2004(6) Supreme 550
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Himachal Pradesh High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & Prakash Prabhakar Naolekar, JJ.
State of Himachal Pradesh -Appellant
versus
Shree Kant Shekari -Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 589 of 1999
Decided on 13-9-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : J.S. Attri, Addl. Advocate General and L.R. Rath, Advocate.
For the Respondent : S.K. Verma, Advocate (NP).
(ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 376-Victim of rape is not an accomplice-No rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars.
Held : It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice would suffice. (Para 21)
(iii) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 228-A-Disclosure of identity of victim of rape is punishable-It would be appropriate that in judgments, be it of trial Court, High Court or Supreme Court, name of victim should not be indicated. (Para 4)
JUDGMENT
Arijit Pasayat, J.-The factual matrix of this appeal is unfortunately related to sordid and obnoxious incidents where the respondent (hereinafter referred to as accused ) who at the relevant point of time was working as a teacher gratified his animated passions and sexual pleasures by having carnal knowledge of his student, a girl of tender age. The result was that the sacred relation of teacher and his pupil was besmirched. As observed by this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Narain Dubey and Anr. (1992 (2) Crimes 168) such offenders are menace to the civilized society.
2. The State of Himachal Pradesh is in appeal against, the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court directing acquittal of the accused who faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC ). The trial Court i.e. the Sessions Court, Kinnaur had convicted and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for 7 years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the first offence and one year and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the second offence. In addition, the accused was directed to pay compensation of Rs. 10,000/- to the prosecutrix.
3. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity - it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty (AIR 1996 SC 922), the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the victim s most cherished of the Fundamental Rights, namely, the Right to Life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution ) The Courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos.
4. We do not propose to mention name of the victim. Section 228-A of IPC makes disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences punishable. Printing or publishing name of any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or found to have been committed can be punished. True it is, the restriction, does not relate to printing or publication of judgment by High Court or Supreme Court. But keeping in view the social object of preventing social victimization or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for which Section 228-A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that in the judgments, be it of this Court, High Court or lower Court, the name of the victim should not be indicated. We have chosen to describe her as victim in the judgment. (See State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja (2003(8) Supreme 364).
5. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is essentially as follows :
On 28.5.1993 the accused Shree Kant asked the victim who was his student of class 4 to wait after school hours for solving a question, while he allowed other students to go. The victim remained in the class room when the accused bolted the door from inside and made the victim to lie on the floor and forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. She kept refusing, wept and cried. Howev
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