which defendants 3 to 13 were the trustees-Allegations of having been forcibly evicted notwithstanding continuance of tenancy of 11 years-Preliminary objection raised by the trust-Whether the suit was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code-(No)-Whether suit was tenable against all the defendants-Whether Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
       Held : A reading of the plaint and the reliefs along with the contents of the plaint goes to show that the main dispute relates to the question of continuance of tenancy and the period of tenancy. They are in essence unrelated with the other reliefs regarding enquiry into the affairs of the trust. Such enquiries can only be undertaken under Section 50 of the Act. For instituting the suit of the nature specified in Section 50, prior consent of the Charity Commissioner is necessary under Section 51. To that extent Mr. Savant is right that the reliefs relatable to Section 50 would require a prior consent in terms of Section 51. If the plaintiffs give up those reliefs claimed in accordance with law, the question would be whether a cause of action for the residual claims/reliefs warrant continuance of the suit. The nature of the dispute is to be resolved by the Civil Court. The question of tenancy cannot be decided under Section 50 of the Act. Section 51 is applicable only to suits which are filed by a person having interest in the trust. A tenant of the trust does not fall within the category of a person having an interest in the trust. Except relief in Para D of the plaint, the order reliefs could be claimed before and can be considered and adjudicated by the Civil Courts and the bar or impediment in Sections 50 and 51 of the Act will have no relevance or application to the other reliefs. That being so, Sections 50 and 51 of the Act would not have any application to that part of the relief which relates to question of tenancy, the term of tenancy and the period of tenancy. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that Courts below were not justified in directing rejection of the plaint. However, the adjudication in the suit would be restricted to the question of tenancy, terms of tenancy and the period of tenancy only. For the rest of the reliefs, the plaintiffs shall be permitted within a month from today to make such application as warranted in law for relinquishing and/or giving up claim for other reliefs. (Para 22)
       Learned counsel for the respondent-trust has urged with some amount of vehemence about the conduct of the plaintiffs in not depositing the arrears of money and the effect of 22 of the tenants out of total 44 tenants surrendering possession. This is a matter which can be considered in the trial itself so far as it is relevant. It was submitted by learned counsel for the trust that in any event the District Court was the only Court having jurisdiction and not the Court where the suit was filed. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically urged before the Courts below. So we do not think it appropriate to express our opinion thereon. As regards the question of arrears it shall be open to the respondent-trust to move the trial Court for such directions as are available in law. Looking into the nature of dispute it would be appropriate if the trial Court makes an effort to complete the trial within six months from the date of the judgment. (Para 28)
       (iii) Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section 6-Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Order 39 Rules 1 and 2-Forcible dispossession-Principles to be borne in mind regarding course to be adopted in case of forcible dispossession-Where a person is in settled possession of property, even on assumption that he has no right to remain in property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner except by recourse of law-A person without title but in settled possession, as against mere fugitive possession, can get back possession if forcibly dispossessed-Whether a trespasser can seek injunction against the true owner-(No).
       Held : There are two different sets of principles which have to be borne in mind regarding course to be adopted in case of forcible dispossession. Taking up the first aspect, it is true that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he has no right to remain in property, he cannot be disposed by the owner except by recourse of law. This principle is laid down in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. That Section says that if any person is dispossessed without his consent from immovable property other wise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. That a person without title but in "settled" possession - as against mere fugitive possession - can get back possession if forcibly dispossessed or rather, if dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law, has been laid down in several cases. (Para 24)
       Now the other aspect of the matter needs to be noted. Assuming a trespasser ousted can seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 can the trespasser seek injunction against the true owner? This question does not entirely depend upon Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, but mainly depends upon certain general principles applicable to the law of injunctions and as to the scope of the exercise of discretion while granting injunction? (Para 25)

Judgement Key Points

Case Summary: Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 448 of 2004, decided on 23-01-2004)

Parties and Background: The appellants (plaintiffs) claimed to be tenants of shops belonging to respondent No. 2, Shaneshwar Deosthan Trust (the trust), with trustees as defendants Nos. 3-13 and Assistant Charity Commissioner as defendant No. 1. They alleged a tenancy for 11 years (disputed by trust as 11 months) and forcible eviction despite ongoing tenancy. The suit sought: (A) declaration of tenancy (!) ; (B) permanent injunction against forcible eviction or interference (!) ; (C) compensation for losses (!) ; (D) direction to Commissioner to inquire into trustees' illegal acts (!) [1000086390001][1000086390002]. Lower courts rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC clauses (a) and (d) for no cause of action and bar under Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Sections 50, 51, 80) [1000086390002].

