Judgement

BOSE J.: This is a habeas corpus petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

2. The petitioner was detained on 16-10-1951 under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 as amended in 1951. Her detention was actually longer than this but the earlier detentions were under a different set of orders which are not relevant to the present matter. The present detention is based on an order of the District Magistrate, Thana, and merely says that the petitioner be detained, without specifying any period. The order of confirmation was passed on 4-1-1952 and there again no period was specified. The petitioner s case is that as no period was specified in the order her period of detention expired on 31-3-1952 because of the amending Act of 1951; or at the outside on 30-9-1952 because of Act 34 of 1952 which effected a further amendment.

3. The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay is that the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again amended by Act 61 of 1952 and that the effect of this amendment was to carry the petitioner s defention on to 31-3-1953 because of S. 11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950.

4. The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act does not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about its duration and so S. 11-A does not serve to extend the period of her detention. She relies on the following portion of S. 11-A (2):

". . . . . . . . every detention order which has been confirmed under S. 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall, "unless a shorter period is specified in the order , continue to remain in force until the 1st day of April 1953. ........ . "

The petitioner concedes that no shorter period is specified in her order of detention but contends that as her detention would have expired either on 31-3-1952 or 30-9-1952, one of those two dates must now be read into the order and when that is done we have an order which specifies a shorter period, therefore S. 11-A(2) does not serve to extend her detention.

5. We are unable to accept this contention. The Section is clear and unless a shorter period is specified in the order , S. 11-A (2) applies. We cannot add the words "or must be deemed to have been specified by reason of the expiry of the earlier Act" into the Section We hold therefore, that S. 11-A (2) validly extended the period of detention till 1-4-1953.

6. The petitioner s next point is based on Arts. 14 and 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution. It arises in this way. Section 3 (1) (a), Preventive Detention Act of 1950, classifies grounds of permissible detention into three categories. Article 22 (7)(b) empowers Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for which any person may "in any class or classes of cases" be detained. The petitioner argues that this permits only one maximum for each class and that if different maxima are provided for "equals" within a class it offends not only Art. 22 (7) (b) but also Art. 14 as interpreted by the decisions of this Court. She next argues that S. 11-A, now introduced by the second amending Act of 1952 (Act 61 of 1952), does just that and so is ultra vires . Her point is put as follows :

7. Sub-Section (1) of S. 11-A states that the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under S. 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. But sub-s. (2) qualifies this by dividing detentions into two classes: (a) those in which the detention was confirmed before 30-9-1952 and (b) those in which the confirmation was after that date, and it provides that in the former case, unless a shorter period is specified in the order , the detention shall continue either till 1-4-1953 or for twelve months from the date of detention, Whichever expires later. This, she says, introduces a fresh classification which divides detentions into those before the Act and those after. That, she says, is ultra vires , first, because it introduces