1954 Supreme(SC) 138

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
20th October, 1954.
B.K. MUKHERJEA, BOSE AND JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.
State of Punjab, Appellant
Versus
Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1953.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, (Messrs. Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, Advocates, with him), for Appellant; Mr. N. S. Bindra, Advocate, appointed by the Court as amicus curiae, for Respondent.

Headnote:East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, (XXI of 1948) Ss. 4, 7, ll-Prosecution under, for filing false claim under East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Ordinance (VII of 1948) -Whether prosecution valid-Ordinance repealed and the Act enacted instead -General Clauses Act, S.6-Scope-Effect on. repeal and re-enactment.

       The East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Ordinance 1948, was promulgated by the Governor of East Punjab under S. 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, on 3rd of March, 1948, making provisions for the registration of land claims of the East Punjab refugees. On the 17th March, 1948 the respondent Mohar Singh filed a claim in respect of certain land in the district of Mainsails in West Punjab. On the 1st ()f April 1948 this Ordinance was repealed and Act XII of 1948 was passed by the East Punjab Legislature re-enacting all the provisions of the repealed -Ordinance. On investigation it was found that the claim of the respondent was absolutely false. On this a prosecution was started against him on the 13th May, 1950, under section 7 of the Act. He confessed his guilt before the trying Magistrate and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 120. The District Magistrate of Hullender considered the sentence to be inadequate and referred the case to the High Court under section 438 Cr. P.C with a recommendation that a deterrent sentence might be imposed upon the accused. The contention of the respondent that it was not within the competence of the trying Magistrate to convict him, as the offence was committed against the Ordinance before the Act came into force and the prosecution was started long .after the Ordinance had come to an end, was accepted by the High Curt.

       Held (allowing the appeal): (1) The consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (corresponding to section 4 of the Punjab General Clauses Act) will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature, automatically expires by effiux of time. The Ordinance in the present case was undoubtedly a temporary statute but it is admitted that the period during which it was to continue had not expired when the Repealing Act was passed. The repeal was therefore• an affective one which would normally attract the operation of section 6 of the General Clauses Act.1

       (2) Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences. laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simpler appeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the new Act must be looked into, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. It cannot therefore be accepted that section 5 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to- be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material.

       (3) Although the lodging of the claim does not come within the purview of section II of the E.P. Refugees (Registration of Land Claims} Act, 1948, the proviso to section 4 of the Act clearly shows that a claim filed under the Ordinance would be treated as one filed under the Act with all the consequences attached thereto. Such claim would be reckoned and registered as a claim under the Act and once it is so treated the incidents and corollaries attached to the filing of a claim, as laid down in the Act, must necessarily follow. The truth or falsity of the claim has to be investigated in the usual way and if it is found that information given by the claimant is false, he can certainly be furnished in the manner laid down in sections 7 and 8 of the Act. The provisions of sections 4, 7 and 8 make it apparent that it was not the intention of the legislature that the rights and liabilities in respect of claims filed under the Ordinance shall be extinguished on the passing of the A ct, and this is sufficient for holding that the present case would attract the operation of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The point for consideration is whether the Act evinces an intention which is inconsistent with the continuances of rights and liabilities accrued or incurred under the Ordinance and this question has to be answered in the negative.

       (4) The provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment.