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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
19th February 1957
BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA DAS, IMAM GOVINDA MENON, AND KAPUR, JJ.
Asgarali Nasarali Singaporewalla, Appellant
Versus
State of Bombay, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 149 of 1954.
Advocates appeared
Messrs. S.A. Desai and I. N. Shroff, Advocates, for Appellant; Messrs Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, Advocates, for Respondent.
Sections 10, 7 of the Act-Meaning of "pending" -Effect on pending cases covered by Section 6 (1).
The appellant and Some other accused were all charged with offences under S. 161 read with S. ll6 and further read either with S. 109 or S. 114 of the Indian Penal Code, and tried by the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay. During the course of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 was enacted by Parliament on 28th July 1952, being an Act further to amend the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and to provide for a more speedy trial of certain offence, viz, offences punishable under Ss. 161, 165 or S. 165 A of the Indian Penal Code or sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified above. On 23rd September 1952 the Government of Bombay by a notification appointed a Special Judge to try offences specified above and this appointment was notified in Official Gazette on 26th September 1952. The defence concluded its address on 26th September 1952 and the learned presidency Magistrate delivered his judgment on 29th September 1952 whereby he acquitted the appellant and two other accused and convicted the remaining two accused.
In appeals before the High Court both by one of the accused convicted and the State of Bombay against acquittal, it was contended on behalf of Government that since the date the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, came into force the Special Judge alone had jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence under S. 161 read with S. 116B of the Indian Penal Code, that the duty of learned Presidency Magistrate was to transfer this case to the court of the Special Judge for Greater Bombay, specially appointed to try such offences by the impugned Act and that the order of acquittal of the appellant and the other two accused was therefore erroneous in law being without jurisdiction. On behalf of the accused it was contended that the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, were vocative of the principle of equal protection of law contained in Art. 14 of the Constitution and therefore the impugned Act was ultra vires of the Constitution. If that was so, it was contended, the learned Presidency Magistrate had jurisdiction to continue the trial inspite of the commencement of the impugned Act and the order of acquittal of the appellant and accused 4 and 5 recorded by him was correct.
The High Court held that the impugned Act was ultra 1iires and that the learned Presidency Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case after the commencement of the impugned Act. The learned magistrates order convicting the accused 2 and acquitting the appellant and the accused 4 and 5 was accordingly set aside, and trial of the appellant and the other accused by the court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay, ordered .. There was further appeal to the Supreme Court by the appellant.
Held: (1) The Act did not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The provisions of the impugned Act in substance amended the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, pro tanto making the specified offences triable by Special Judges and all persons who committed these offences became punishable by higher sentences and were subjected to procedure for trial of warrant-cases, the Courts of the Special Judges being deemed to be Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury or without the -aid pf assessors. It can therefore be legitimately urged that there was no classification at an, the provisions thus enacted being equally applicable to all citizens alike without any discrimination whatsoever.
The classification was founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguished the offenders thus grouped together from those left out of group. The persons who committed these offences of bribery or corruption would form a class by themselves quite distinct from those offenders who could be dealt with by the normal provisions contained in the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and if the offenders falling within this group of category were thus singled out for special treatment, there would be no question of any discriminatory treatment being meted out to them as compared with other offenders who did not fall within the same group or category and who continued to be treated under the normal procedure.
Bribery and corruption having been rampant and the need for weeding them out having been urgently felt it was necessary to enact measures for the purpose of eliminating all possible delay in bringing the offenders to book. It was with that end in view that provisions were enacted in the impugned Act for speedier trial of the said offences by the appointment of Special Judges who were invested with exclusive jurisdiction to try the same and were also empowered to take cognizance thereof without the accused being committed to them for trial and follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates. All these provisions had the necessary effect of bringing about a speedier trial of these offences and it cannot be denied that this intelligible differentia had rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act.
"It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two condition must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well-established that Art. 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.
