Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
22nd December 1955
BOSE, VENKATTARAMA AYYAR AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.
Aher Raja Khima, Appellant
Versus
State of Saurashtra, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 64 of 1955.
Advocates appeared
Mr. V. N. Sethi, Advocate, for Appellant; Mr. R. Ganapathy Iyer and Mr. R. H. Dhebar, Advocates, for Respondent. 220
Held (Per majority): It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial Court was wrong,2 and if the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under S. 417 Cr. P .C. is not justifiable unless there are really some strong reasons for reversing that view.3
Per Venkataramma Ayyar J.: (1) When the State appeals against an order of acquittal, it has to establish on the evidence that the accused is guilty, and to establish it, it has to satisfy the court that the judgment of the trial court is erroneous. The oft-repeated observation that on acquittal the presumption of innocence became reinforced is merely this principle stated in terms of criminal law. Likewise, the weight to be attached by an appellate court to a finding of the trial court based upon appreciation of oral evidence is the same whether it is given in a civil litigation or a criminal trial. An appeal against acquittal under section 117, Cr. P.C. stands, as regards the powers of an appellate court on the same footing as appeals against conviction.
The words "compelling reasons" in Surajpal Singh v. State4 are vague and indefinite to a degree; they are of undefined import, and relate to appreciation of evidence. If these words import a limitation on the
I. Tara Singh v. The State, (1951) S.C R. 729, referred to.
2. Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953) S.C.R. 41 I : A.l.R. 1953 S.C. 76.
3. Surajpal Singh v. Stale (1952) S.C.R. 193: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 52.
4. (1952) S.C.R. 193: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 52.
powers of a court hearing an appeal under S. 417, Cr. P.C. not applicable to a court hearing appeals against conviction then it is merely the old doctrine that appeals against acquittal are in a less favoured position, dressed in a new garb, and reasons for rejecting it as unsound are as powerful as those which found favour with the Privy Council in She a Sarup v. Emperor1 and Nur Muhammad v. Emperor.2 But it is probable that these words were intended to express as were the similar words of Lord Russell in Sheo Sarup v. Emperor,1 that the court hearing an appeal under S. 417 Cr. P.C. should observe the rules which all appellate courts should, before coming to a conclusion different from that of the trial court. If so understood, the expression "compelling reasons" would be open to no comment.
If the expression "compelling reasons" does not impose a restriction on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under S. 417, and if its true scope is to guide it in arriving at a decision, the question whether the Supreme Court can interfere with that decision presents no difficulty. The decision will then be one on a question of fact depending upon the appreciation of evidence, and the Supreme Court cannot interfere with it.
(3) The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a public officer as of other persons, and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds there for. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration. - Section 164-Confession must be voluntary-Indian Evidence Act, S. 24.
Held: A confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. It is abhorrent to notions of justice and fair play, and is also dangerous, to allow a man to be convicted on the strength of a confession unless it is made voluntarily and unless he realises that anything he says may be used against him; and any atempt by a person in authority to bully a person into making a confession or any threat or coercion would at once invalidate it if the fear was still operating on his mind at the time he makes the confession if it would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. " Section 24, Indian Evidence Act. - Article 134(1), 136- Appeal on facts.
See under "Criminal Procedure Code". Ss. 417,423 at pp. 791, 792
post. - Articles 136, 134 (I)-Appeal on facts-Appeal against acquittal-Interference by High Court-Special leave to appeal under Art. 136-Interference by Supreme Court. See under "Criminal Procedure Code" post. - Sections 367, 423-Appreciation of evidence-Evidence Act (1872), S.5.
Held: There are two important factors in every criminal trial that weigh heavily in favour of an accused person, one is that the accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the other, an off-shoot of the same principle, that when an accused person offeres a reasonable explanation of his conduct, then, even though he cannot prove his assertions, they should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that they are false. - Sections 417, 423-Appeal against acquittal-Principles for interference.
Held (per majority): It is not enough for, the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial Court was wrong1 and if the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under S. 417 Cr. P. C. is not justifiable unless there are really some strong reasons for reversing that view 2
Per Venkataramma Ayyar J.: (1) When the State appeals against an order of acquittal, it has to establish on the evidence that the accused is guilty, and to establish it, it has to satisfy the court that the judgment of the trial court is erroneous. The oft-repeated observation that on acquittal the presumption of innocence became reinforced is merely this principle stated in terms of criminal law. Likewise, the weight to be attached by an appellate court to a finding of the trial court based upon appreciation of oral evidence is the same whether it is given in a civil litigation or a criminal trial. An appeal against acquittal under section 417, Cr. P.C. stands, as regards the powers of an appellate court on the same footing as appeals against conviction.
