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1955 Supreme(SC) 69

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
27th September 1955.
BOSE, JAGANNADHA DAS AND SINHA JJ.
Machander, Appellant
Versus
The State of Hyderabad, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1955.
Mr. R. Patnaik. Advocate, for Appellant, Mr. Porus A. Mehta and Mr. P. G. Gokhale, Advocates, for Respondent.

Advocates:
P.G.COKHALE, PARAS A.MEHTA, R.PATTANAIK

Headnote:Section 300-Circumstantial evidence.

       The Appellant was tried on a charge of murder. His brother who was a co-accused absconded. There was only circumstantial evidence .against him. A few days before the murder the accused and the deceased had both attended the Court in connection with some litigation. The accused knew that the deceased had attended the court and that he had seen him there but when questioned about it he told a lie. The second factor was that thirteen days after the murder he knew that the deceased had been murdered. He also knew where the murder had been committed and where the body and certain articles belonging to the deceased were hidden. There was also ill-will between them. The same ill-will, however, could have been shared by other members of the accused family also. He had full opportunity to commit the crime but other members of his family had the same kind of opportunity.

       Held: These circumstances were not enough to warrant a conclusion of murder by the accused, as the same circumstances could be said to point with equal suspicion at other members of the accused family.

       1. (1952) S.C.R. 1091: A.I.R. 1952 S. C. 343. - Section 342 not complied with-Effect-Accused confessed six days after arrest, charged with murder but not questioned under S. 342 about the confession-Accused for trial for over 4t years-Accused acquitted.

       Constitution of India-Article 136.

       Held: (1) " We referred, earlier in our judgment to a confession which the High Court has excluded. This was excluded from evidence because the appellant was not questioned about it under S. 342 C.P.C. We were asked to re-open the question and, if necessary, to remand the case. But we decline to do that. Judges and Magistrates must realise the importance of the examination under S. 342 Cr. P.C. and this Court has repeatedly warned them of the consequences that might ensue in certain cases. The appellant -was arrested in December 1950 and has been on his trial one way and another ever since, that is to say, for over 4l years. We are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one-sided. It has many facts and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the length to which they may go." (per Bose J.)

Judgement

BOSE, J. : This is another of those cases in which Courts are compelled to acquit because Magistrates & Sessions Judges fail to appreciate the importance of S. 342, Criminal P. C., and fail to carry out the duty that is cast upon them of questioning the accused properly and fairly, bringing home to his mind in clear and simple language the exact case he has to meet and each material point that is sought to be made against him, and of affording him a chance to explain them if he can and so desires. Had the Sessions Judge done that in this case it is possible that we would not have been obliged to acquit.

2. The facts are simple the appellant Machander was charged with the murder of one Manmath. Machander s brother Gona was also challaned but as he absconded he could not be tried.

3. The appellant and the deceased and Gona reside in the same village. There was some ill-feeling between the appellant and the deceased and it can be accepted that Gona shared his brother s sentiments because, so far as the latest cause for enmity goes, Gona is equally concerned; and this also applies to Pandu, the appellant s father, and Bhima, another brother. The causes for enmity are the following.

4. In or about the year 1947 the appellant appears to have stolen a pair of bullocks & a cart belonging to the deceased. The deceased prosecuted him for the theft & also instituted a civil suit for the price of the cart and bullocks. He succeeded in both cases. The appellant was convicted of the theft and sent to jail. A decree was also passed against him for Rs. 520 and that decree was duly executed.

5. We now come to the events immediately preceding the murder. The appellant and his family took forcible possession of some land belonging to the deceased s sister Parubai. She sued the whole family for possession of this land, that is to say, she impleaded the appellant s father Pandu, the appellant and his two brothers Bhima and Gona. The last hearing was on 15-12-1950 and the decision was announced in 16-12-1950. It was in Parubai s favour. The deceased conducted this litigation on behalf of his sister. He was present in Court on the 15th and was present at Parendam where the Court is situate, up to 3 p. m. on the 16th, the day the decision was announced. That was the last that was seen of him. These facts are said to be the cause of the ill-feeling. But, as the facts themselves indicate a similar cause for enmity (though not to the same degree) could be assigned to the father and the other brothers equally, they had similar opportunities. The movements of the appellant have been traced to Parenda and back not the movements of the rest of the family. So it is not shown that they had no similar opportunity to murder. It can however be accepted that cause for enmity on the appellant s part is established.

6. It is proved that the deceased went to Parenda on the 15th for the last hearing of the case and he was also there on the 16th up to 3 p. m. It is also proved that the appellant was in court on the 15th and that he was in Parenda on the following day. It can be accepted that both the deceased and the appellant were present in Court at the same dote on the 15th and that therefore the appellant knew that the deceased had attended the Court that day. But there is no proof that the two met each other or that either knew about the movements of the other on the 16th. All we know is that both went to see their respective pleaders at different places and times and learned the result of the case.

7. Four or five days after the case, the appellant came home but not the deceased. The deceased s son Shantiling (P. W. 10), who knew that the appellant had also gone to Parenda for the case, asked him where his father was. The appellant said that the father had not attended court. This made the son anxious, so he went to Parenda to make enquiries. The pleaders there told him that his father had attended court on the 15th and that he was in Parenda till 3 p. m. o




















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