Both the above conditions were fulfilled by the impugned Act and it could not be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act were in any manner violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
(2) A legal proceeding is "pending" as soon as commenced and until it is concluded i.e. so long as the court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue, or to be dealt with therein. There is no doubt that the case of the appellant was not concluded and was perusing before the learned Presidency Magistrate at the date of the commencement of the impugned Act.
The trial of the accused could not be said to have been concluded on 28-7-1952 and even on 26-9-1952 assuming for the sake of argument that the effective commencement of the Act could not be said to have come about until the Special Judge was appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.
The words of S. 10 are very clear and categorical and are not capable of being construed in any other manner except that all cases triable by the Special Judges which were pending immediately before any magistrate must be forwarded for trial to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases, the magistrate having cognizance of the same and trying them being divested of jurisdiction to proceed further with trial thereof immediately after the commencement of the Act. The only persons who were invested with jurisdiction to try these cases after the commencement of the impugned Act were the Special Judges having jurisdiction over the same and whatever was done by the magistrates thereafter was without jurisdiction and void.
Judgement
BHAGWATI J. - This appeal with special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution is direct against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay setting aside the acquittal of the appellant by the, Court of the Presidency Magistrate. 19th Court, Bombay and ordering his retrial by the Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay in accordance with the Provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Act XLVI of 1952).
2. The appellant was accused 3 in the Court of the learned Presidency Magistrate. Accused 1 was the Mehta in the employ of a firm called Messrs M.M. Baxabhoy & Co., accused 2 was the manager of the said firm. The appellant and accused 4 and 5 were Receivers of the firm, in litigation in regard to it. They were all charged with offences under S. 161 read with S.116 and further read either with S.109 or S.114 of the Indian Penal Code for offering to one Jibhai Chhotalal Barot, a sub-inspector of police attached to the Anti-Corruption Branch of the C.I.D. the sum of Rs. 1,25,000 as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for his showing favour to the accused and to the firm Messrs M. M. Baxabhoy & Co. in the exercise of his official functions. The offence was alleged to have been committed on 28th July 1950 and the accused were charge-sheeted on 16th June 1951; the trial commenced on 14th July 1951, and charges were framed on 27th September 1951. 40 witnesses were examined and 226 documents were exhibited in the course of the trial, and the prosecution closed its case on 25th July 1952.
3. During the course of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Act XLVI of 1952) hereinafter called the impugned Act was enacted by Parliament on 28th July 1952, being an Act further to amend the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and to provide for a more speedy trial of certain offences, viz., offences punishable under S.161, S.165 or S. 165A of the Indian Penal Code or sub-s.(2)of S.5, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947(Act II of 1947) and any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified above. The learned Presidency Magistrate proceeded with the trial and after the examination of the appellant under S.342 of the Criminal P.C., the appellant filed his written statement on 14th August 1952. The addresses commenced thereafter. The prosecution commenced its address on 26th August 1952 ending it on 5th September 1952. The defence thereafter addressed the learned Magistrate. In the meantime on 23rd September 1952 the Government of Bombay by a notification appointed a Special Judge to try offences specified above and this appointment was notified in the Official Gazette on 26th September 1952. The defence concluded its address on 26th September 1952 and the learned Presidency Magistrate delivered his judgment on 29th September 1952 wherebythe convicted the accused 1 and 2 of the offences with which they were charged and sentenced them each to nine months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 in default 6 months rigorous imprisonment. He however aquitted the appellant and the accused 4 and 5 of these offences.
4. The accused 2 carried an appeal before the High Court of Bombay being criminal Appeal No. 1304 of 1952. The State of Bombay also thereupon filed an appeal against the acquittal of the appellant and the accused 4 and 5 being criminal Appeal No. 349 of 1953. In the memorandum of appeal in criminal Appeal No. 349 of 1953 a point was taken that the learned Presidency Magistrate had no jurisdiction to continue the trial and acquit the appellant and accused 4 and 5 as the same was ousted by the impugned Act. It was contended that since the date the said Act came into force the Special Judge alone had jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence under S.161 read with S.116 of the Indian Penal Code, that the duty of the learned Presidency Magistrate was to transfer this case to the Court
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