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1954 Supreme(SC) 69

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
15th April 1954.
B.K. MUKHERJEA, BOSE, GHULAM HASAN AND VENKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ.
Wuntakal Yaloi Chenabasavana Gowd, Appellant
Versus
Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshwarappa and another Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1953
the running of time is checked if the co-owner in exclusive possession acknowledges the title of the other co-owners or discontinues his exclusive possession of the property held in common
Advocates appeared
Mr. K.S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, Senior Advocate, (Messrs. K. R. Chowdhaury D. Gundu Rao, A. Rama and Ranjinder Narain, Advocates with him), for Appellant; Mr. B. Somayya, Senior Advocate, (Messrs, M. V. Ganapathi and Ganpat Rai, Advocates, with him), for Respondent No. 1.

Advocates:
A.RAMA RAO, B.SOMALAYA, D.GUNDU RAO, GANPAT RAI, K.R.CHAUDHARY, K.S.KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR, M.V.GANAPATHI, RAJENDER NARAIN

Headnote:Article 144-Co-sharer-Possession of one becoming adverse to another by ouster-How the running of adverse possession can be ousted. - Co-sharer-Possession of one becoming adverse to another by ouster-How the running of adverse possession can be interrupted-Limitation Act, Art. 144.

       1. From A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 81.

       2. Section 222 of the Indian Contract Act provides:

       "The employer of an agent is bound to indemnify him against the consequences of all lawful acts done by such agent in exercise of the authority conferred upon him.” Held: Once it is held that the possession of a co-sharer has become adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer will not interrupt the running of adverse Possession. He must actually and effectively break up the exclusive possession of his co-sharer by re-entry upon the property or by resuming possession in such manner as it is possible to do. A mere mental act on the part of the person dispossessed unaccompanied by any change of possession cannot affect the continuity of adverse possession of the deseizor. It may also check the running of time if the co-sharer who is in exclusive possession acknowledges the title of his Co-owner or discontinues his exclusive possession of the property. A mere mental act on the part of the person dispossessed unaccompanied by any change of possession cannot affect the continuity of the adverse possession of the deseizor. Co-sharers-Partition Hindu law

Judgment

B. K. MUKHERJEA, J. : This appeal arises out of a suit, commenced by the plaintiff respondent, in the court of the District Judge of Bellary, being Original Suit No. 17 of 1944, for establishment of his title to one-half share of the land described in the schedule to the plaint and for recover of possession of the same after partition with defendant No. (1) who is the appellant before us. The suit was dismissed by the trial Judge by his judgment dated 23rd of July 1945. On an appeal being taken against that decision by the plaintiff to the High Court of Madras, a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated the 28th of March 1949 allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment of the trial court. The defendant No. 1 has now come up on appeal to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under Article 133 of the Constitution read with Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. To appreciate the contentions that have been raised before us it may be necessary to give a short resume of the material facts. The land in suit, which has an area of a little over 9 acres, was admittedly the property of one Basappa who died some time before 1918, leaving three daughters to wit Paramma, Pompamma and Hamgamma. Under a settlement entered into with the immediate reversioner of Basappa which is evidenced by two registered deeds --- Exs. P-2 and P-3 --- executed respectively in the years 1918 and 1919, the three sisters got about 15 to 16 acres of wet land in absolute right. Hampamma subsequently took away her one-third share in these lands and we are not concerned with her any further in this litigation.

Paramma and Pompamma continued to enjoy the remaining two-thirds share of the property and it is this two-thirds share comprising 9 acres 49 cents of wet land which forms the subject-matter of the present suit. Pompamma married one Nagana Gowd and after giving birth to two sons to wit Siddalingana and Chenabasavana, she died in the year 1923. It is not disputed that her share in the lands mentioned above devolved upon these two sons. After Pompamma s death, Nagana married again and stayed with his second wife in his ancestral village, while these two infant sons of Pompamma remained at village Kampli with Paramma, their mother s sister, who reared them up as her own sons.

On the 22nd June 1923 Paramma executed a deed of gift in favour of the two sons of her sister by which she conveyed to the later her own share in the suit property. The result was that the two sons of Pompamma got the entitety of 9 acres 49 cents of land which was owned jointly by their mother and their mother s sister Paramma. Shortly after this gift was made, Siddalingana, the elder son of Pompamma, died in the year 1924 and the plaintiff s case is that his half-share in the disputed property devolved upon his father Nagana under the Hindu Law of Inheritance. It is admitted however that Paramma continued to possess the entirety of the land on behalf of the younger son Chenabasavana who is defendant No. 1 in the suit.

On the 25th August 1946 there was a lease deed (Ex. D-1) and its counter part (Ex. D-2) executed by and between Paramma on the one hand and Nagana as the father and guardian of the infant Chenabasavana on the other by which the infant represented by his father purported to grant a lease of the entire property to Paramma for a period of 12 years at a rental of Rs. 500 a year. Two rent receipts passed by Nagana to Paramma in token of the receipt of rents, reserved by this lease, on behalf of Chenabasavana have been proved in this case (Exs. D-4 and D4-1) and they are of the years 1927 and 1932 respectively.

3. It appears that in 1934 Nagana instituted a suit as guardian of his infant son Chenabasavana in the Munif s court at Hospet to recover a sum of Rs. 500 as rent from Paramma on the basis of the lease mentioned above. The suit was decreed ex parte and the decree was discharged later on by a document (Ex. D

















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