The words "compelling reasons" in Surajpal Singh v. States are vague and indefinite to a degree; they are of undefined import, and relate to appreciation of evidence. If these words import a limitation on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under S. 417, Cr. P.C. not applicable
1. Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953) S.C.R. 411: A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 76.
2. Surajpal Singh v. State (1952) S.C.R. 193: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 52.
3. (1952) S.C.R. 193: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 52.
to a court hearing appeals against conviction then it is merely the old doctrine that appeals against acquittal are in a less favoured position, dressed in a new garb, and reasons for rejecting it as unsound are as powerful as those which found favour with the Privy Council in Sheo Sarup v. Emperor1 and Nur Muhammad v. Emperor.2 But it is probable that these words were intended to express as were the similar words of Lord Russel in Sheo Sarup v. Emperor, that the court hearing an appeal under S. 417 Cr. P.O. should observe the rules which all appellate courts should, before coming to a conclusion different from that of the trial court. If so under-stood, the expression" compelling reasons" would be open to no comment.
If the expression" compelling reasons" does not impose a restriction on the powers of a court hearing an appeal under S. 417, and if its true scope is to guide it in arriving at a decision, the question whether the Supreme Court can interfere with that decision presents no difficulty. The decision will then be one on a question of fact depending upon the appreciation of evidence, and the Supreme Court cannot interfere with it.
(3) The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons, and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefore Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration. - Section 24-Confession must be voluntary. - Section 27-InCormatlon and discovery of articles.
Held: Discovery of incriminating articles alleged to have been recovered by the accused is inadmissible in evidence if the police already knew where they were hidden.
Judgement
BOSE, J. : (With him, Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.) The only question in this appeal is whether the High Court had in mind the principles we have enunciated about interference under S. 417, Criminal P. C. when it allowed the appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of the appellant.
It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial Court was wrong. Almer Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 76 at pp. 77-78 (A): & if the trial Court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference under S. 417 is not justifiable unless there are really, strong reasons for reversing that view, Surajpal Singh v. State , AIR 1952 SC 52 at p. 54 (B).
2. The appellant was prosecuted under Ss. 302 and 447, I. P. C. for the murder of Aher Jetha Sida. It is not necessary at the moment to set out the facts. It is enough to say that the High Court based its conviction on a retracted confession plus certain circumstances which the learned Judges regarded as corroborative.
3. The learned Sessions Judge excluded the confession on the ground that it was neither voluntary nor true. The learned Judge s reasoning about its falsity is weak. We do not think there is material on which a positive finding about its falsity can be reached but when he says that he is not satisfied that it was made voluntarily we find it impossible to hold that that is a view which a judicial mind acting fairly could not reasonably reach.
4. The facts about that are as follows. The offence was committed during the night of the 18th/19th May 1952. The police were informed on the 19th morning at 9.30. The police station was only 4 miles distant and they started investigation immediately. The appellant was arrested on the 20th.. He says in his examination under S. 342, Criminal P. C., that three other persons were also arrested but later released. They are Bhura, Dewayat and Kana.
The investigating officer was not examined, so he could not be asked about this and the point could not be developed further. But the appellant did cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses, about this and elicited contradictory replies. Kana, P. W. 4, said :
"I was not arrested. Dewayat, Barat Lakhmansingh was arrested first ...... All the three of us were released the same evening. We were not put under arrest at all".
5. Dewayat P. W. 5, denied that either he or any of the others were arrested and Maya, P. W. 15, said the same thing but Meraman P. W. 11, insisted that Dewayat was arrested. In the absence of the Sub-Inspector it is difficult to say definitely that the appellant is wrong.
It is evident that the others were at least suspected, especially as one of the points made against the appellant is that he was seen sharpening an axe on the evening of the murder and Meraman, P. W. 11, says that not only was the appellant sharpening an axe but so was Dewayat.
If this was a matter of suspicion against the appellant, it must equally have been so against Dewayat and accordingly there is nothing improbable in the appellant s statement about these other arrests; and as the Sub-Inspector was not there to clear up the matter it is only fair to accept what the appellant says.
6. The appellant was sent to a Magistrate at 8 p. m. on the 21st for the recording of a confession but the Magistrate did not record it till the 3rd June. He was examined as P. W. 21 and explained that he gave the appellant ten days for reflection.
The length of time is unusual but no objection about its fairness to the accused could reasonably have been raised had it not been for the fact that the judicial lock-up is in charge of a police guard which is under the direct control , orders and supervision of the very Sub-Inspector who had conducted the investigation and had earlier suspected and according to the accused, actually arrested three other persons; and two of them
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
