1. Habeas corpus petition challenging detention extension under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, where the detention order was silent regarding the specific period of detention. (Para 1 , 2 )
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1952 Supreme(SC) 83
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M. Patanjali Sastri, CJI., B. K. Mukherjea, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan, JJ.
Mrs. Godavari Parulekar, w/o. Shamrao V. Parulekar – Appellant
Versus
State of Bombay and others – Respondent
Petition No. 399 of 1952
Decided On : 05-12-1952
Advocates appeared
Petitioner in person:Shri M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Shri G. N. Joshi and Shri P. A. Mehta, Advocates, with him) instructed by Shri G. H. Rajadhyaksha, Agent, for Respondents.
Petitioner in person:Shri M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Shri G. N. Joshi and Shri P. A. Mehta, Advocates, with him) instructed by Shri G. H. Rajadhyaksha, Agent, for Respondents.
The court held that statutory extensions of detention apply if the order is silent on duration, and that fixing a common outer limit for a class of detainees, resulting in varying individual detention lengths, does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
Headnote:(A) Preventive Detention Act, 1950 - Section 11-A - Constitution of India - Articles 14, 22(7)(b) - Extension of detention period - Interpretation of "unless a shorter period is specified in the order" - Where the detention order is silent regarding the duration, the statutory extension applies - The court cannot read into the section that a period is "deemed to have been specified" by reason of the expiry of an earlier Act. (Para 5)
(B) Constitution of India - Article 14 and 22(7)(b) - Classification of detainees - Validity of classification based on a specific date - A classification dividing detentions into those confirmed before and after a certain date is reasonable and not discriminatory (Paras 8, 9)
(C) Constitution of India - Article 14 - Discrimination - Fixing a maximum outer limit for a class of detainees, which inevitably results in varying lengths of actual detention for different individuals, does not constitute discrimination - The government is not bound to detain every person for the same length of time and retains discretion to revoke or modify orders. (Para 12)
Facts of the case:
A petitioner was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Neither the original detention order nor the confirmation order specified a period of detention. Following an amendment to the Act, the state contended that the detention was extended to a fixed date. The petitioner argued that the detention had expired under previous amendments and that the new statutory extension was inapplicable. Furthermore, the petitioner challenged the amendment as ultra vires under Articles 14 and 22(7)(b) of the Constitution, alleging that it created a discriminatory classification between detainees based on the date of their confirmation.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the statutory provision extending the detention period applied because no shorter period was explicitly specified in the order. It further held that the classification based on a specific date was reasonable and that the resulting variation in the actual duration of detention for different individuals did not amount to discrimination.
Issues: Whether a period deemed to have expired under a previous Act constitutes a "specified period" under Section 11-A(2); whether the classification of detainees based on the date of confirmation is discriminatory under Article 14 and ultra vires under Article 22(7)(b).
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the plain language of the statute must be followed; a "specified period" requires an actual specification in the order, not a deemed one. Additionally, the court held that establishing a maximum outer limit for a class of cases does not violate the principle of equality, as the government has the discretion to vary the length of detention or revoke orders.
Result: Application dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether Section 11-A of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, validly extends detention and whether such extension violates Article 14 and Article 22(7)(b). (Para 3 , 4 , 6 , 7 , 10 )
3. The court observed that statutory extensions apply unless a shorter period is explicitly specified and that date-based classifications for detention limits are reasonable and non-discriminatory. (Para 5 , 8 , 9 , 12 )
4. Varying lengths of detention resulting from a fixed outer limit do not constitute discrimination under Article 14, and statutory terms must be interpreted literally. (Para 5 , 12 )
5. The habeas corpus petition was dismissed. (Para 14 )
6. Does a detention order silent on duration count as specifying a shorter period if the detention would have expired under a previous amendment?
No. The court held that Section 11-A(2) applies unless a shorter period is actually specified in the order. The court will not read into the section that a period is deemed specified by reason of the expiry of an earlier Act. (Para 5 )
7. Is a classification that divides detention orders based on a specific date for the purpose of determining maximum detention periods valid under Article 22(7)(b)?
Yes. Such a classification is reasonable, especially when based on the timeline of various legislative amendments, and does not necessarily offend constitutional protections. (Para 8 , 9 )
8. Does it constitute discrimination under Article 14 if different individuals in the same class are detained for different lengths of time due to a fixed outer limit?
No. Fixing a maximum period or an outside limit inevitably results in varying detention lengths for individuals detained at different times. This is a matter of government discretion and not prohibited discrimination. (Para 12 )
Judgement
BOSE J.: This is a habeas corpus petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
2. The petitioner was detained on 16-10-1951 under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as amended in 1951. Her detention was actually longer than this but the earlier detentions were under a different set of orders which are not relevant to the present matter. The present detention is based on an order of the District Magistrate, Thana, and merely says that the petitioner be detained, without specifying any period. The order of confirmation was passed on 4-1-1952 and there again no period was specified. The petitioner s case is that as no period was specified in the order her period of detention expired on 31-3-1952 because of the amending Act of 1951; or at the outside on 30-9-1952 because of Act 34 of 1952 which effected a further amendment.
3. The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay is that the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again amended by Act 61 of 1952 and that the effect of this amendment was to carry the petitioner s defention on to 31-3-1953 because of S. 11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950.
4. The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act does not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about its duration and so S. 11-A does not serve to extend the period of her detention. She relies on the following portion of S. 11-A (2):
". . . . . . . . every detention order which has been confirmed under S. 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall, "unless a shorter period is specified in the order , continue to remain in force until the 1st day of April 1953. ........ . "
The petitioner concedes that no shorter period is specified in her order of detention but contends that as her detention would have expired either on 31-3-1952 or 30-9-1952, one of those two dates must now be read into the order and when that is done we have an order which specifies a shorter period, therefore S. 11-A(2) does not serve to extend her detention.
5. We are unable to accept this contention. The Section is clear and unless a shorter period is specified in the order , S. 11-A (2) applies. We cannot add the words "or must be deemed to have been specified by reason of the expiry of the earlier Act" into the Section We hold therefore, that S. 11-A (2) validly extended the period of detention till 1-4-1953.
6. The petitioner s next point is based on Arts. 14 and 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution. It arises in this way. Section 3 (1) (a), Preventive Detention Act of 1950, classifies grounds of permissible detention into three categories. Article 22 (7)(b) empowers Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for which any person may "in any class or classes of cases" be detained. The petitioner argues that this permits only one maximum for each class and that if different maxima are provided for "equals" within a class it offends not only Art. 22 (7) (b) but also Art. 14 as interpreted by the decisions of this Court. She next argues that S. 11-A, now introduced by the second amending Act of 1952 (Act 61 of 1952), does just that and so is ultra vires . Her point is put as follows :
7. Sub-Section (1) of S. 11-A states that the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under S. 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. But sub-s. (2) qualifies this by dividing detentions into two classes: (a) those in which the detention was confirmed before 30-9-1952 and (b) those in which the confirmation was after that date, and it provides that in the former case, unless a shorter period is specified in the order , the detention shall continue either till 1-4-1953 or for twelve months from the date of detention, Whichever expires later. This, she says, introduces a fresh classification which divides detentions into those before the Act and those after. That, she says, is ultra vires , first, because it introduces
