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1954 Supreme(SC) 180

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
22nd December 1954
B.K. MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS AND BOSE JJ.
Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli and another, Appellants
Versus
State of Bombay Respondent.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 89 and 90 of 1954.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Narayanayya, Advocate, Dr. C. V. L. Narayan, Advocate and Mr. C. Sanjeevarow Nayadu, Senior Advocate with Mr. R. Ganapathy Ayyar, Advocate, for Appellants (in Nos. 89 and 90 of 1954 respectively); Mr. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (Messrs. G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, Advocates, with him), for Respondents.

Advocates:
C.K.DAFTARY, C.SANJIVAROW NAYADU, C.V.L.NARAYAN, G.N.Joshi, M.C.SETALVAD, NARAYANSWAMY, PARAS A.MEHTA, R.Ganapathy Iyer

Headnote:Penal Code, Section 34-Presence of accused on scene, if essential.

       1Held: The essence of the misdirection consists in the direction to the jury that even though a person "may not, be present when the offence is actually committed" and even if he remains "behind the screen" he can be convicted under S. 34 provided it is proved that the offence was committed in furtherance of the common intention. This is wrong, for it is the essence of the section that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime. He need not be present in the actual room he can, for instance, stand guard by 8. gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present at the scene of the occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the offence in some way or other at the time the crime is actually being committed. The antithesis is between the preliminary stages, the agreement, the preparation, the planning, which is covered by S. 109, and the stage of commission when the plans are put into effect and carried out. Section 34 is concerned with the latter. It is true there must be some sort of preliminary planning which mayor may not be at the scene of the crime and which may have taken place long beforehand, but there must be added to it the element of physical presence at the scene of occurrence coupled with actual participation which, of course, can be of a passive character such as standing by a door, provided that is done with the intention of assisting in furtherance of the common intention of them all, and there is a readines to play his part in the pre-arranged plan when the time comes for him to act.

       The emphasis in S. 34 is on the word "done". It is essential that the accused join in the actual doing of the act and not merely in planning its perpetration.

Judgement

BOSE J. : These two appeals arise out of the same trial. The two appellants, Shreekantiah (accused 1 in the trial Court and the appellant in Appeal No. 89 of 1954) and Parasuram (accused 2 and the appellant in Appeal No. 90 of 1954) were tried with a third accused Dawson on a number of different charges centring round S. 409, Indian Penal Code: criminal breach of trust by a public servant. The trial was by jury and all three were found guilty of an offence under S. 409 read with S. 34. They were convicted and sentenced as under:

Accused No. 1. Shreekantiah to one year and a fine of Rs. 500 with four months in default;

Accused No. 2. Parasuram to two years and a fine of Rs. 500 with six months in default; and

Accused No. 3. Dawson to six months and a fine of Rs. 200 with two months in default.

2. The appeal of accused 2 to the High Court was dismissed summarily on 25-8-1953 with the one word "dismissed". Accused 1 and 3 appealed separately. Their appeal was heard by another Bench and was admitted, and a reasoned judgment followed on 23-11-l953. This, to say the least, was, in the circumstances of this case, anomalous. The appeals arise out of the same trial and are from one judgment and relate to the same charge to the jury, and what is more they raise substantially the same points. This Court was constrained to express its disapproval of the summary rejections of appeals which raise issues of substance and importance. We draw attention to the remarks in - Mushtak Hussein v. State of Bombay , AIR 1953 SC 282 at P. 286 (A). Those observations apply with even greater force in the present case.

3. The three accused are Government servants. At all material times, the first was the Officer Commanding the Military Engineering Stores Depot at Dehu Road near Poona. He was in over-all-charge. The second was under him as the officer in charge of the Receipts and Issue control section. The third worked directly under the second as the Assistant Stores Officer.

4. The depot is maintained by the Central Government and covers an area of some 150 acres. Government stores worth several lacs of rupees are kept there. On 11-9-1948 iron stores worth about Rs. 4,000 were illegally passed out of the depot and were handed over to one lbrahim Fida Hussain, an agent of the approver Mohsinbhai (P. W. 1).

The case for the prosecution is that the three accused, who were in charge of these stores and to whom they had been entrusted in various capacities, entered into a conspiracy to defraud Government of these properties and that in pursuance of this conspiracy they arranged to sell them to the approver (P. W. 1) for a sum of Rs. 4,000. The money is said to have been paid and then the stores were passed out of the depot. The money is said to have been pocketed by the three accused and not credited to Government.

5. On these facts a number of charges were framed. The first set was drawn up on 9-7-1953. All three accused were jointly charged with an offence punishable under S. 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and all three were further jointly charged with having committed criminal breach of trust in furtherance of the common intention of all under S. 409, I. P. C. read with S. 34.

6. Then followed a number of alternative charges in which each was separately charged with having committed criminal breach of trust personally under S. 409.

7. As a further alternative, all three were jointly charged under S. 409, I. P. C. read with S. 109 for having abetted each other in the commission of a criminal breach of trust under S. 409.

8. Objection was at once taken to these charges and the one which concerns us now was couched in the following terms:

" It is further submitted that the trial under S. 5(2), Corruption Act, 1947 with I. P. C., S. 409 is likely to embarrass the accused in their defence as it would be difficult to efface the evidence (if any) of the accused persons given on oath from the minds of the Jurors when considering the charge under S. 409,










































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