SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
4th March 1955
BOSE, JAGANNADHA DAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR AND SINHA JJ.
A. V. D Costa, Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Railway, Appellant
Versus
B. C. Patel and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1953.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, (Messrs. Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, Advocates, with him), for Appellant; Messrs. J. B. Dadachanji, M. V. Jayakar and Rajinder Narain for Respondent 2.
PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT - AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 15 - JURISDICTION - CLAIM FOR HIGHER WAGES - DETERMINATION OF TERMS OF CONTRACT - POTENTIAL WAGES - SCOPE OF JURISDICTION.
Fact of the Case:
Respondent 2, a carpenter employed by the appellant railway administration, claimed that he should have been absorbed as a monthly-rated permanent employee and that he had been wrongly superseded. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, held that the respondent was entitled to be treated as a temporary employee and not as a casual labourer and to receive wages as such.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court held that the Authority had the jurisdiction to decide what the wages payable were and, for that purpose, what the contract of employment and the terms thereof were. However, the Authority did not have the jurisdiction to determine the question of "potential wages", which depended on the determination by a superior departmental or other authority.
Issues: 1. Whether the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had the jurisdiction to determine the terms of the contract of employment and the wages payable thereunder. 2. Whether the Authority had the jurisdiction to determine the question of "potential wages".
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Authority had the jurisdiction to decide what the wages payable were and, for that purpose, what the contract of employment and the terms thereof were. This was necessary for the Authority to determine whether there had been a deduction from wages or a delay in payment of wages, which were the matters over which the Authority had jurisdiction. 2. The Authority did not have the jurisdiction to determine the question of "potential wages", which depended on the determination by a superior departmental or other authority. Such a determination involved the exercise of administrative judgment or discretion or certification, and would be a condition of the payability of the wage.
Final Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the orders of the Authority and the High Court, and held that there would be no order as to costs throughout.
Judgement
SINHA J.: (With him Vivian Bose and Venkatarama Ayyar JJ.): This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 24-8-1951 upholding that of a single Judge of that Court sitting on the Original Side, dismissing the appellant s petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 23-1-1951 passed by respondent 1, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. The facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows: Respondent 2 is and has been at all material times an employee of the Central Railway (formerly called the G.I.P. Rly.) represented by the appellant who has been nominated by the Railway Administration as responsible for payment of wages under S. 3 of the Act. Ever since 1941, respondent 2 has been employed by the Railway Administration as a carpenter on daily wages, and has been treated as a daily rated casual labourer and has been paid his wages at the rate of Rs. 3-4-0 per day.
He continued receiving his wages at that rate. until October, 1949 without any demur, and granting receipts for the wages thus received. On 2-12-1949 an application was made by one K. N; Pitkar "an official of Registered Trade Union, a person permitted by the Authority" under sub-s. (2) of S. 15, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, against the G. I. P. Rly. administration through its Divisional Engineer, Parel, Bombay. It was alleged on behalf of respondent 2 that his wages due in respect of six months from May to October 1949 amounting to Rs. 245 had not been paid or had been subjected to illegal deductions as shown in the schedule. The schedule will be set out hereinafter. A claim for Rs. 245 plus Rs. 15 by way of compensation was made.
3. The appellant, as the opposite party before the Authority, resisted the claim, inter alia , on the grounds-
(l) that Rs. 245 had not been illegally deducted from the wages of respondent 2; and
(2) that the claim of respondent 2 , who was employed as a daily, rated casual labourer on specified daily wages, to be placed on a permanent cadre on the scale of monthly, rates of pay was unfounded.
It was further alleged that respondent 2 did not, come within the purview of the Railway Services (Revision of Pay,) Rules as he was a daily rated casual labourer charged to works and that no rules had been laid down governing the rates of pay and the conditions of service of daily rated casual labourers like respondent 2. Hence his terms of service were the daily wages paid to him all along. It was thus contended that there had been no deduction from his wages. In this connection reference was made to the award of the Railway Workers Classification Tribunal, dated 28-5-1948.
4. The Authority by its orders dated 23-1-l951 decided that the position of respondent 2 was not that of a casual labourer but that of a "temporary employee" and that therefore he was entitled to be on the scale of Rs. 55-150 plus the allowances admissible. In coming to this conclusion the Authority observed that the work done by respondent 2 is of the same nature as that of a member of the permanent staff. Hence respondent 2 could not be called a casual labourer. It also made reference to Art. 39(d) of the Constitution containing the direction that there should he equal pay for equal work. The Authority also negatived the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the question of classification of an employee was outside its jurisdiction. In pursuance of the said order the authority allowed respondent 2 s application by its further orders dated 2-3-1951 .
5. Against the said orders of the Authority the appellant moved the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders. The matter was heard in the first instance by a learned single Judge of that Court who by his orders dated 19-6-1951 dismissed the application. The appellant preferre
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