Issues: 1. Whether plaint liable for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by dissecting portions or reading in totality (!) - (!) [1000086390006]. 2. Jurisdiction of civil court over tenancy disputes vs. trust administration inquiries under the Act [1000086390021]. 3. Severability of reliefs and effect of relinquishing some claims [1000086390015][1000086390021]. 4. Remedy for alleged forcible dispossession from settled possession [1000086390022][1000086390023].

Supreme Court Holdings: - Plaint must be read as a whole without compartmentalization, dissection, or isolated reading of paragraphs to ascertain true import; substance over form, avoiding pedantic technicalities [1000086390014][1000086390015]. Order VII Rule 11 aims to bar irresponsible suits, exercisable even sans defendant intervention, but does not allow rejecting portions (use Order VI Rule 16 for striking pleadings); plaintiffs may file fresh plaint under Rule 13 (!) [1000086390016][1000086390017][1000086390019]. - Reliefs distinct from cause of action (material facts); non-grantable reliefs do not oust jurisdiction or negate cause if others triable by civil court. Main dispute on tenancy continuance/term unrelated to trust inquiries (under Section 50 needing Section 51 consent); tenants lack "interest in trust" for Section 51 bar. Suit to proceed solely on tenancy issues post-relinquishment of other reliefs (e.g., Para D) within one month [1000086390021]. - Settled possession (vs. fugitive) entitles recovery if dispossessed without due process (Specific Relief Act Section 6); trespasser cannot seek injunction against true owner, as injunction discretionary and unavailable to unlawful possessor [1000086390023][1000086390024][1000086390025]. Forcible dispossession, arrears, surrenders by other tenants, and jurisdiction queries deferred to trial court, with directions for expeditious disposal within six months [1000086390022][1000086390026][1000086390027]. - Appeal allowed; plaint rejection set aside, restricted adjudication (!) [1000086390027].

Outcome: Suit revived on tenancy reliefs; parties to cooperate for early trial [1000086390027].

JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.-Leave granted.

2. The appellants who were plaintiffs in a suit filed before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Srirampur have questioned legality of the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below holding that the plaint filed by them was to be rejected in terms of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the Code ). The plaintiffs claimed to be tenants under respondent No. 2, Shaneshwar Deosthan Trust (hereinafter referred to as the trust ). Its trustees and the Assistant Charity Commissioner (in short the Commissioner ) were the other defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants of the trust of which the defendants Nos. 3 to 13 were the trustees. Alleging that they have been forcibly evicted notwithstanding continuance of the tenancy, the suit was filed for the following reliefs :

(A) Plaintiff No. 1 to 17, be declared as the tenants of the properties described in the plaint belonging to temple Trust, of which defendant No. 2 to 13 are trustees.

(B) Defendant No. 1 to 13, be permanently restrained by an order of injunction not to evict plaintiff No. 1 to 13, forcibly with the help of police and also not to interfere in their business being carried on by them in suit shops, and not to interfere in the possession of suit shops in any manner-whatsoever, either by themselves or by their servants, agents, relatives or anybody claiming through or under them.

(C) Direct the defendant No. 2 to 13, to pay compensation for the loss caused to the plaintiffs on account of their acts of omission and commission as described in the plaint, committed by them prior to the filing of the suit and during pendency of suit for the damage that may be caused to the plaintiffs.

(D) Defendant No. 1 be directed to enquire into the illegal acts, committed by defendant No. 2 to 13, and issue appropriate direction to that effect.

3. The suit was numbered as R.C.S. No. 160/1997 in the trial Court. The stand of the plaintiffs-appellants essentially was that the tenancy was for a period of 11 years and not for 11 months as claimed by the trust. An application was filed by the trust raising a preliminary plea that the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. With reference to Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (in short the Act ) it was urged that no Civil court had jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which by or under the Act is to be decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under the Act and in respect of which the decision or order of such officer or authority has been made final and conclusive. The trial Judge framed two preliminary issues, i.e. (a) whether the suit was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code for want of cause of action, and (b) whether the suit was tenable against all the defendants. Findings in respect of the preliminary issues were recorded against the plaintiffs. A finding was recorded that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action and also in view of the specific provisions of the Act, the jurisdiction vests only with the District Court to give direction to Commissioner and in any event Section 80 of the Act took away jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the plaint was rejected. Challenging the judgment and decree dated 21.10.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Srirampur, an appeal was preferred before the District Court which was numbered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 178 of 2000. The appeal was dismissed and the decree passed by the trial court was confirmed by II Additional District Judge at Srirampur, Ahmed Nagar District. The matter was carried in Second Appeal before the High Court which by the impugned judgment upheld the findings recorded by the Courts below. Before the High Court, it was contended by the appellants that Sections 50, 51 and 80 of the Act had no application and the lease bei

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2004 Supreme(SC) 96

Case Summary: Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 448 of 2004, decided on 23-01-2004)

Cases Referred (14)